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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This project arose out of my involvement with the Religion and Genetics study 
group at Vanderbilt University.  Led by Professors Larry Churchill and Ellen Wright 
Clayton and sponsored by Vanderbilt’s former Center for the Study of Religion and 
Culture, the study group consisted of ethicists, attorneys, physicians, genetic counselors, 
nurses, scholars of religion, and graduate students (including myself).  Very broadly, our 
interests were in the manifold ways that genetic knowledge shaped our understandings of 
health and disease, healing and enhancement, human nature, and human relationships.  
These fundamental issues have deeply religious dimensions to them.  Further, the 
language used to discuss genetics is often imbued with religious meaning.  In the opening 
chapter of this dissertation, I provide examples of individuals, including scientists, 
proclaiming DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) to be the “secret of life” and the “language of 
God.”  To a significant degree, religious perspectives and genetic knowledge 
simultaneously shape one another.  The symbols associated with genetics in popular 
discourses are frequently saturated with religious meaning.  At the same time, increased 
genetic knowledge and newfound genetics-based technologies bring many of those 
fundamental religious issues to the forefront of debates about how genetics shapes human 
self-understanding. 
 In early 2007, the Religion and Genetics study group conducted a series of 13 
focus groups with members of the caring professions—physicians, nurses, genetic 
counselors, chaplains, and Christian ministers.  Nine of the focus groups consisted of 
medical professionals (physicians, nurses, genetic counselors) and four involved hospital 
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chaplains and Christian ministers.  We were interested in their experiences dealing with 
genetics-related issues in the course of their work and asked them to reflect on their 
experiences and to recall any especially memorable instances.  I observed three of these 
focus groups and assisted with data analysis based on the transcripts from each focus 
group.  In my work with the study group, I was intrigued by the ways in which 
participants, particularly the ministers, spoke about matters of responsibility in relation to 
genetics-based technologies.  The ways in which they framed their moral experiences 
were also noteworthy. 
 I noticed that some of these individuals spoke about their moral distress and the 
distress of their congregants in the language of identity-conferring commitments, self-
understanding, and integrity.  Their challenges were not framed as matters of decision-
making but as challenges related to living a life of integrity in light of difficult, often 
tragic, circumstances.  Many times, there were no difficult decisions to make and yet 
their moral distress remained.  References to responsibility often followed this trajectory, 
going well beyond the language of free, responsible choice.  These individuals spoke of 
responsibilities that arose by virtue of the particular identity-conferring commitments that 
they held as fundamental to their self-understanding rather than out of any specific choice 
that they had made. 
 
Thesis and Significance of Project 
 Turning to literature in religion, philosophy, and bioethics, I discovered that this 
way of thinking about responsibility is grossly underappreciated in academic scholarship.  
In particular, bioethics, as an emerging field of study, lacks a sufficiently robust 
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theoretical account of responsibility.  Much of analysis of responsibility in these fields 
presupposes decision-making contexts and voluntaristic accounts of moral agency.  It 
also fails to attend to the unique contours of the contextualized moral experiences of 
individuals.  As a result, responsibility is construed primarily as a matter of making free, 
autonomous, voluntary decisions.  In this dissertation, I argue that a voluntaristic and 
intentional account of responsibility must be supplemented by a vision of responsibility 
that acknowledges the ways in which an agent’s roles and status may give rise to specific 
responsibilities in the context of the clinic—responsibilities that the agent does not 
intentionally and autonomously choose, but responsibilities for which the agent will 
nonetheless be held accountable.   
This project contributes to bioethics scholarship on responsibility by developing a 
robust theoretical account of that concept that is attentive to the ways in which people 
involved with genetics-related issues frame their moral distress.  To do so, I draw heavily 
on scholars of religion and philosophy, namely Judith Butler, John Silber, and William 
Schweiker.  Specifically, I contend that this supplemental account of responsibility must 
emphasize two salient features that are often ignored in discussions of responsibility: 1) 
Responsibility entails the acceptance of obligations borne from one’s status, regardless of 
one’s acceptance of the status itself—whether one is a medical professional, a potential 
carrier of a genetic anomaly, a parent, or a member of a religious community; and 2) 
While responsibility promotes the movement toward greater integrity in one’s life, that 
movement paradoxically involves recognizing and incorporating uncertainty and loss of 
control into that life.  This paradox is especially evident in light of biotechnologies like 
PGD and predictive genetic testing, which purportedly provide a person with greater 
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control and certainty about the biological conditions of her life or the future life of her 
offspring, though they often highlight the ways in which agents lack certainty and self-
control. 
On a more practical level, in its turn to scholars of religion, philosophy, and 
rhetoric, the theoretical arm of this project provides a foundation for responding to the 
challenges posed to clinicians, counselors, patients, and families in the context of the 
clinic.  It demonstrates the fruitfulness that attitudes of humility and openness to unique 
modes of being in the world have for considering what responsibility demands in a given 
set of circumstances.  Along these lines, this project also highlights ways in which 
uncertainty inevitably rears its head in the clinic, even when dealing with genetic 
technologies that offer a person the ability to supposedly “take charge” of her health.  
Such boasts, I suggest, are profoundly misguided due to the type of information that 
genetic testing provides as well as the significant degree of uncertainty and 
unknowability that rests at the very heart of human existence.  Finally, with its emphasis 
on the giftedness of human being, this project affirms the notion that humans are not fully 
self-creating masters of our own fate.  In this way, it opens up deeply religious questions 
for individuals in the clinic as well as for scholars of bioethics. 
 
Outline of the Project 
 Chapter one, “The Promises and Challenges of the New Genetics,” presents an 
overview of dominant themes in the public perception of genetics following the 
completion of the Human Genome Project.  Specifically, I examine themes of novelty, 
genetic exceptionalism, and genetic determinism.  I argue that while genetic technologies 
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provide us, in some instances, with novel ways to express human power and agency, 
much of the talk about the novelty of genetics is medicine is overstated.  I also assert that 
statements about the exceptional nature of genetic information and the determinative 
nature of a person’s genes are likewise overstated.  This misunderstanding gives the 
impression that technologies like predictive genetic testing and PGD offer us certainty 
and control than they actually provide.  I also clarify basic concepts of health, disease, 
and genetic to demonstrate how those concepts are more dynamic that we typically 
believe.  Finally, I provide an overview of what predictive genetic testing and PGD entail 
as well as the ethical challenges that these technologies create for clinicians, patients, and 
family members. 
 In chapter two, I turn to the transcripts of the focus groups described above and 
highlight the ways in which individuals in the caring professions speak about 
responsibility in light of genetics-related issues.  This chapter also provides evidence that 
responsibility is a critical moral concept for how people and institutions think about 
ethical challenges related to genetics.  I then examine the codes of ethics of the American 
Medical Association, the American Nurses Association, and the National Society of 
Genetic Counselors to demonstrate how those institutions draw on the language of 
responsibility to describe the appropriate work of members of those professions.  
Similarly, I examine survey responses and doctrinal statements from Jewish and Christian 
denominations, highlighting the interesting ways that they speak of responsibility in 
relation to genetics-based issues.  Key questions for this chapter include: How do people 
speak of responsibility? With what concepts or values is that term associated? Are there 
common features among the various articulations of responsibility? Where are the key 
 xv 
differences? How are these differences relevant for how one understands oneself in 
relation to genetic biotechnologies? 
 In chapter three I contextualize the themes that emerge from those focus group 
transcripts and institutional statements.  I turn to scholarship on responsibility in both 
philosophy and religious studies, relying heavily on the typologies of Albert Jonsen and 
William Schweiker to organize that scholarship.  Specifically, I discuss Albert Jonsen’s 
patterns of attributions and appropriation of responsibility.  I then turn to the work of 
theological ethicist William Schweiker, who has also developed a typology for theories 
of responsibility, classifying those theories as agential, social, or dialogical.  I appeal to 
representative examples of each type of theory: Immanuel Kant (agential), Stanley 
Hauerwas (social), and H. Richard Niebuhr (dialogical).  In doing so, I have selected the 
quintessential modern philosopher (Kant), someone who eschews any attempt to render 
“the Christian story” into the supposedly universal language of modernity (Hauerwas), 
and someone who described his work as an example of “Christian moral philosophy” 
(Niebuhr).  I conclude by turning to ways in which responsibility has been cursorily 
examined in bioethics.  In providing these overviews, I demonstrate how most of that 
scholarship on responsibility construes responsibility as a matter of autonomy, 
presupposing a voluntaristic account of moral agency and a context of decision-making. 
 Chapter four initiates the constructive turn in this project.  Here, I develop the 
robust account of responsibility described above, paying special attention to the 
importance of integrity and status for what responsibility entails.  I also briefly return to 
the focus group transcripts in order to show how many of the moral agents who deal with 
issues related to genetics actually see their work as a matter of integrity rather than 
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appropriate decision-making.  To make this constructive move, I turn to the works of 
Judith Butler, John Silber, and the constructive work of William Schweiker.  I explore 
Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself to render problematic the very notion of an 
“autonomous self” who is in control of her own life and can take full responsibility for 
herself.  I also highlight the ways in which Butler argues that we are nonetheless called to 
responsibility—to give an account of ourselves—even though a full account is always 
beyond our grasp.  I articulate John Silber’s notion of “status responsibility” and show 
how it is beneficial for thinking about one’s moral responsibility in relation to her genetic 
constitution. As it will be demonstrated in chapter three, most theories of responsibility 
hold that control or authority is a crucial component to assigning or accepting 
responsibility. That is, a person can only be responsible for actions, events, or entities he 
or she can control. Silber calls such assumptions into question and offers a way in which 
an agent can think of responsibility for those things to which she is related but over which 
she has no authority or control.  Finally, I turn to William Schweiker’s account of 
responsibility as a matter of integrity.  For Schweiker, responsibility promotes an agent’s 
movement toward greater integrity and self-understanding.  Even though I contend full 
self-understanding is never achievable, I construe the moral life as a constant quest for 
greater self-understanding and integrity. 
 Finally, chapter five returns to the earlier discussions of the challenges posed by 
predictive genetic testing and PGD.  I examine those challenges in light of the vision of 
responsibility I advocate in chapter four.  I demonstrate how this underappreciated way of 
thinking about responsibility clarifies some of the ethical challenges that arise from these 
technologies and their increasing presence in the clinic.  I show how the source of moral 
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distress is not necessarily uncertainty about what choices a person should make—for 
some the choice is all too clear—but rather in understanding oneself and being able to 
give an account of the responsibilities that an agent does not choose but for which she 
will still be held responsible.  I also examine how technologies like predictive genetic 
testing and PGD actually reinforce my assertions about the ever-presence of uncertainty 
and the limits of self-knowledge.  Those limits, I maintain, are oftentimes sources of 
moral distress for those agents who come face-to-face with uncertainty in the context of 
the clinic. 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW GENETICS 
 
 In both public discourse and within medical contexts, genetics is frequently 
approached with a deep sense of awe, if not outright reverence.  At the popular level, we 
find mention of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) as being “the secret of life” or “the 
language of God.”1  Advances in this field have spurred a renewed interest in those 
questions that we hold to be fundamental, personal, and deeply religious—questions of 
human nature and personal identity:  What does it mean to be a human being?  What does 
it mean to be me?  How did I become the person that I am today?  In what aspects of my 
life do I have control?  In what ways am I at the whim of chance?  Genetics also follows 
in a tradition of sciences that are used to explain human traits and behaviors.  We hear of 
certain aspects of life being “in our genes” and thus outside the domain of our design or 
control.  We also hear promises of new biotechnologies that will allow us to gain greater 
                                                
1 See Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief 
(New York: Free Press, 2006); James D. Watson and Andrew Berry, DNA: The Secret of 
Life, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). Interestingly, both Watson and Collins 
are research scientists who have played crucial roles in the development of the field of 
genetics.  Watson, of course, is famous for discovering DNA’s helical structure in 1953, 
along with the help of Francis Crick, Rosalind Franklin, and several others.  Francis 
Collins was the original director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, the 
group that originally led the charge to complete the Human Genome Project in the 1990s.  
As I argue later in this chapter, such language of genetic exceptionalism is not consistent 
with what scientific research has revealed about the function of DNA and its role in 
producing the traits that comprise a human being.  To have influential scientists like 
Watson and Collins drawing on such language, however, only serves to further entrench 
many of the misguided popular notions surrounding DNA. 
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access to those previously uncontrollable aspects of our lives, exercising profound levels 
of choice and control over the genetic constitution of our offspring.  In this way, genetics 
also raises serious questions about the nature of responsibility. 
 Concerns about the ethical implications of genetics and genetic biotechnologies 
have persisted in scholarly circles for over forty years, though these concerns are now 
finding a home within public discourse.  This movement into public consciousness was 
driven largely by the development of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in October 
1990.  At that time, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) joined forces to create an initiative designed to sequence the 
three billion nucleotide base pairs and to identify the 20,000-25,000 genes that comprise 
the entire sequence of human DNA.2  The Project brought together hundreds of scientists 
from across the country, and one of the HGP’s goals was to make its findings readily 
accessible to other researchers for further work.  Recognizing the potential for the HGP 
to create controversy, the DOE and NIH also earmarked 3-5% of their annual HGP 
budget to analyzing the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) raised by the Project and 
the technologies it could spawn.3  While the HGP was initially a government-sponsored 
initiative, private research firms (such as Craig Venter’s Celera Genomics) quickly joined 
in the efforts.  The combination of scientific curiosity and a healthy competition among 
                                                
2 United States Department of Energy Office of Science,  "About the Human Genome 
Project." <http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml> 
(accessed April 8 2009). 
 
3 United States Department of Energy Office of Science,  "Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Issues—Genome Research."  
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/elsi.shtml> (accessed June 
24 2009). 
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researchers led to the completion of the HGP in late 2003, roughly two years ahead of 
schedule.  Perhaps the greatest catalyst for the HGP and its rapid completion was its 
incredible translational potential, that is, the potential for HGP discoveries to move from 
the scientist’s bench to the patient’s bedside in the form of new medical technologies. 
 Though the “new genetics” long carried promises of personalized medicine, 
pharmacogenomics, and a battery of echnologies designed to contribute to medical care, 
the fervor surrounding those promises reached a fever pitch as the HGP came to fruition.  
In popular media, we hear of a “genetic revolution” in medicine, with visions of genetic 
interventions for nearly any imaginable condition.4  We hear of a future in which 
“designer children” with pre-selected traits will be increasingly common.  With these 
images becoming routine, people now often discuss genetic technologies and their 
implications popular media, public policy arenas, Sunday School classrooms, and around 
family dinner tables.  To a significant degree, those discussions are warranted.  Genetic 
biotechnologies are becoming common components of “Western” medical care, 
particularly in prenatal and neonatal medicine.  The proliferation of these technologies 
indicates that medical practitioners (with some exception) find them to be beneficial and 
that the ethical issues they raise are acceptable challenges for medical care.  Thus, it 
seems that some of those fundamental questions—Can we do this?  Should we do this?—
have already been answered affirmatively.  As a result, questions about the ethical import 
of genetics in medicine have now shifted to an examination of how genetic information 
and technology can be utilized in medical contexts.  Here again we are confronted with 
                                                
4 For example, see Gina Kolata’s "A Revolution at 50; Genetic Revolution: How Much, 
How Fast?"  New York Times, February 25, 2003, Science section. 
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questions of responsibility: How can we responsibly use genetic information in medical 
care?  What does it mean for a responsible person to have access to these newfound 
attempts at greater control?  What are the responsibilities of care providers?  Of patients?  
To whom are those responsibilities owed? 
 This dissertation is an analysis of responsibility in light of two specific 
technologies that have arisen as our understanding of genetics has increased: predictive 
genetic testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  This chapter describes 
these two technologies and details the intellectual context within which they have 
developed.  In doing so, I illustrate how this larger intellectual framework places great 
emphasis on the “gene” as a concept for understanding human health, behavior, and 
disease.  I also note the ethical challenges that these technologies pose to individuals 
involved in their use.  My concern with the popular understandings of genetics and 
genetic technologies is due to the significant gap in understanding between scientists and 
the lay public.  Though the human genome consists of thousands of genes and billions of 
nucleotides, it is a microscopic, sub-cellular phenomenon.  Typically, those who are 
qualified to wear the priestly vestments—the white lab coats of physicians and 
scientists—have a much more nuanced understanding of what genetics actually entails.  
The transition from technical, scientific idiom to language that the layperson can 
understand is fraught with potential misunderstanding.  Attempts to “translate” the work 
of the physician or scientist are bound to result in “mistranslation” as the process of 
simplification inevitably leaves out crucial details while drawing on imagery (DNA as a 
“code” or “book,” for example) whose own limits are rarely acknowledged.  Popularized 
understandings of genetics, though often riddled with inaccuracies, are nonetheless 
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powerful forces that shape the tenor of current debates on the place of genetics in the 
medical clinic.  To ignore the power of those views would be to neglect one of the 
sources of many of the perceived ethical challenges that genetic biotechnologies pose to 
physicians, counselors, patients, and other care providers. 
This “popular” understanding of genetics that I describe is grounded in three 
distinct but related concepts: novelty, exceptionalism, and determinism.  In the following 
sections, I describe some of the ways in which these concepts fuel public perceptions of 
genetics.  I also illustrate ways in which those three concepts fall well short of accurately 
portraying the history and science of genetics and genetic technologies.  In doing so, I 
endorse accounts of genetics and genetic information that are less sensationalized and 
truer to scientific data.  Such accounts would not only be more factually accurate but 
would also promote a more robust response to the ethical challenges that genetics and 
genetic technologies like predictive testing and PGD pose to patients and care providers 
alike. 
 
Contextualizing Genetics and Genetic Medicine 
 
Novelty 
 If we relied on their portrayal in popular media (magazines, film, television), we 
might believe that genetics and genetic biotechnologies are new phenomena.  We would 
see frequent references to the “new genetics” or a “genetic revolution.”  Recall, for 
example, the cover of the January, 17, 1994 Time magazine that depicts a man with 
outstretched arms, adorned with DNA’s double-helix and the caption “Genetics: The 
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future is now.”5  The 1997 science-fiction film GATTACA (a reference to DNA’s 
nucleotide base pairs) portrays a not-too-distant future in which upper and upper-middle 
class families use technologies akin to PGD to select the “best” possible traits for their 
offspring.  If we relied on this imagery for our primary understanding of genetics, we 
would have to believe that we are in uncharted territory, laden with previously unknown 
challenges and possibilities for our futures.  In other words, we would think that genetics 
and genetic technologies were novel components of both medicine and our self-
understanding. 
 Of course, the history of genetics and the concept of a “gene” extend well beyond 
the work of the HGP, even long before the 1953 discovery of DNA’s helical structure.  
What scientists now describe as “a specific sequence of nucleotides in DNA or RNA… 
usually on a chromosome and that is the functional unit of inheritance controlling the 
transmission and expression of one or more traits by specifying the structure of a 
particular polypeptide” has also become the site at which the theories of Darwinian 
evolution and Mendelian inheritance have merged.6  Thus, the “gene” has become the 
biochemical unit for explaining the mechanisms by which traits are passed from 
generation to generation and for describing how various species are related to each other.  
Even as early as 1902, scientists like Archibald Garrod were searching for such a sub-
cellular explanation for the presence of inherited traits (especially diseases or disorders).  
Around that same time, Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen was the first to coin the word 
                                                
5 Dena S. Davis, “Genetics: The future is now,” Time, January 17, 1994. 
 
6 Webster’s New World Medical Dictionary, ed. William C. Shiel, Jr. and Melissa Conrad 
Stöppler, 3rd edn.  (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing, 2008), s.v. “gene.” 
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“gene,” to describe units of Mendelian inheritance.7  As research progressed throughout 
the 20th century, we have arrived at a contemporary view of the “gene” as a mutable unit 
of inheritance that specifies the production of amino acids (the biochemical building 
blocks of proteins).8  What should be noted here, however, is that this particular 
understanding of the “gene” has been a long time coming.  Quite simply, the gene is not a 
recent discovery, contrary to how it may be portrayed in popular culture.  Rather, as the 
work of scientists like Garrod and Johannsen demonstrate, researchers have long 
suspected that something akin to the gene must exist.  That process of discovery, 
however, may be better understood as a process of gradual and incremental refinement 
rather than sudden discovery.  Thus, to portray genetics as something novel to our 
contemporary context is fundamentally misguided. 
 Further, it should be noted that genetic information has long been utilized in the 
medical context, long before any contemporary discussions of a “genetic revolution” 
arising from the work of the HGP.  For example, chorionic villus sampling (CVS)—first 
developed in 1968—is a prenatal diagnostic tool that tests for a range of genetic 
abnormalities in a fetus by examining the genetic material from chorionic villi (which is 
identical to the genetic material of the fetus).9  In the United States, newborn infants are 
                                                
7 Lenny Moss, What Genes Can't Do, Basic Bioethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003), 28 ff. 
 
8 For a brief history of the development of the gene, see the 3rd chapter of Matt Ridley’s 
Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters  (London: Fourth Estate, 1999).  
See also Evelyn Fox Keller’s The Century of the Gene (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
 
9 Jan Mohr, "Foetal Genetic Diagnosis: Development of Techniques for Early Sampling 
of Foetal Cells," Acta Pathol Microbiol Scand 73, no. 1 (1968). 
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routinely screened for phenylketonuria (PKU), a condition for which early dietary 
intervention can drastically improve one’s health outcomes.  Those tests are based on 
knowledge of human genetics.  To speak of a “genetic revolution” in medical care is 
therefore hyperbole.  What has changed most about the place of genetics in clinical 
settings is the ever-increasing degrees of specificity and multiplicity that these 
technologies now possess.  New tests are available that provide us with more information 
about our health status, our futures, and the genetic constitution of future offspring.  
While I maintain that it is beneficial to temper our discussions of genetics by resisting the 
language of novelty as much as possible, it should be noted the levels of knowledge and 
control that new genetic technologies purportedly offer is indeed at a new level.  In other 
words, genetics has been a component of medical care for quite some time.  The 
newfound levels of knowledge, control, and power that those technologies provide us, 
however, may indeed be unlike anything we have previously witnessed. 
 
Exceptionalism 
 Another theme fueling many popular understandings of genetics is often called 
genetic exceptionalism.  The language of genetic exceptionalism is at work in the earlier 
remarks about the reverential attitude that many people have toward genetics.  Within the 
framework of genetic exceptionalism, people speak about genetic material and 
information as if there is something qualitatively unique about genes that make them 
somehow special or different.10  As a result of those unique features, genetics warrants 
                                                
10 Thomas Murray first coined the phrase “genetic exceptionalism” to describe this 
perspective.  See his “Genetic Exceptionalism and ‘Future Diaries’: Is Genetic 
Information Different from Other Medical Information?” in Genetic Secrets: Protecting 
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special consideration that we rarely give to other biochemical entities, processes, and 
technologies.11  For example, consider the words of former President Bill Clinton in his 
June 26, 2000 press conference announcing the completed first draft of the HGP’s 
findings: “Today we are learning the language in which God created life. We are gaining 
ever more awe for the complexity, the beauty and the wonder of God’s most divine and 
sacred gift.”12  Former Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, Dr. 
Francis Collins, recently wrote a book (which has a strand of DNA emblazoned across its 
cover) about science and religion entitled The Language of God.13  These examples 
demonstrate ways in which genetics can be imbued with powerful symbols and 
metaphors that portray that genetics as special, worthy of reverence, and even sacred.  
Further, such reverential language is rare—if not downright foreign—when speaking 
about other bodily materials and processes.  We do not describe neuronal networks, the 
cardiovascular system, or waste removal with such sacred, special language.  In the light 
of exceptionalism, genetics becomes the fundamental explanatory model for 
understanding numerous aspects of human existence.  Picking up on the reverential 
                                                                                                                                            
Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, ed. Mark A. Rothstein (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1997). 
 
11 Ronald M. Green and A. Michael Thomas, "DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for 
Policy Analysis," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 11, no. 3 (1998). 
 
12 “June 2000 White House Event,” Office of the Press Secretary, 26 June 2000. The 
White House: Washington, D.C.  21 April 2009. <http://www.genome.gov/10001356>. 
 
13 Collins, The Language of God. 
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themes in the two examples above, Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee even assert that 
DNA has become popular Western culture’s “secular equivalent of the Christian soul.”14 
 Claims about the exceptional nature of genetic material and information do not 
rely solely on religious or theological language, although the examples indicate that such 
claims are often bolstered by such appeals.  Beyond the obvious reference to God in the 
metaphor that Clinton and Collins have drawn upon, there is a significant element of non-
religious symbolism present in the “language of God” metaphor—the very reference to 
language.  Genetic material is often portrayed through the use of textual and linguistic 
symbols; the very concept of the genetic “code” is a prime example of reliance on such 
communicative imagery.  In these references, genetic material is described as that 
component of the body that both contains (like a book) and communicates (like a 
language or code) the information necessary for our very existence as human beings.  For 
example, Audrey Chapman (among others) compares DNA to a “blueprint” with the 
“instructions” for assembling the amino acids and proteins that comprise the human 
body.15  Anders Nordgren has examined texts in behavioral genetics for their 
metaphorical content and found abundant descriptions of DNA as “programs” or “books” 
that “control” or “respond.”16  In her study rebuking such appeals to communicative 
imagery, Lily Kay argues that their influence has been all the more potent because of 
                                                
14 Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural 
Icon (New York: Freeman, 1995), 2. 
 
15 Audrey R. Chapman, Unprecedented Choices: Religious Ethics at the Frontiers of 
Genetic Science (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 4. 
 
16 Anders Nordgren, "Metaphors in Behavioral Genetics," Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 24, no. 1 (2003). 
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resonance with the religious symbol of the “book of life.”17  Within biological sciences, 
textual symbols appear to be uniquely associated with genetic material in particular, 
thereby supporting the idea that genetic material is uniquely special in a way that other 
biological materials are not. 
Following this prevalent textual understanding of the human genome, we might 
conclude that the genetic “code” has become the new “Western canon” for the late 
modern or post-modern era.  Biologist Scott Gilbert and his colleagues claim that 
“Introduction to Biology” courses have usurped the foundational status in colleges that 
previously belonged to courses on “Western Civilization.”18  Living in an era where the 
notions of a “canon” and “Western civilization” are unceasingly critiqued, enrollments in 
courses on this topic are on the decline in American university systems.  Yet, most 
students will take an introductory biology course.  Gilbert and his colleagues suggest that 
by taking over that foundational position from Western civilization classes, biology has 
now become the lens through which human culture, history, political relations, and 
behavior are explained.  When our genetic sequence becomes the primary “text” for this 
course, genetic material then comes to be understood as providing the biochemical basis 
for a wide range of human traits, including specific physical characteristics, intellectual 
capacity, behavioral tendencies, and health status. 
                                                
17 Lily E. Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life?: A History of the Genetic Code, Writing 
Science (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).  See especially chapter 7, “In 
the Beginning Was the Wor(l)d?” 
 
18 Scott F. Gilbert and the Biology and Gender Study Group, “Mainstreaming Feminist 
Critique into the Biology Curriculum,” in Doing Science + Culture, ed. R. Reid and S. 
Traweek (New York: Routledge Press, 2000), 199-220. 
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The claims of genetic exceptionalism have also made a significant impact in 
public policy arenas.  Worried about the prospect of employers and insurance companies 
using genetic information as exclusion criteria against potential employees and 
customers, former President George W. Bush signed into law H.R. 493, the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in May 2008.19  The law prohibits the use of 
information about genetic predispositions to disease as exclusionary criteria for 
employment and insurance coverage.  Supporters of GINA hope that this protection will 
ease people’s fears about potential genetic discrimination, allowing people to feel more 
comfortable with pursuing genetic tests as part of their healthcare plans and leaving open 
the possibility of personalized genetic medicine.  The very existence of GINA (which had 
been debated in Congress for over a decade) indicates the perception of policymakers that 
genetic information requires unique legislative protections above and beyond measures 
that are already in place for a person’s medical record (like the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Privacy Law, HIPAA). 
From a public policy perspective, legislation like GINA might be necessary if the 
claim of genetic exceptionalism is true, that is, if there are indeed good reasons for 
treating genetic information as qualitatively different from other types of information.  
Legal and bioethics scholar Mark Rothstein has identified seven arguments that 
advocates of genetics-specific laws provide in support of such legislation (in other words, 
seven reasons why genetic material and information warrants special protection): 
 “(1) Genetic information has implications not only for the individual but 
also for family members; (2) genetic information may have implications 
                                                
19 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Public Law 110-233, 110th 
Congress, 2nd session, 21 May 2008. 
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for reproduction and characteristics of future generations; (3) genetic 
information may be predictive; (4) genetic information often carries 
stigma, and the misuse of genetic information has led to eugenics, racism, 
and genocide; (5) genetic information is regarded as unique by the public; 
(6) there are other ‘special’ categories of medical information for which 
separate protections have been adopted, including HIV/AIDS and mental 
illness; and (7) the political reality is that there is greater support for 
genetic nondiscrimination than for more general and sweeping laws.”20 
 
Ultimately Rothstein finds each of these arguments to be unpersuasive.  He notes that the 
supposedly unique characteristics described in 1-3 are not unique to genetic information 
but could be equally applied to socioeconomic factors and family history.  The issue of 
stigma, he argues, does not indicate anything unique about genetic information and could 
best be addressed through public education on the genetic science and medicine, not 
through legislation.  The idea that because people hold genetics to be unique it should 
therefore receive unique treatment is a self-fulfilling prophecy, while the analogy in 6 
does not hold because unlike information about one’s HIV/AIDS status, genetic 
information cannot be easily isolated in a patient’s medical record.  As for the political 
impetus for supporting genetics-specific laws, Rothstein argues that general 
discrimination laws would diminish the stigma attached to genetic information whereas 
laws like GINA may actually perpetuate such stigmatization and empty claims of genetic 
exceptionalism. 
 Another motivating force underlying the support of genetics-specific legislation is 
the idea that because genetic information is unique to individuals and can therefore be 
used for identification purposes, its privacy must be protected  (even within the already-
                                                
20 Mark A. Rothstein, "Genetic Exceptionalism & Legislative Pragmatism," Hastings 
Center Report 35, no. 4 (2005), 27-33; quote on 30.  See also Rothstein’s “Policy 
Recommendations” in Genetics and Life Insurance: Medical Underwriting and Social 
Policy, ed. Mark A. Rothstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
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private medical record).  James Evans and Wylie Burke readily note, however, nearly 
everything in a person’s medical record is “identifying” to a significant degree.21  They 
also note that “genetic risk” for a particular disease is rarely different from other forms of 
risk (family history, socioeconomic status, diet, lifestyle, etc.).  Why then do the calls for 
genetics-specific protection remain?  Evans and Burke suggest that legislation informed 
by genetic exceptionalism persists for two significant reasons: “genetics is at the heart of 
our most profound relationships” and the “cultural belief that genetics largely determines 
who we are (despite many observations to the contrary).”22  That is, people tend to view 
genetics as constitutive of who we are as human beings, both as relational creatures (I 
have these parents rather than those parents, these siblings rather than those siblings, etc.) 
and as specific individuals with unique physical and character traits.  Here, Evans and 
Burke suggest that views of genetic exceptionalism are bolstered by a perspective known 
as genetic determinism.  It is thus necessary to examine what that idea entails. 
 
Determinism 
Broadly speaking, genetic determinism is the notion that a person’s genetic 
constitution is determinative of his or her physical, mental, and even psychological 
constitution.  In the supposed struggle between “nature” and “nurture,” a person’s given 
genetic “nature” rules the day.  We hear the language of genetic determinism in remarks 
about a person’s appearance, talents, or traits being “in his/her genes.”  When physicians 
and laypeople alike refer to “the gene” for a specific disease, deterministic thinking is 
                                                
21 James P. Evans and Wyle Burke, "Genetic Exceptionalism. Too Much of a Good 
Thing?," Genet Med 10, no. 7 (2008), 500-501. 
 
22 Ibid., 501. 
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again at work.  Although deterministic thinking is not unique to considerations of 
genetics, it has become the focal point for such perspectives in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries.  Where brain size was once considered to be “the” reason that men were 
(supposedly) more intelligent than women and Caucasians were (supposedly) more 
intelligent than Africans, today those sexist and racist claims are often made with 
reference to apparent differences “in the genes” of these different groups.23  Recall the 
controversy that arose in late 2005 when then-President of Harvard University, Lawrence 
Summers, suggested that research in behavioral genetics may hold the key to explaining 
why women are underrepresented in the fields of mathematics and the sciences.  Such 
deterministic thinking often provides people with a perceived genetic basis for one’s fate 
and future possibilities—potentially limiting those possibilities altogether. 
Messages of genetic determinism permeate popular discourse on genetics in 
American culture.  For instance, consider the research that was sensationalized as a 
search for a “gay gene.”  In July 1993, USA Today published an article with the headline 
“Is there a Gay Gene? Key evidence: More maternal kin are gay.”24  Soon after, other 
popular news magazines followed suit.25  These articles drew upon research published in 
the journal Science that indicated that a portion of the X chromosome in males (the sex 
                                                
23 For numerous examples of genetics used to justify racist and sexist claims, see Nelkin 
and Lindee, The DNA Mystique, ch. 6, pp. 102-126.  See also Diane B. Paul’s Controlling 
Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995). 
 
24 Kim Painter, “Is There a Gay Gene? Key evidence: More maternal kin are gay,” USA 
Today, 16 July 1993, Sec. A1. 
 
25 For example, see Sharon Begley’s article “Does DNA Make Some Men Gay?” in 
Newsweek, Vol. 26 Issue 4 (26 July 1993), 59 and Anastasia Toufexis’ “New Evidence of 
a ‘Gay Gene,’” Time, Vol. 146 Issue 20 (13 November 1995), 95. The latter article cites 
1995 research in Nature Genetics that seems to confirm the 1993 Science article. 
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chromosome inherited from one’s mother), when it contained specific markers, may 
influence a man’s sexual orientation.  The Science article noted with “a statistical 
confidence level of more than 99 percent that at least one subtype of male sexual 
orientation is genetically influenced.”26  The key word in this phrase is influenced.  
Previous studies had shown that sexual orientation is not genetically determined, as there 
are numerous cases of identical twins who share identical genetic sequences and yet have 
different sexual orientations.  Nonetheless, this study sponsored by the National Cancer 
Institute demonstrated that for some men—usually those men who had homosexual 
uncles and cousins in their mother’s family—statistics indicate that there is a genetic 
predisposition toward likewise identifying themselves as homosexual men. 
Why then did such popular news articles consistently refer to the “gay gene?” 
Media initially presented this research with an air of determinism, although in carefully 
reading these articles (as well as the scientific research on which they are based), it 
becomes apparent that it would be inaccurate to speak of a genetically-determined 
homosexuality.  Instead, we find that “more likely, inheritance and experience together 
shape sexual orientation.”27  Dean Hamer, principal investigator on these studies, 
explicitly notes, “’from twin studies, we already know that half or more of the variability 
in sexual orientation is not inherited.  Our studies try to pinpoint the genetic factors, not 
to negate the psychosocial factors.’”28  Nonetheless, by connecting homosexual 
                                                
26 Dean Hamer, et al, “A Linkage between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and 
Male Sexual Orientation,” Science, Vol. 261, No. 5119 (16 July 1993), pp. 321-327.  
Sexual orientation in this study was measured according to the Kinsey scale system. 
 
27 Begley, “Does DNA Make Some Men Gay?” 
 
28 Hamer, quoted in Toufexis, “New Evidence of a ‘Gay Gene.’” 
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orientation to a genetic factor, these studies seemingly demonstrate that homosexuality 
“is not ‘a deviant choice and [the result of] a lack of will.  It is at least partly a biological 
orientation, as important to one’s constitution as eye color.’”29   
Motivations for simplifying the complex relationship between genes, 
environment, behavior, and experience may be purely pragmatic: “One reason is that 
people like to read and buy books and magazines that tell them something definite about 
their origins, nature, and, perhaps, their future…. there is a pragmatic interest for 
publishers to present definite explanatory and predictive claims that seem to pertain to 
each of us individuals.”30  Besides the obvious commercial interests that promote 
simplified, deterministic portrayals of genetics, there are other factors at work.  Perhaps it 
is ignorance on the part of the non-scientist reporter or perhaps an intellectual laziness 
that favors simple explanations, even at the cost of truthfulness.  Political and ideological 
forces are also at work in deterministic portrayals of genetics, as there may be ideological 
and prejudiced reasons for promoting deterministic thinking. 
Lenny Moss has argued that this prevalent idea that “genes constitute information 
for traits (and blueprints for organisms)” is based on the conflation of a deterministic 
view of genes as predictive of an organism’s phenotype (the observable characteristics of 
an organism) with an “epigenetic” view of genes as “developmental resources” that serve 
as templates for RNA and protein synthesis.31  This conflation, he argues, is enabled 
                                                                                                                                            
 
29 Kenneth Paul Rosenberg, quoted in Begley. 
 
30 Neil C. Manson, “Presenting Behavioural Genetics: Spin, Ideology, and Our Narrative 
Interests,” Journal of Medical Ethics 30, no. 6 (2004), 601-604; quote on 603.  Italics are 
Manson’s. 
 
31 Moss, What Genes Can’t Do, xiv. 
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through the use of textual images and metaphors, like those that I described above.  As a 
result, there is a strong tendency to think of one’s traits as being “written in the genes” 
that carry the “instructions” for making the proteins that constitute the human body.  
While it may be possible to separate these two distinct ideas of what constitutes a gene, 
he argues that their combination perpetuates deterministic thinking about genetics. 
It is crucial to note that while researchers have clearly identified numerous 
monogenic traits or conditions (Huntington disease, for example) for which phenotypic 
expression is indeed a direct product of one’s genotype, such clear-cut certainty is rare in 
the realm of genetics.  In fact, there is a great deal variability associated with genetics and 
the move from genotype (genetic constitution) to phenotype.  Instead, it is more accurate 
in speaking of genetic predispositions to specific traits or conditions.  The movement 
from genotype to phenotypic expression can be influenced by a host of non-genetic 
factors, including environment, the epigenetic and biochemical environment surrounding 
DNA, the translation of DNA to RNA, diet, and various developmental events.  In fact, 
the same sequence of DNA material can be “translated” into different RNA and thereby 
produce different amino acid products.  It would be false to maintain such a fixed, 
deterministic understanding of what “a” gene can do.   
While the science behind arguments against widespread genetic determinism may 
be difficult for the non-scientist to understand, an easy-to-understand real-world example 
can illustrate determinism’s shortcomings.  Consider identical twins.  Although they 
share a common genome, those of us who know sets of identical twins can quickly point 
to differences in traits—both physical and in their personalities—that enable us to readily 
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identify which twin is which.  To claim that because those twins share the same genetic 
material they must be identical in every way would be ludicrous to those of us who know 
them!  Thus, it should be apparent that the claims of genetic determinism are oftentimes 
exaggerated at best, and sometimes altogether incorrect. 
 
Interlude: Thinking More Clearly about Genetics and Genetic Health 
 To address the ethical challenges posed by emerging genetic technologies like 
predictive genetic testing and PGD, we must also clarify some of the basic terms that 
appear in public discourse and in scholarly literature on these topics.  While I have 
already addressed the power of three themes—novelty, exceptionalism, and 
determinism—and demonstrated how they are often exaggerated in public discourse on 
genetics, the meanings of the fundamental terms of those debates are often taken for 
granted.  For example, what does “genetic” mean in these discussions?  One can appeal 
to biochemical data in order to point to some identifiable sub-cellular entity that we call 
“DNA” or a “gene” or a “chromosome” but such appeals provide little insight about what 
constitutes a “genetic disease” or what “genetic health” might look like.  In other words, 
what makes a condition a “genetic” condition rather than a physiological condition?  
What difference does “genetic” make here?  Does it make sense to speak at all of genetic 
health and diseases?  While an entire dissertation could be devoted to unpacking those 
questions, I merely intend to prod them in order to reveal the significant ambiguity at the 
heart of such concepts and the difficulties that this ambiguity creates for discussions of 
genetic technologies. 
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Health and Disease 
First, consider the very concepts of health and disease.  Human beings are, to a 
great extent, goal-oriented creatures.  As Aristotle noted at the beginning of Book One in 
his Nicomachean Ethics, “Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and 
pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; for this reason the good has rightly been declared 
to be that at which all things aim.”32  Leaving aside questions of what the proper telos of 
human life might be, I want to follow Aristotle and suggest that the art of medicine has its 
own particular goals that are typically couched in the language of health promotion and 
disease prevention.  As H. Tristram Engelhardt (among others) has noted, however, 
health and disease are both descriptive and evaluative concepts.33  As a descriptive 
concept, health is decidedly ambiguous, typically articulated in relation to equally 
ambiguous notions of physical, mental, and social well-being (which merely pushes the 
bump around in the rug, so to speak).34  “Health” generally describes the ability to live 
and successfully interact with the world, though again, what such success entails is not 
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22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official 
Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 
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easily agreed upon.  Disease, on the other hand, describes conditions that thwart one’s 
health.  Engelhardt notes that the concept of disease can be descriptive in both an 
ontological sense (referring to some material entity that causes a disease) as well as in a 
physiological sense (referring to the state of being diseased).35  We can thus speak of 
disease in relation to both material conditions (such as germs or viruses) as well as one’s 
actions that contribute to his or her state of disease. 
As evaluative concepts, the labels of health and disease are value judgments, ways 
of expressing that something is significant, worthy of praise or blame, worth seeking and 
promoting or avoiding and eradicating.  As value judgments, assigning those labels is 
thus a context-dependent and dynamic process.  What is considered to be a “disease” in 
one time and context may be of little concern or even considered to be healthy and 
beneficial in other contexts.  Masturbation, for example, was considered to be a disease 
by Western cultures in the 18th and 19th centuries, thought to contribute to a host of 
degenerative conditions as well as other deviant behaviors.  Nowadays, it is largely 
considered to be an acceptable component of one’s sexual activities and is rarely (if ever) 
the purview of physicians.  In fact, some people might argue that it can serve as a 
“healthy” outlet for one’s sexual energy.  Further, because it is no longer considered to be 
a disease, masturbation is no longer seen as a condition for which a physician can provide 
treatment.  In this way it has lost its status as an object of medical concern, perhaps 
making the use of health and disease labels seem a bit odd in this specific context.  Of 
course, we can also readily think of conditions that are considered to be diseases in 
almost any culture, some condition that is so adversely significant that it would be called 
                                                
35 Engelhardt, “The Concepts of Health and Disease.” 
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a disease in nearly any context.  What I mean to emphasize here, however, is that 
“disease” itself is not always a static concept. 
Examples of the dynamic, malleable nature of health and disease can be found in 
relation to supposed “genetic” conditions, as well.  Sickle cell anemia is a condition in 
which a person’s red blood cells are sickle-shaped due to abnormally shaped hemoglobin 
proteins in the cells.  That “abnormality” is caused by a single nucleotide mutation on the 
short arm of chromosome 11p15.5, on the “hemoglobin beta gene.”  In order for the 
condition to manifest, each of the two chromosomes 11p15.5 must possess the mutation 
in question (that is, sickle cell is a homozygous condition).36  Sickle cell anemia is much 
more prevalent in people of African ancestry and is today considered to be a condition 
that requires treatment.  Left unchecked, sickle cell anemia can contribute to a host of 
other complications, including stroke and significant organ damage.  However, the sickle-
shaped red blood cells have been demonstrated to protect individuals from contracting 
malaria, a parasite prevalent throughout much of Africa.  In fact, at one point it may have 
been advantageous to carry the genetic mutation that causes sickle cell anemia due to its 
protective abilities.  These days, we see the debilitating effects of sickle-cell anemia and 
rightly consider it a disease that is to be treated.  But again, context matters—even 
(especially?) regarding what constitutes healthy and diseased states of being.  As contexts 
shift, so too do the meanings we associate with particular behaviors and modes of 
existence.  To reify health and disease would be to ignore the dynamic nature of those 
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concepts and give a false sense of security about what is appropriate in a given situation. 
 
Genetic 
Health and disease are not the only relevant concepts that are subject to such 
ambiguity, however.  Even the very idea of what counts as “genetic” is up for debate.  At 
times “genetic” refers to the material contained in cells that we call DNA.  At other times 
“genetic” refers to the phenotypic expression of what that DNA has encoded.  As a 
descriptor, the adjective “genetic” implies something about the origin of the concept in 
question, be it health, disease, or information (to give but a few examples).  Neil Manson 
states that the semantics of “genetic” “have subtly altered from ‘pertaining to origins’ to 
‘pertaining to heredity’ to ‘pertaining to the material which we think is causally important 
in heredity’…[to] ‘of or pertaining to DNA.’”37  But thinking of “genetic” in this way 
does not necessarily specify what that modifier entails in any given instance, particularly 
as it is used to describe states of health and disease.  In calling a disease a genetic disease, 
is one asserting that one’s DNA is itself in a state of disease?  Or, is the physical 
manifestation of a genetic product—which is significantly shaped by non-genetic 
factors—the genetic disease in question?   
Physicians in contemporary American medicine will agree that Huntington 
disease is clearly worthy of the label of “disease” and is often the paradigmatic example 
of a genetic disease.  But how are such assertions defended?  David Magnus has 
identified three ways in which ideas of “genetic disease” are defended, though he finds 
                                                
37 Neil C. Manson, "What Is Genetic Information, and Why Is It Significant? A 
Contextual, Contrastive, Approach," Journal of Applied Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2006), 1-
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each approach to be lacking.38  The first approach to defining genetic disease is the 
“causal approach” in which a disease is considered to be a genetic disease if one’s genetic 
constitution is the “direct cause” of the disease (as in the case of Huntington disease).  
However, Magnus argues that this way of thinking of genetic disease suffers from a 
“selection problem”: phenotypic expressions of traits or conditions (or diseases) are 
rarely the product of one’s genetic makeup but arise from the confluence of genetic and 
non-genetic (environmental, developmental, etc.) factors; diseases like Huntington are the 
exception rather than the rule.  How does one identify which factor is most important in 
the development of a condition or disease?  The second approach to identifying genetic 
diseases is a statistical approach in which phenotypic differences in a given population 
can be explained by genetic differences in that same population.  This approach, 
however, focuses only populations and not individuals and, according to Magnus, simply 
pushes the “selection problem” back to the level of population classes: what is the proper 
population to sample and with whom should they be contrasted?  The last approach 
Magnus identifies is the “manipulation approach” to identifying genetic diseases, in 
which a disease may be called “genetic” if genes are identified as the factor “most easily 
manipulated to prevent or treat disease.”39  However, genetic therapy is still in its 
infancy.  Paradigm cases of “genetic disease” like Huntington would not qualify as 
genetic diseases under this last rubric because no gene therapies are currently available in 
the medical treatment of disease (though this may eventually change). 
                                                
38 David Magnus, “The Concept of Genetic Disease” in Health, Disease, and Illness: 
Concepts in Medicine, eds. Arthur L. Caplan, James J. McCartney, and Dominic A. Sisti, 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 233-242. 
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The Utility of Genetic Health and Disease Concepts 
So where does all of this ambiguity leave us?  Must we abandon the very ideas of 
genetic health and disease?  As in the discussions of novelty, exceptionalism, and 
determinism, I do not necessarily want to lose the concepts of genetic health and disease 
altogether as I move forward in this dissertation.  Instead, I want to encourage restraint in 
deploying those concepts.  Just as human beings seek to exercise control over the natural 
world through powerful manipulation, so too do we strive for that control through the 
ways in which we use our words.  While it will be helpful to temper our grandiose 
pronouncements about the “genetics revolution,” we must nonetheless recognize that the 
lens of genetics provides one way in which to understand many debilitating conditions 
from which we suffer, and it may very well be appropriate to use concepts like “genetic 
disease”—particularly if technologies like predictive genetic testing and PGD can use 
genetic data to predict and prevent conditions like cystic fibrosis or Huntington disease.  
Genes do establish many of the boundaries within which we live, creating possibilities for 
interacting with the world in specific ways while limiting our access to other options.  In 
some cases—carrying the genetic abnormality for Huntington disease, for example—
those genes are in fact determinative insofar as they limit one’s ability to exercise his or 
her agency in the world, which is a critical component of nearly any understanding of 
health. 
However, as we explore predictive genetic testing and preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis, it will be important to remember just how dynamic the concepts of health and 
disease can be.  In speaking of “genetic enhancement” a person makes a value judgment 
about genetic states of affairs, so such references should not be looked upon with an air 
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of certainty about what is worth seeking and worth avoiding.  Rather, we should be open 
to the possibility that the judgments we make about what is desirable and what is to be 
eradicated are not always grounded in universal standards but are instead built on moving 
ground that shifts as times and cultures shift.  Further, we should be open to the 
possibility that the scientific data on which we base many of these judgments are open to 
revision (as in the case of masturbation or the shifting etiology of ulcers).  Part of the 
dynamic nature of the concepts of health and disease is due to new information that 
researchers uncover.  That research can call into question ideas that we previously held to 
be evident.  Such recognition these various limits may be the first step toward 
responsibility in relation to genetic biotechnologies like the ones described below. 
 
Emerging Genetic Technologies 
 
Predictive Genetic Testing 
 Earlier in the chapter I mentioned PKU screening, one example of large-scale 
genetic testing that became a routine component of medical care in the United States well 
prior to the HGP.  With the completion of the HGP, however, researchers have been able 
to identify genetic markers associated with over 900 diseases and conditions, several of 
which are initially asymptomatic but manifest later in life, and these discoveries are 
indeed a novel dimension of the science of genetics.  As a result, people can now undergo 
genetic testing for such late-onset conditions before ever experiencing any symptoms of 
the condition in question, hence the label “predictive genetic testing.”  Currently, testing 
exists for a wide range of diseases and conditions, from monogenic autosomal dominant 
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diseases like Huntington to breast cancer susceptibility, eye color, and even testing for 
one’s susceptibility to developing alcoholism.40  From a technical standpoint, these tests 
generally work through one of three methods: by directly sequencing the DNA of the 
patient, by testing for abnormal protein levels that would indicate an alteration in the 
DNA that codes for the proteins associated with a certain condition, or by directly 
attaching biochemical markers to specific sections of DNA in order to obtain a visual 
representation of a possible alteration in the tested section of DNA. 
 Predictive genetic testing raises compelling ethical challenges, particularly as a 
result of the ways in which predictive genetic testing is different from traditional medical 
diagnostic tests (like testing blood and tissue samples).41  First, typical medical tests 
reveal something about a patient’s current condition—elevated white blood cell counts 
are typically indicative of infection or the presence of some pathogen, for example—
while predictive genetic tests seek to forecast a patient’s future condition.  For this 
reason, there is a greater degree of certainty for most medical tests that is lacking for 
predictive genetic testing.  After all, nearly any attempt to forecast the future is subject to 
change due to numerous variables: environmental factors, dietary changes, changes in 
habits, exercise levels, stress levels, etc.  Second, the direct correlations we find in other 
tests—viewing tumor cells in a biopsy that indicate a specific form of cancer, for 
example—are usually replaced in genetic tests with statistical probabilities regarding a 
                                                
40 The Genetics & Public Policy Center has identified some interesting traits for which 
someone can receive direct-to-consumer genetic testing, including athletic performance, 
hair loss, gout, restless legs syndrome, and periodontal syndrome.  See the above “Direct-
to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies” below. 
 
41 James P. Evans, Cécile Skrzynia, and W. Burke, "The Complexities of Predictive 
Genetic Testing," BMJ 322, no. 7293 (2001), 1052-1056. 
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person’s susceptibility to developing a certain disease or condition.  Finally, predictive 
genetic testing cannot determine with a significant degree of accuracy when an individual 
will develop a condition for which she tests positive.  With blood assays, however, those 
tests indicate whether or not a particular pathogen or condition is already present.  Thus, 
predictive genetic testing often lacks the certainty that can be provided by other clinical 
tests. 
 Others have expressed fears that employers and insurance companies may use 
information from predictive genetic tests to deny employment and insurance coverage to 
those whose tests indicate a genetic anomaly.42  While legislation like GINA may ease 
some of those fears, there is nevertheless a risk of stigmatization for those who undergo 
predictive genetic testing, as well as concern about the psychological well-being of those 
who are found to carry some genetic anomaly.  What might it be like to live knowing that 
one carries a significant risk of developing a lethal condition—but without knowing 
precisely when that condition will manifest itself?  Further, what if there are no available 
treatments for that condition?  While predictive genetic testing may provide someone 
with information about his or her genetic constitution, is that information valuable if he 
or she cannot act on it and it carries with it such potential for psychological harm and 
public stigmatization? 
 Predictive genetic testing also raises questions about one’s relations to others, 
particularly one’s family.  Evans, Skrzynia, and Burke have suggested that this testing 
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raises these issues because the results of a genetic test may reveal something about the 
genetic constitution of a person’s family members.43  While I grant that one component 
of their argument is correct—blood samples and tissue biopsies reveal something about 
individual patients while genetic testing says something about the shared genetics of the 
patient and her family—I find their argument to be largely overstated.  It seems to me 
that the family history that a physician takes of her patients reveals similar information 
that is considered medically relevant, namely patterns of susceptibility to particular 
diseases or conditions.  I see no significant difference in the type of information that is 
revealed when a patient mentions that hypertension runs in her family rather as opposed 
to receiving the results of a genetic test for hypertension susceptibility.  Either way, the 
patient—and her family—is at risk for developing hypertension and should take the 
appropriate cautions. 
 There are instances, however, where predictive genetic testing poses unique 
challenges to those who utilize it.  Consider the example of Katharine Moser, whose 
decision to utilize genetic testing for Huntington disease was documented in the New 
York Times.44  Ms. Moser’s grandfather had suffered from the disease and at age 23, she 
decided to undergo genetic testing to discover if she carried the genetic markers that 
cause the incurable disorder.  Her test came back positive, indicating that she would 
eventually develop the disease that struck her grandfather, a great uncle, a cousin, and an 
aunt.  The story recalls some of the major changes in Ms. Moser’s life following her 
testing, but what is particularly interesting here were the ramifications of Ms. Moser’s 
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44 Amy Harmon, "Facing Life with a Lethal Gene," New York Times, March 18 2007. 
 
 30 
test for her mother.  Katharine’s mother did not want her daughter to receive the test, nor 
did she want to have the test herself.  Following the test, Ms. Moser and her mother 
became estranged.  In a heated custody battle between her mother and one of her aunts, 
the topic of Huntington disease was raised.  Through those court proceedings, Ms. 
Moser’s mother came to learn—unwillingly—of her own status as someone who would 
eventually develop Huntington disease.  
Ms. Moser’s mother had insisted that she did not want to know her chances of 
developing the disease, but through her daughter’s testing she could not avoid learning 
about her status as a person who will eventually develop Huntington.  Ms. Moser’s case 
illustrates some of the difficulties associated with undergoing predictive genetic testing:  
What can one do with that information, particularly if one learns of an incurable lethal 
genetic anomaly?  Does one have a right not to know about one’s genetic status?  In cases 
where predictive genetic tests would might reveal such life-changing information that 
impacts more than one person, must all potentially affected people agree to the testing?  
What does this do to how we understand confidentiality? 
In cases like Ms. Moser’s, a person interested in predictive genetic testing 
typically visits a physician, a genetic counselor, and sometimes even a psychologist.  
These care providers work to ensure that the person understands what genetic testing 
reveals about her health and raise awareness about the possible ramifications of 
undergoing testing. They can even urge a person to forego genetic testing if it is clear that 
he or she has not given the matter careful consideration.  These days, however, if 
someone is interested in pursuing predictive genetic testing, she does not even need to 
leave her own home.  Companies offering direct-to-consumer genetic testing are now 
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becoming booming businesses, allowing a person to simply swab the inside of her cheek, 
mail the sample to the company providing the test, and receive test results in the privacy 
of her own home—all for just a few hundred dollars.  In fact, the Genetics & Public 
Policy Center has identified forty such companies (as of May 2009), including the 
cleverly named 23andMe and Suracell.45 
 Bringing genetic testing into people’s homes is certain to raise ethical challenges 
for patient/customer and physician alike.  The American College of Medical Genetics has 
been quick to note that “the consumer should be fully informed regarding what the 
[direct-to-consumer genetic] test can and cannot say about his or her health.”46  Picking 
up on earlier points, it should be noted that because these tests provide the 
patient/customer with statistical probabilities regarding their susceptibility to developing 
the disease or condition(s) in question, these tests often do not provide the diagnostic 
certainty that patients/customers may seek.  23andMe, for example, readily states on its 
website that they do not “sequence your entire genome or perform predictive or 
diagnostic tests.”47  They currently offer genetic testing for 116 conditions, and with 30 
of those conditions (including Crohn’s disease, BRCA cancer mutations, earwax type, 
and HIV/AIDS resistance), the customer receives a “clinical report” that provides an 
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estimate of whether one’s “genetic risk” for a condition is above or below “average risk” 
as well as the “heritability” rate for the condition, which can be as little as 1% in some 
cases.  For the other 86 conditions, one instead receives a “research report” that contains 
the same information, only with a notice that not enough “scientific consensus” has been 
built to include that information in the aforementioned “clinical report.”  23andMe does 
not provide tests for monogenic conditions or for other conditions for which genetic 
constitution can in fact be determinative.48  
 Direct-to-consumer predictive genetic tests are aimed at empowering individuals 
to take charge of their own health by “personalizing” medicine according to a person’s 
genetic susceptibility to specific diseases or conditions.  However, we may want to ask 
some pointed questions about what personalized medicine in the age of genetic testing 
entails: Are many of these tests necessary?  Is the information that they provide of any 
real value?  While the old Baconian adage “knowledge is power” motivates the 
movement toward putting personalized genetic “information” in the hands of 
customer/patients, we should still recognize that predictive genetic testing (and DTC 
genetic testing in general) can cause headaches for customers/patients and physicians 
alike.  Without the assistance of a genetic counselor or physician, can the average person 
interpret information from these tests in any meaningful way?  Does the lack of an 
“expert” in that process promote certain misconceptions about the power of genetics for 
shaping and predicting a person’s future?  While knowledge about genetic susceptibility 
to particular conditions may indeed empower a person to make better decisions about 
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how to live his or her life, basing such decisions on misunderstood or incorrect 
information might actually disempower that person from being able to live his or her life 
on the basis of sound knowledge. 
 Nonetheless, predictive genetic testing—whether it takes place in the clinic or in 
someone’s home—may be a worthwhile endeavor for many people, provided that they 
are cognizant of what the test results actually indicate about their genetic constitution.  
The certainty that so many of us crave is all too elusive except in the rarest of instances.  
In those rare cases (such as that of Ms. Moser) a person may find that having the 
information provided by a predictive genetic test is itself a form of therapy.  He or she 
can incorporate that information into his or her self-image and live a rewarding life in 
accord with that new image.  Even when lacking that certainty, just knowing that one has 
an increased risk of developing some future condition can be an impetus for one to 
reorient his or her new life in a beneficial way.  In these ways, predictive genetic testing 
can be of value. 
Despite the anxiety that can come about using predictive genetic testing and 
despite the various other challenges that such testing creates, it is also clear that in some 
cases predictive genetic testing can be a beneficial diagnostic tool for patients and 
physicians alike.  As this dissertation moves forward, I will make the case that thinking 
of predictive genetic testing in the language of responsibility provides an avenue for 
navigating the bumpy terrain between certainty and probability, between self-control and 
self-alienation, and between acceptance and dread.  There is no doubt that this type of 
genetic testing has its limitations; the way in which it has become a mass marketed 
product only serves to further complicate matters.  However, there is also little doubt that 
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predictive genetic testing is here to stay.  The key, it seems, is to think about how to 
responsibly incorporate predictive testing into a person’s medical care.  This question—
and the challenges I have described here—will be a revisited later in this dissertation. 
 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is another example of a genetic 
technology that is becoming an increasingly routine component of medical care.  From a 
technical perspective, PGD is a combination of the molecular biology of genetic testing 
with the reproductive technology of in vitro fertilization (IVF).  In this process, multiple 
embryos are created in vitro from the germ cells (sperm and egg) of those who are 
seeking reproductive assistance.49  When the embryos have matured to a size of six to ten 
cells (just prior to the blastocyst stage of development), an embryonic cell is removed 
from each embryo.  The excised cells are then tested for potential genetic anomalies, just 
as that process was described in the previous section.  The embryos that are discovered to 
contain a genetic anomaly are either discarded or frozen, while the embryo(s) that is/are 
deemed to have the “best” genetic constitution is selected for implantation.  A 2001 
report indicates that PGD carried a 24% pregnancy rate, a similar rate to that of assisted 
reproductive techniques that do not involve such excision.50  PGD is an expensive 
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procedure that is usually not covered by insurance programs, adding approximately 
$3000-$5000 to the cost of a cycle of IVF. 
PGD has been used since 1990, when it was first implemented to test for 
aneuploidy (having other than 46 chromosomes) in embryos of low prognosis infertility 
patients, or in testing for single-gene and X-linked conditions in at-risk patients.51  One of 
the seemingly attractive aspects of PGD is that it provides an alternative to pregnancy 
termination for potential parents who are at risk of passing inheritable genetic disorders 
to their children, allowing those potential parents to avoid conventional prenatal testing 
(namely CVS and amniocentesis) and any subsequent discussions about abortion if the 
fetus was discovered to possess some genetic disorder.52  In Great Britain, PGD is 
utilized to test embryos for over 70 diseases and conditions, some of which are gravely 
painful and certainly lethal (β-thalassemia, for example).  Other conditions for which 
potential parents can use PGD in Great Britain include Huntington disease, BRCA-1 
breast cancer susceptibility, and hemophilia.53  Interestingly, some of the conditions for 
which PGD is used in Great Britain include conditions that are non-lethal, manifest later 
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in adulthood, and have readily available clinical treatments available.  Additionally, it 
should be noted that PGD cannot be used to diagnose congenital conditions like spina 
bifida or anencephaly. 
In the United States, PGD is not regulated as it is in Great Britain.  The only 
limitations to the conditions for which PGD can be used are the availability of genetic 
tests for a given condition and the willingness of a clinician to perform PGD for a 
specific condition.  Hypothetically, one could thus use PGD to seemingly test embryos 
for potential athletic performance, eye color, sex, and/or susceptibility to food allergies 
and migraines (among a host of other testing possibilities).  That is, PGD can be utilized 
for not merely for karyotyping and testing for inheritable genetic disorders, but also for 
genetic susceptibility, late-onset conditions (like Huntington disease), human leukocyte 
antigen (HLA) matching for producing a donor for an existing person in need, gender 
selection, and even for non-medical conditions.54  Quite simply, the possibilities are 
almost endless, provided one can afford the procedures and find a willing clinician.  
 For this reason, PGD is often portrayed as the quintessential “genetic boogeyman” 
that casts its shadow over ethical discussions concerning the place of genetics in 
medicine.  It brings the ideas of “playing God,” “controlling human destiny,” and 
“fabricating man” to the forefront of those discussions.   Particularly with the rise of in 
vitro fertilization and the blossoming of genetics as a scientific discipline, theologians 
and philosophers have expressed serious concern about the perceived encroachment of 
human power and direction into the realm of reproduction (beyond the basic procreative 
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act).55  Leon Kass, for example, has argued that the gradual movement from IVF to PGD, 
genetic engineering, and the prospect of human cloning in the name of reproductive 
freedom and genetic health actually leads to a dehumanization of the procreative process 
altogether.56  From this perspective, children become little more than products, parents 
become customers, and clinicians become the manufacturer and supplier of the desired 
product.57  So this line of argument goes, PGD—and other reproductive and genetic 
biotechnologies—remove much of the mystery from procreation and turn the whole 
process into a sterile, depersonalized and dehumanizing affair.  PGD also removes much 
of the mystery and perceived giftedness from the procreative endeavor—a theme that will 
be revisited in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
 Similarly, PGD raises the typical “line-drawing” questions that are prevalent in 
public policy discussions.  For example, why might it be okay to use PGD to test for 
cystic fibrosis but not for sickle cell anemia?  What about sex selection?  If treatments are 
currently available for a given disorder or disease, should a person nonetheless opt 
against implanting an embryo that possesses the genetic markers for that disease?  If a 
lethal disease manifests itself later in adulthood, should a person choose not to implant an 
affected embryo—or might the years of (presumably) healthy life prior to the onset of 
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disease be considered a “life worth living” by clinicians and potential parents?  John 
Robertson even raises the possibility of eventually being able to use PGD to select 
embryos based on their potential sexual orientation.58  Should that be permissible?  In 
asking the basic question of where the proverbial line out to be drawn—or if it should be 
drawn at all—we should recognize that the various positions on those questions 
“illustrate a balancing a number of considerations, including the moral status of the 
embryo and fetus, the limits of professional authority, the limits, if any, of our respect for 
personal autonomy, and the impact of individuals with disabilities on the family and 
society.”59  The way in which those considerations should be balanced, however, is 
certainly up for debate and would go a long way toward determining the conditions under 
which PGD is an acceptable diagnostic tool for potential parents to utilize. 
 Finally—and related to this issue of acceptability—I cannot discuss PGD without 
recognizing the specter of eugenics that hovers over these discussions.  Many individuals 
and disability rights groups view such “line drawing” as discriminatory.  If an embryo 
possesses the genetic markers for a given susceptibility or condition (such as deafness), 
any decision to not implant that embryo may be seen as an affront to those people who 
already have the condition in question, tantamount to asserting that living with that 
condition would be a life “not worth living.”  This only serves to further increase the 
level of stigmatization that individuals living with a particular disability or condition 
might face.  Further, in this process of establishing boundaries between “acceptable” and 
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“unacceptable” states of existence, there is a definite compulsion to actively pursue the 
“best” or “most acceptable” avenue in the name of disease prevention, health promotion, 
and human progress.  However, recalling the prior discussion about the dynamic nature 
of health and disease labels, we should approach this process of discernment with 
caution.  What some individuals view as “disability” may be seen as “diversity” by 
others, and to use technologies like PGD to eliminate diverse elements of human 
existence would be to act unjustly and inhumanly toward our fellow humans. 
Clearly PGD presents patients and clinicians with a variety of ethical challenges, 
particularly around our understandings of what constitutes a “life worth living” and what 
we view as diseased and disordered states of being.  Complicating these discussions is the 
fact that PGD is currently a “boutique” diagnostic test, not covered by insurance 
programs and available only to those who are able to afford its hefty price tag.  Thus, 
issues of class and socioeconomic status permeate every discussion of PGD.  Here, the 
question of responsibility becomes all the more important:  Are clinicians and potential 
parents responsible to/for anyone beyond themselves when they undergo PGD and use 
that information to decide which embryos to implant for pregnancy?  Are there larger 
societal implications for those actions, and if so, to what degree should those implications 
be taken into account when acting on the basis of PGD results?  These are just some of 
the questions posed to us when we consider the use of PGD in light of responsibility.  As 
I will demonstrate later, however, PGD also poses challenges to the very ways in which 
we understand what “responsibility” entails.  As I will later argue, the pursuit for greater 
control and certainty about a person’s life (or the life of her offspring) is oftentimes a 
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worthy pursuit.  To think that PGD provides us with full control and certainty, however, 
is misguided. 
 
 
Summary 
 In this opening chapter, I have suggested that genetic biotechnologies are 
becoming an increasingly routine component of medical care.  Two such technologies—
predictive genetic testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis—raise a host of 
challenges to our moral frameworks and how we think about ideas of health, disease, and 
responsibility.  To establish the historical and intellectual context within which 
discussions of genetics and genetic biotechnologies take place, I have used this chapter to 
provide an overview of dominant themes that permeate those discussions—specifically 
novelty, genetic exceptionalism, and genetic determinism.  I argued that while many of 
the genetic biotechnologies making headlines these days are new, genetic information has 
long been used in the context of the clinic.  While I found many of the claims of genetic 
novelty and exceptionalism (for example, genetics as “the book of life” or the “language 
of God”) to be greatly exaggerated, I pointed out that technologies like PGD and 
predictive genetic testing do indeed raise unique challenges that must be addressed.  
Finally, while I noted that views of genetics as being determinative of a person’s 
existence are overly simplistic and downright false, I also asserted that one’s genes do 
establish some limitations to a person’s possible modes of existence.   
 Additionally, I noted that many of the basic notions on which discussions of 
genetic biotechnologies are based—genetics, health, and disease, specifically—are 
sometimes misconstrued as static concepts.  “Genetic,” for example may describe either 
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the DNA material or the phenotypic expression of the genome’s products.  To speak of 
“genetic health” therefore, one must be clear about whether one is applying the label of 
“health” to one’s genetic constitution or to the way in which those genes phenotypically 
manifest themselves.  I also asserted that the very labels of health and disease are both 
descriptive and evaluative (normative).  In describing someone as healthy or diseased, 
one makes a claim about that person’s ability to live and interact in the world.  As 
evaluative concepts, health and disease provide ways of expressing what activities or 
states of being are to be pursued or avoided, promoted or eliminated.  Because health and 
disease are evaluative concepts, however, we must recognize that they are also dynamic 
concepts whose contents are provided by the specific contexts and times in which they 
are used.  What is considered diseased in one context may be insignificant—or even 
considered healthy—in another context.  Thus, I urged us to exercise extreme caution 
when attaching labels of health and disease to issues of genetics, particularly because we 
are still learning more and more each day about the role that genes play in shaping 
various aspects of our lives. 
 Finally, I turned to the two specific examples of genetic biotechnologies in 
action—predictive genetic testing and PGD—in order to articulate what those processes 
entail and to highlight some of the ethical challenges that they pose to clinicians, 
patients/customers, and society at large.  Predictive genetic testing, I argued, is limited in 
the type of information it can provide.  Even if a person tests 100% positive for a lethal 
condition, predictive genetic tests cannot tell that person when the condition will 
manifest.  Second, these tests deal largely with statistics and probabilities rather than 
certainty.  Thus, predictive genetic tests cannot tell someone about their specific case, but 
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only about the disease rates for populations sharing the indicated genetic markers with 
that individual.  In other words, while a predictive genetic test can tell me that I have a 
72.5% chance of developing a particular condition, it cannot tell me if I am part of that 
72.5% or if I may be part of the 27.5% of the population who does not develop the 
condition in question.  Additionally, predictive genetic testing has expanded into direct-
to-consumer products, readily available for individuals to use with little or no counseling 
or expertise.  In this expansion, tests now exist for a wide array of conditions and 
susceptibilities—including hair loss and athletic performance (!)—leading me to question 
what constitutes “medically valuable” information.  Lastly, others have noted that 
predictive genetic tests challenge how we understand our relationships to others, 
particularly other members of our family.  The case of Ms. Moser clearly brings some of 
those issues to light. 
 With PGD, I noted the broad but pervasive challenge that PGD represents yet 
another example of human beings attempting to “play God” by inserting new levels of 
precise intentionality into the process of reproduction.  From this perspective, PGD is a 
tool that may be used to create “designer babies” and dehumanize the reproductive 
process by striving to eliminate the mystery and giftedness that accompanies human 
reproduction.  Along these lines, I also noted some of the ethical challenges associated 
with discerning what might constitute an acceptable use of PGD.  That is, the task of 
“drawing the line” between acceptable and unacceptable uses of PGD—if such a line is to 
be drawn at all—is typically dependent upon our shifting understandings of health and 
disease.  Through the process of line drawing that often belongs to the realm of public 
policy discussions, PGD also brings to the forefront issues of discrimination and 
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stigmatization that must be addressed, particularly if PGD is to be used to select against 
conditions for which treatments or accommodations already exist. 
 As I have already noted, I will probe many of these challenges later in the 
dissertation by focusing on the idea of responsibility.  The decision to focus on 
responsibility, as the following chapter will indicate, is with good reason.  Clinicians, 
care providers, and other caring professionals readily draw on the concept of 
responsibility in their discussions of genetics and genetic biotechnologies.  The following 
chapter is dedicated to understanding how those people talk about genetics and 
responsibility, and as I will argue, they do so in a manner that provides valuable insights 
for rethinking and confronting many of the challenges I have described above.  They also 
point to interesting ways in which we can reconsider what responsibility actually means 
for us, sometimes challenging dominant views of responsibility as a matter of 
autonomous, rational, free choice.
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CHAPTER II 
 
SPEAKING OF RESPONSIBILITY: STATEMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITY 
FROM MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS AND RELIGIOUS CARE PROVIDERS 
 
 
 I have suggested that responsibility is an important concept for understanding the 
ethical challenges posed by genetics and genetic technologies in the medical context.  
Tools like predictive genetic testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) are 
becoming more common in the clinic, or in our very homes, as is the case with predictive 
genetic testing.  In the spirit of ethics as a form of critical inquiry, it will be necessary to 
examine questions about how these genetic innovations should be implemented.  Here, it 
is crucial to listen to the voices of those people who often confront those questions 
through their work, people serving in caring professions: physicians, genetic counselors, 
nurses, chaplains, and religious ministers who counsel congregants dealing with these 
issues.  Turning to those voices, it is apparent that responsibility is an important concept 
for moral understanding in this context 
 The Religion and Genetics study group at Vanderbilt University conducted a 
series of focus groups with members of the caring professions named above.  The 
ministers involved were all Christian ministers, with separate focus groups geared toward 
mainline Protestant ministers and evangelical ministers.1  As noted, “responsibility” 
                                                
1 Vanderbilt University’s Religion and Genetics study group, “Religion and Genetics 
Focus Groups” (IRB #061052, first approved 3 November 2006).  I can access and utilize 
these transcripts for my work without subsequent IRB approval, provided that I have the 
permission of the study’s principal investigator, Dr. Ellen Wright Clayton.  Doctor 
Clayton has granted me that permission. 
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emerged from many of those sessions in a significant way and without provocation.  
While the focus group transcripts by no means provide a full data set for drawing 
conclusions about how these groups care for their patients and congregants, they 
nonetheless attest to the power of responsibility for informing how care providers 
understand their work in such settings.  Additionally, in this chapter I will examine the 
published statements of medical professional organizations (American Medical 
Association, National Society of Genetic Counselors, American Board of Genetic 
Counseling, and the American Nursing Association) and religious denominations in order 
to demonstrate how responsibility also functions as a crucial concept for ordering 
institutional responses to how its members should conduct themselves in their work.  The 
medical professional statements are readily available online.  The religious 
denominational statements I examined where taken from Rebecca Rae Anderson’s 
Religious Traditions and Prenatal Genetic Counseling.2 
 It should come as little surprise that the positions taken in these numerous 
statements are as diverse as the focus group participants and the religious and medical 
professional organizations that I discuss throughout the chapter.  I should note that their 
statements about responsibility are my primary concern in this chapter, not the stances 
that these individuals and groups take regarding the morally licit or illicit character of 
genetic biotechnologies.  Hence, I will only draw on those positions when they are 
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 Rebecca Rae Anderson, Religious Traditions and Prenatal Genetic Counseling, 
Notebook format (Omaha, NE: Munroe Meyer Institute and University of Nebraska 
Medical Center, 2002). 
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relevant to how responsibility is articulated in light of issues of genetics and genetic 
technologies. 
 As much as possible, I aim for this chapter to be an expression of the perspectives 
that these care providers offer in their own words.  Thus, analysis of the statements, focus 
group transcripts, and any other documents will be rooted in grounded theory, 
particularly in the in vivo coding strategies articulated by Corbin and Strauss.3  Further, I 
follow this method because the Religion and Genetics group initially adopted it during 
the design and development of their study.  In grounded theory, the coding process takes 
place in three basic stages: open, axial, and interpretive coding.  In open coding, I broadly 
examine the materials for instances where “responsibility” emerges as a theme of interest.  
This stage of coding relies on the concepts that are specifically mentioned by study 
participants, hence the term “in vivo coding.”  Next, through axial coding I examine the 
concepts that surround uses of the term “responsibility” in order to identify common or 
interesting themes that may emerge from the data.  Finally, through interpretive coding I 
can relate that data back to questions about what responsibility means and what 
responsibility requires in relation to genetics and genetic technologies. 
 Drawing on grounded theory analysis provides space for themes to emerge from 
the data without manipulating that data to suit my own predetermined ends; thus I am not 
testing any hypotheses about those discussions.  As I stated, I want—as much as 
possible—for the participants to speak for themselves.  This approach also provides space 
for situating those emergent expressions of responsibility within larger social and 
                                                
3 Juliet M. Corbin and Anselm L. Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques 
and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 2008). 
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religious frameworks that may provide the specific content of that concept.  While those 
frameworks often remain implicit in our discourses, I aim to make them explicit; 
grounded theory makes that task possible.  In other words, grounded theory provides the 
necessary tools to highlight those previously unacknowledged presuppositions upon 
which discussions of responsibility rest.  For example, when someone asserts that she is 
“responsible to God for the decisions I make,” a variety of unstated presuppositions give 
meaning to that statement: a view of God that holds people accountable for specific 
personal decisions, that she can know that God holds her responsible, and that there are 
consequences for failing to be responsible to God (to give but a few examples).  By 
identifying some of those presuppositions I can then utilize these statements to flesh out a 
more substantive account of responsibility later in this dissertation.  Further, I can also 
turn to prevalent views of responsibility in ethics and bioethics in order to demonstrate 
how they are often blind to some of the themes that emerge from the institutional 
statements and focus group transcripts. 
  
A Note on Focus Group Transcripts 
 The transcripts discussed in this chapter are from a series of 13 focus groups 
conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Religion and Genetics study group in early 2007.  
The study group, an interdisciplinary collection of ethicists, genetic counselors, 
physicians, and nurses, sought to learn about how members of “caring professions” 
(physicians, nurses, genetic counselors, hospital chaplains, and Christian ministers) 
articulated and understood their experiences in dealing with issues of genetics during the 
course of their work.  With the exception of the genetic counselor focus groups, 
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participants were recruited through investigator contacts and the process of “snowball 
sampling” in which initial participants were asked to recommend others who may be 
interested in participating in this research.4  Genetic counselors were recruited through 
the American Society of Genetic Counselors and participated via telephone.  As a result 
of these recruiting methods, focus group participants were largely from the middle 
Tennessee area, again with the exception of these genetic counselors.  Focus groups were 
between 3-6 members in size. 
The focus groups lasted up to two hours and were conducted by a member of the 
Religion and Genetics group while one or two members of the group observed, taking 
notes on verbal and non-verbal communications.  The moderator would describe the 
study and present the participants with two of four possible case studies: a 40-year old 
woman (Debbie) who is 16 weeks pregnant and has been referred for ultrasound and 
amniocentesis; a 35-year old father (Jeff) of two who watched his mother suffer through 
Huntington disease and is considering predictive testing for himself; a 9-year old boy 
(R.J.) who develops Becker muscular dystrophy (BMD), a genetically-based condition he 
inherited from his mother (Susan); and a 30-year old woman (Laura) diagnosed with 
multiple endocrine neoplasia type 2A (MEN 2A) whose father refuses DNA testing for 
the condition despite the presence of some of its symptoms.  The ministerial groups 
focused solely on the cases of Debbie and Jeff, while clinicians were not limited in this 
way.  Participants were then asked a series of open-ended questions regarding their 
experiences caring for patients/congregants where issues of genetics have arisen.  They 
                                                
4 Emily C. Hansen, Successful Qualitative Health Research: A Practical Introduction 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2006). 
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were also asked to reflect on the case studies and offer their own responses to the cases, 
though we encouraged participants to speak as much as possible about their own personal 
experiences with these matters.  The case studies of “Debbie” and “Jeff” will be attached 
as an appendix to this dissertation.5 
  
Insights from Physician, Nurse, and Genetic Counselor Focus Groups 
 Of the 13 focus groups conducted, nine of these sessions consisted of medical 
care providers (physicians, nurses, and genetic counselors).  Each focus group had 
between three and six participants (excluding facilitators and observers) and was 
conducted in person, with the exception of the genetic counseling focus groups that were 
conducted via teleconference.  In all, seven physicians, eight nurses, and 15 genetic 
counselors participated in these focus groups.  In their discussions, participants rarely 
drew on language of responsibility to describe their activities or to recall specific 
instances where religious issues were raised by their work as caring professionals.  In 
fact, the word “responsibility” was not used at all among the participants in the physician 
focus groups, which is interesting considering that the American Medical Association 
(AMA) crafted a significant “Code of Ethics” for physicians in which responsibility plays 
a key role in framing the ethical nature of the physician’s work.  One nurse and two 
genetic counselors used the language of responsibility to describe their experiences, and 
their discussions will be examined here.  I chose not to focus on presumed surrogates for 
                                                
5 A thorough account of the methods for this study can be found in Virginia L. Bartlett 
and Rolanda L. Johnson, "God and Genes in the Caring Professions: Clinician and Clergy 
Perceptions of Religion and Genetics," Am J Med Genet C Semin Med Genet 151C, no. 1 
(2009). 
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responsibility (duty and obligation, for example) because I did not want to assume that I 
knew what “responsibility” would mean for these focus group participants. 
 When those individuals spoke of responsibility, the theme of control consistently 
emerged alongside that concept.  In fact, control (or a lack thereof) informs each of the 
statements made in this section.  Consider the statement below from a nurse who was 
describing her involvement with a patient facing very difficult circumstances.  Here, 
responsibility appears to be equated with control, and as such, it may be deferred to 
someone or something else.  In other words, the nurse senses that by deferring 
responsibility for her health care to God, the patient signals that she no longer has control 
over her health outcomes: 
Nurse 1: “This was a very young patient; she was about 29 years old, who 
had developed heart failure as a result of pregnancy-related complications.  
And she had given up, and in the process of giving up, she basically 
deferred all the responsibility for her own health care to God: “If God 
wants me to be well, I will be well.  If God wants me to live to see 
tomorrow, I will see tomorrow.” Basically, she externalized all the control 
for her health care based on her faith, and that’s a very difficult thing to 
contradict, because I think on a lot of levels, that’s a way for them to gain 
control of their emotions and of their emotional reactions.  It’s so stressful 
to deal with that they don’t want to, so they defer to the object of their 
religious faith, and in that situation, we spent a lot of time with her, talking 
about the importance of sticking to their therapeutic regimen, relying, you 
know, on supportive networks, and helping her identify factors in her daily 
care that she could control: taking of her medications, you know; doing 
her daily weights; those kinds of things.  So it wasn’t that I was attempting 
to contradict what she said, but I was trying to re-frame it, rather than 
deferring all of the responsibility to God.  There are some things that you 
can still do, that you have control of.” 
 
 In the exchange below between two nurses, one nurse equates responsibility to 
control in the form of causality.  The patient views herself as being an active contributor 
to her present health status, noting that her eating, drinking, and smoking habits 
“corrupted” her status of being made in the image of God: 
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Nurse 1: “One patient comes to mind who had a congenital dyslipidemia 
that was a family trait on her mother’s side.  And we talked about that, and 
her sense was that this—you know, she was made in God’s image, which, 
in her mind, was a perfect relationship, but that nothing in this world is 
perfect, and so, the building blocks of God’s creation are corrupted by the 
nature of this world and things that happen within this world, which I 
thought was sort of interesting.  And what she did was then sort of bring in 
the fact, ‘Well, you know, I smoke; you know, I was a heavy drinker.  You 
know, these are all things that I did in this world.  This was not part of 
God’s creation, and even though I had this tendency to have, you know, 
high blood fats, you know: the way that I ate, living on McDonald’s and 
pizza, you know.  It was something that I—I corrupted the situation by 
what I did in this world.’  So I thought that was kind of an interesting 
thing.” 
 
Nurse 2: “Did she name Adam and Eve?” 
 
Nurse 1: “No.  No, she didn’t.” 
 
Nurse 2: “Collaborators in this?” 
 
Nurse 1: “She didn’t.  She didn’t.  But she clearly put the onus on herself, 
as being responsible for that, and corrupting God’s creation.  Interesting.” 
 
 In another focus group session, one genetic counselor recounted her work in a 
Catholic hospital, specifically her experiences with a patient facing the choice of 
terminating her pregnancy.  Here, the counselor expresses a feeling of lacking control 
when the patient makes an unexpected decision regarding her care, and once again we 
find that responsibility is articulated in relation to the ideas of decision-making and 
control: 
Genetic Counselor: “In a lot of the cases where there’s a fetal anomaly or 
they get a diagnosed condition, sometimes the issue of, you know, 
spiritual assessment will come up, and there, I have offered patients the 
options to speak with our peri-natal grief support person…the nurse that is 
RTS trained…RTS is, it’s kind of a peri-natal loss training 
program….Resolve Through Sharing…and I’ve also offered for patients 
to speak with a chaplain person and we’ve only had one person in all of 
my time, here, ever take me up on the offer to speak with a chaplain.  And 
interestingly that patient ended up terminating her pregnancy.  You know, 
it was kind of counter-intuitive to me, I thought, you know, what I thought 
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her decision would be ended up being completely different from what it 
was and you know, that was kind of a puzzling situation for me where I 
expected the patient to make a decision and they ended up with a 
completely different (?).  That comes up a lot, actually, I’m finding out.  
That no matter what support services, or what resources I offer to patients, 
it seems like they are going to make their decision how they’re going to 
make it.  And I don’t think it means that we shouldn’t be offering them the 
resources and the grief support, to talk with a chaplain or a grief support 
specialist, but I’ve realized not to feel like I have so much responsibility 
for the decision that patient makes.  And, I think that’s something that I’ve 
learned in the past few years.  It’s difficult for me when patients make the 
decision to terminate but I can’t take responsibility for that.” 
 
 Finally, another genetic counselor in the same focus group speaks of her 
responsibilities “as a counselor,” in other words, her professional responsibilities.  
Though this mention of responsibility is in line with the other statements that render it in 
language of control and choice, it is worth noting that the counselor’s appeal to 
responsibility occurs in her description of her own anxiety.  She draws a distinction 
between her “responsibility as a counselor” and her religious and familial backgrounds, 
noting how they seemingly pull her in different directions on the issue of abortion.  
Though responsibility may appear to be synonymous with duty or obligation in her 
statement, she is discussing her responsibilities.  In other words, responsibility informs 
her self-understanding of her work as a counselor: 
Genetic Counselor 3:  Yeah, but what if it were?  Abortion to used to not 
be legal and now it…. 
 
Genetic Counselor 2: Right but what I’m thinking of is what is their legal 
right to do and my responsibility as a counselor and where I do or do not 
draw the line as my responsibility as a counselor as long as what their 
choice is is legal and my religious beliefs, I’ve had to sort through, 
through the years, because I still do have a problem with that is a 
life…that is a life that is being taken and I take that very, very 
seriously…very seriously…and I still struggle with that issue but I also 
would fight for their right to make that decision because and part of that 
doesn’t come just from my religious beliefs and that’s concern about that 
child.  Part of that comes from my familial background that I have a sister 
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with Down Syndrome who was born 40 years ago when there was nothing 
to do for those children.  And I watched my mother attempt to kill herself 
twice over having produced that abnormal child and over having a 
husband who said that child could not be his because he wasn’t capable of 
producing an abnormal child…so I’ve seen what it can do to a whole 
family and so it’s not just a decision about that child…it’s a decision about 
the whole family unit and so it’s not just my religious beliefs.  It’s where I 
come from from a family perspective that I would fight for their right, 
regardless of whether I think what they’re doing is right, as long as it’s 
legal, and I as a counselor, whether I agree with what they’re doing or not, 
have worked through the point that I can support that decision and I can 
say to them, I know that you are doing what you believe is right because 
one of the research studies I did, because it’s one of the things that 
couple’s need to hear the most is, you’re doing the right thing.  Well, I 
can’t always say you’re doing the right thing but I can say I know you 
have struggled with this decision and thought it through and I know you 
are doing what you feel is best for you…this is the best decision you can 
make for you.   
 
 In sum, relatively few of the medical professionals spoke about responsibility 
during these focus groups, but when they did it was typically in relation to notions of 
decision-making and control.  In lacking control over a patient’s decision-making 
process, the care provider feels that she lacks responsibility for that decision.  In other 
words, one gains responsibility by having some form of control.  Especially in the final 
statement, we see that responsibility is also linked to a person’s particular role as a 
professional (in this case, as a genetic counselor).  This should come as little surprise, 
given that focus group participants were asked to reflect on their work as professionals 
dealing with issues of genetics and religion.  Further, as we examine the medical 
professional codes of ethics later in this chapter, we shall find a similar emphasis on 
professional role-based responsibilities.   
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Clergy Members Speak: Notes from Hospital Chaplain and Ministerial Focus 
Groups 
 Medical clinicians are not the only caring professionals who encounter genetics-
related issues in their work.  Both within and outside the clinic, pastoral care providers 
seek to comfort and assist patients who face challenging medical circumstances in their 
own lives or in the lives of family members.  The Religion and Genetics study group also 
conducted four focus groups of Christian ministers and hospital chaplains.  One focus 
group was devoted solely to hospital chaplains, while one focus group consisted of 
“mainline” Protestant ministers and two focus groups centered on “evangelical” Christian 
ministers.  Each focus group consisted of three or four participants.  In all, 13 religious 
professionals participated in the focus groups (10 ministers and three chaplains).  As 
described above, participants were provided a set of case studies to consider in order to 
launch discussion.  Participants were then asked to reflect on their own experiences 
providing care for patients and congregants.  In these focus groups, participants drew on 
the language of responsibility more frequently than did the clinicians I previously 
described.  All three chaplains, one mainline Protestant minister, and three evangelical 
ministers referenced responsibility in their remarks (five, one, and nine times, 
respectively), although the facilitator made the first mention of responsibility in brief 
remarks in each instance.  In another focus group of evangelical ministers, one minister 
raised the issue of responsibility on his own. 
 In the chaplaincy focus group, participants spoke of role-related responsibility.  
However, the chaplain’s statement below ties parental responsibility to possessing 
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knowledge, even if that knowledge is unactionable.  In other words, knowledge is a 
requirement for responsibility: 
Chaplain 2: “You know, if it matters that he has this, and thereby, his 
children may also have that possibility, then he would probably want to, as 
a parent, responsible parent, might choose to go ahead with the testing, 
even if it wasn’t going to benefit him, in terms of treatment options, so he 
would know what their status would be, I would think.” 
 
 At another point during the chaplaincy focus group,  participants turn their 
attention to patients using the language of God’s will to understand themselves and their 
circumstances.  In this particularly revealing exchange, two of the chaplains note that 
while some people may see a reliance on such views as an “abdication of responsibility,” 
others may find such recourse to be comforting and a very different way of understanding 
what it means to be responsible.  It may be that recognizing one’s lack of control may in 
fact be a hallmark of the type of responsibility of which they speak: 
Chaplain 1: “It’s a security of knowing that even though I don’t 
understand why, somebody’s in charge.  This isn’t just a fickle world 
that—I don’t understand why God is doing this to me, but I trust that God 
is in control.  And I may be angry with God for giving me cancer or 
whatever, but ultimately, God’s in control, and that’s been my experience 
of the sense of payoff, is there’s a sense of security; there’s a sense of 
orderliness, in the midst of what otherwise might feel like a chaotic, 
unordered world.” 
 
Chaplain 2: “In watching that, it often looks like an abdication of 
responsibility.” 
 
Chaplain 1: “Yeah.” 
 
Chaplain 2: “When you watch people walk through that, you go, “Gosh!  
It looks as though they’ve given up any sense of responsibility for 
themselves or for the folks around them, but it can be a very comfortable 
place to be, if you think you’re just rolling with it, and God, again, will do 
what God chooses to do.  It seems, again, and can look, irresponsible to 
outsiders, particularly, I think sometimes, medical personnel who aren’t 
familiar with that kind of thinking.” 
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 A discussion among evangelical ministers echoes a similar point as they discuss 
responsibility in the case study of Debbie, the 40-year-old pregnant woman who is asked 
about undergoing amniocentesis.  In the case study, Debbie defers to “God’s will” in her 
responses, as she is hesitant to accept the risks involved with the procedure.  She suggests 
that it will be God’s will if she has a child with Down syndrome, just as it will be God’s 
will if her child is born without that condition.  Note how the exchange moves quickly 
from a question about Debbie’s responsibility to a discussion of how her theological 
worldview informs her self-understanding and her interpretation of her specific 
circumstances.  Interestingly, one of the ministers echoes the sentiment that Debbie’s 
movement away from making a decision is an abdication of her responsibility, but 
another minister frames the issue quite differently.  Instead of Debbie struggling with 
what is the “responsible” decision to make, this minister interprets her hesitance to make 
a decision as a signal of her attempt to live in accord with her faith-based experiences.  
Her struggle is not with making a particular decision—whether or not to undergo 
amniocentesis—but rather with understanding her current situation in light of her 
theological worldview: 
Minister 1:  “What are you saying?  Backing away from a decision or 
backing away from…because she ultimately has to make a decision.” 
 
Minister 2:  “Right.” 
 
Minister 1:  “Nothing is a decision.” 
 
Minister 2:  “Right.” 
 
Minister 1:  “So, are you saying she’s backing away from a decision as 
far as her own human responsibility or help me to follow on what you 
were saying.” 
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Minister 2:  “Yeah, it just seems like she’s struggling with and she, yeah, 
I agree.  She’s making a decision by not making a decision.  She’s going 
to just see what happens.” 
 
Minister 3:  “I think she’s also dealing with, as she looks at the genetic 
counselors scenarios that have been given to her, I think, I think the first 
thing that she is acknowledging here is the fact that what is her faith 
experiences up to this point and how do they fit into the context of the four 
scenarios and I think that, I think what I’m finding today, more and more 
people are operating off of that premise to begin with than off of the 
situation.  In other words, what is my faith based experience and therefore 
my decisions are coming off of that faith based decision.  Ah, and that’s 
particularly true with what I would call core church attenders and 
members.” 
 
 This link between God’s will and human responsibility ran throughout the 
evangelical ministers’ focus groups.  Participants grappled with what it means to be a 
responsible human moral agent in light of a worldview in which God is still “in control” 
and actively participating in the affairs of the world.  In elaborating on this point, one 
participant drew on an enlightening metaphor—a ship at sea.  Though his focus is on the 
relationship between human freedom and God’s control, his response is directed to a 
prompt regarding the nature of responsibility in light of that tension.  In the statement, the 
minister concedes that human beings have freedom to act to a certain degree, but we lack 
control over the overall trajectory of our lives.  That trajectory, according to this minister, 
is the purview of God.  As a result, responsibility remains for individuals even when they 
lack total control over their lives: 
Facilitator:  “Well, so speaking with this God’s will claim, my grace is 
the notion of sovereignty and….Bruce raises the notion of responsibility 
so my sense is this sort of tension…how do you hear that tension with 
your congregants or folks that you are ministering too?  How do they 
experience that tension?” 
 
Minister 2:  “Well, I hear people, I don’t know if they use the word God’s 
will but they ah, during prayer, you know, they say, ‘Lord, (?) but if it’s in 
your sweet will, you know, I ask that this occur and that occur.’  You 
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know, they want to be where where God wants them to be on there but 
they still know, that, you know, we can tug on the heart of God through 
(?).  I heard somebody say one time that God’s will is like an ocean liner 
that’s going from here to Germany and that while I’m on it, I’ve got all the 
freedom; I can do whatever I want to do.  I can play shuffleboard, I can 
exercise, I can eat, I can do what I want to but that ship is going to 
Germany, not going some place else so God’s will is at work and all, 
saying we’re going this direction but I think within sight of that we have, 
there is some of that freedom that is in there working in you know, 
different areas.” 
 
 What we find in these various statements is both a harmony and a discord with 
what the medical professionals said about responsibility.  On one hand, there is a 
recognition that one’s status as a parent or professional or church member gives rise to 
and informs certain responsibilities.  On the other hand, some of these clergy members 
made overtures toward a vision of responsibility in which people struggle not with 
making difficult decisions, but rather with discerning how best to live out their 
fundamental commitments amid a challenging set of circumstances.  In other words, the 
question of responsibility for these clergy and their congregants is not “What decision 
should I make?” but rather “How can I live in accord with my commitment to the idea 
that God is in control?”  As I will later show, this is a very different approach to thinking 
about responsibility, but it is one that may be fruitful for probing the ethical challenges 
that genetics and genetic biotechnologies pose to care providers, patients, families, and 
others who confront those issues in the course of medical care. 
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Institutional Responses to the New Genetics 
 
Statements from Medical Professional Organizations 
 The focus group transcripts are certainly helpful for eliciting what individual 
members of the caring professionals say about responsibility in light of genetic issues.  
However, as some of those statements suggested, responsibility is not merely a personal 
value or commitment; it often carries social and institutional connotations.  Thus, it will 
be helpful to turn to the official statements of religious denominations and medical 
professional organizations in order to see how these institutions speak of responsibility.  
Further, the institutional perspectives can carry significant weight for public policy 
discussions and for setting expectations and standards for members of these caring 
professions, even if the personal views of individual professionals may differ from the 
institutional statements.  Specifically, I turn to the Codes of Ethics for the American 
Medical Association (AMA), the American Nurses Association (ANA), and the National 
Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC). 
 
The American Medical Association 
 The American Medical Association (AMA) has developed an extensive Code of 
Medical Ethics over the course of its 160-year existence, going well beyond simple 
recitation of the Hippocratic oath.  The AMA Code is designed to provide “standards of 
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician.”6  For this 
                                                
6 American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,  “Principles of 
Medical Ethics” in “AMA Code of Medical Ethics,” 2001 Version.  <http://www. 
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reason, the AMA Code offers both general principles and specific suggestions for guiding 
the conduct of AMA physician members in a variety of circumstances. 
 Just as the physician’s role is multi-dimensional, so too does the AMA Code 
address the physician’s relationship to her patients, other physicians and health 
professionals, hospitals, and society at large.  Not surprisingly, responsibility becomes 
one of the conceptual lenses through which those relationships are understood.  For 
example, physicians are called to “recognize responsibility to patients first and foremost, 
as well as to society, to other health professionals, and to self.”7  AMA members are 
urged to recognize that “ethical obligations typically exceed legal duties” and that “in 
exceptional circumstances of unjust laws, ethical responsibilities should supersede legal 
obligations.”8  Here, obligation, duty, and responsibility appear to be used 
interchangeably, indicating that responsibility carries connotations associated with 
bearing some obligation or possessing a duty.  Further, even in this brief statement we see 
that the AMA makes a distinction between what the law demands and what is “ethical,” 
with the ethical being of greater importance. 
 Responsibility also plays a crucial role in describing the physician-patient 
relationship for the AMA.   The Code states that “patients share with physicians the 
responsibility for their own health care.”9  However, sharing in responsibility does not 
                                                                                                                                            
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.shtml> 
(accessed August 20, 2009). 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 “Opinion 1.02—The Relation of Law and Ethics” in the AMA Code. 
 
9 “Opinion 10.01—Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship,” AMA 
Code of Medical Ethics. 
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mean that the physician and patient share in the same activities, nor do they share in 
power: “Such a partnership does not imply that both partners have identical 
responsibilities or equal power.”10  In this partnership, the physician is instructed to 
provide healthcare services while the patient is asked to be honest about her medical 
history and condition, to tell the physician of medical issues in a timely manner, and to 
treat the physician with respect.  While the activities of the physician and patient are 
distinct, they nonetheless share a common goal: the promotion of health.  By sharing a 
common goal, the physician and patient both become responsible for their efforts in 
reaching that goal through collaboration. 
 Interestingly, the AMA Code goes into much greater detail about the source of the 
patient’s responsibilities for her healthcare.  Presumably, the fact that a physician is 
responsible to her patients is taken for granted by the AMA and needs little explanation 
regarding the source of that responsibility; instead the AMA Code details how the 
honorable physician should respond to a wide variety of specific issues.  As for the 
patients’ responsibility, the AMA holds the following: 
“Like patients’ rights, patients’ responsibilities are derived from the 
principle of autonomy. The principle of patient autonomy holds that an 
individual’s physical, emotional, and psychological integrity should be 
respected and upheld. This principle also recognizes the human capacity to 
self-govern and choose a course of action from among different alternative 
options. Autonomous, competent patients assert some control over the 
decisions which direct their health care. With that exercise of self-
governance and free choice comes a number of responsibilities.”11 
 
                                                
10 “Opinion 10.01—Patient Responsibilities,” AMA Code of Medical Ethics. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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This brief statement provides the most robust articulation of the AMA’s 
understanding of responsibility.  A patient’s responsibility, according to the AMA, is 
grounded in the principle of autonomy.  Notice the themes that the AMA associates with 
patient autonomy: integrity, self-governance, decision-making, self-governance, and free 
choice.  It is through the patient’s capacity to “self-govern and choose a course of action” 
that she comes to bear some of the responsibility for her health care.  The combined 
emphasis on integrity and choice is particularly revealing in this case.  Integrity carries 
connotations of “wholeness” or “completeness” as well as a consistent commitment to 
particular values or principles.  In the context of decision-making, integrity means being 
able to give an account of decisions and actions in order to demonstrate how they are 
commensurate with how a person understands herself, that is, how those decisions and 
actions are my own.  And it is through being able to choose for myself—especially in 
making a decision that is commensurate with my self-understanding—that I share in the 
responsibility for my health care. 
 As for the role of genetics in medical care, the AMA Code covers 11 “social 
policy issues” but only mentions responsibility in two of their opinions—gene therapy 
and genetic engineering.12  Here, both references are to “the standards of medical practice 
                                                
12 The “social policy issues” for which the AMA has issued opinions in their Code of 
Medical Ethics are as follows: patenting human genes (Opinion 2.105), gene therapy 
(2.11), genetic counseling (2.12), genetic engineering (2.13), disclosure of familial risk in 
genetic testing (2.131), genetic testing by employers (2.132), insurance companies and 
genetic information (2.135), genetic information and the criminal justice system (2.136), 
ethical issues in carrier screening of genetic disorders (2.137), genetic testing of children 
(2.138), and multiplex genetic testing (2.139). 
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and professional responsibility.”13  In both cases, what the standards of professional 
responsibility entail in those specific situations is not elaborated.  A section of the AMA 
Code titled “Opinions on Professional Rights and Responsibilities” covers an array of 
topics (accreditation, physician health and wellness, gender discrimination in the medical 
profession, medical testimony, among other topics) that arise in the day-to-day activities 
of a medical professional; presumably these are the types of professional responsibilities 
to which the Code refers in its discussion of genetics-based issues.  This section of the 
AMA Code articulates both the rights and attendant responsibilities that are vested in the 
role of physician: By accepting that role, one accepts the responsibilities listed therein.  
Yet, the AMA Code does not make note of any other responsibilities that arise for the 
physician in situations that specifically concern genetics.  In this way, genetic 
biotechnologies are no different for the physician than other forms of biotechnology: all 
must be used within the limits of professional responsibility. 
 
The American Nurses Association 
 The American Nurses Association (ANA) also established a Code of Ethics, one 
that was initially drafted in 1985 with an extensive revision culminating in 2001.  There 
are nine provisions in the ANA Code, and unlike the AMA Code that was designed with 
physicians in mind, the Nurses’ Code does not pore through lists of specific situations 
that may warrant ethical consideration on the part of the professional.  As such, there are 
no specific provisions in the ANA Code that are geared toward issues of genetics and 
                                                
13 “Opinion 2.11—Gene Therapy” and “Opinion 2.13—Genetic Engineering” in the 
AMA Code of Medical Ethics. 
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genetic biotechnologies.  Instead, the ANA Code was established for the following 
purposes: “It is a succinct statement of the ethical obligations and duties of every 
individual who enters the nursing profession; it is the profession’s nonnegotiable ethical 
standard; [and] it is an expression of nursing’s own understanding of its commitment to 
society.”14  With these goals in mind, the ANA Code is an articulation of the ethical 
dimensions of the nursing profession, one that carries with it an explicitly normative 
component. 
 Like the AMA Code of Ethics for physicians, the ANA draws heavily on the 
language of obligation, duty, and responsibility in detailing the ethics of the nursing 
profession.  In fact, the words “responsible” and “responsibility” appear 62 times in this 
brief statement.  In the ANA Code we find that “the nurse’s primary commitment is to 
the patient, whether an individual, family, group, or community.”15  However, the nurse 
must not forget to take care of herself: “The nurse owes the same duties to self as to 
others, including the responsibility to preserve integrity and safety, to maintain 
competence, and to continue personal and professional growth.”16  While the AMA 
physician’s code emphasizes respect for both patient and professional, the ANA code for 
nurses repeatedly stresses the guiding force of the “inherent dignity” of everyone 
involved in the clinical encounter. 
                                                
14 American Nurses Association Board of Directors and the Congress of Nursing 
Practice,  “Preface to the ‘Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements.”  
Adopted July 2001. 
<http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/EthicsStandards/CodeofEthicsfor 
Nurses/AboutTheCode.aspx> (accessed September 4, 2009). 
 
15 “Provision 2” of the ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses. 
 
16 “Provision 5” of the ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses. 
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Responsibility also plays a key role in establishing and protecting the 
“professional boundaries” of nursing.  Nurses are told that they have a “professional 
responsibility” to retain personal boundaries when working with patients and families so 
that the work of the nurse is not jeopardized by those interactions.  Further, the very 
profession of nursing is “responsible and accountable for assuring that only those 
individuals who have demonstrated the knowledge, skill, practice experiences, 
commitment, and integrity essential to professional practice are allowed to enter into and 
continue to practice within the profession.”17  Nursing educators “have a responsibility” 
to ensure that this level of competency is achieved by a student prior to entering the 
profession and nursing administrators are “responsible for” assessing nurses’ competency 
and assigning them duties commensurate with their level of competency.  Finally, once 
she has entered the nursing world, the nurse herself “has a responsibility” to uphold the 
standards of her profession and to report unethical or incompetent behavior on the part of 
her colleagues. 
Ultimately, responsibility is the bedrock of the nursing profession’s understanding 
of itself and its activities.  Individual nurses “bear primary responsibility for the nursing 
care that their patients receive and are individually accountable for their own practice.”18  
In this section of the Code, the ANA provides its clearest understanding of what 
responsibility entails for the nursing profession: “Responsibility refers to the specific 
accountability or liability associated with the performance of duties of a particular role.  
                                                
17 “Provision 3.4 Standards and Review Mechanisms” of the ANA Code of Ethics for 
Nurses. 
 
18 “Provision 4.1 Acceptance of Accountability and Responsibility” of the ANA Code of 
Ethics for Nurses. 
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Nurses accept or reject specific role demands based upon their education, knowledge, 
competence, and extent of experience.”19  The Code then elaborates on responsibilities 
that are specific to certain nursing roles, such as the individual registered nurse and the 
nursing administrator.  This understanding of responsibility is commensurate with others 
we have seen throughout this chapter, particularly as it is understood in terms of 
accountability and role-related activities. 
One final component of the ANA Code of Ethics is worth mentioning here.  
Earlier there was a reference to the nurse’s responsibility to “preserve integrity.”  In the 
provision that addresses this responsibility there is a significant emphasis on moral self-
respect and character.  This section reiterates the nurse’s responsibility to participate in 
the development of assessment criteria and her responsibility to maintain competence, but 
preserving moral-self respect and character goes beyond these professional and 
procedural matters.  The Code states, “Nurses have both personal and professional 
identities that are neither entirely separate, nor entirely merged, but are integrated.  In the 
process of becoming a professional, the nurse embraces the values of the profession, 
integrating them with personal values.”20  Part of this integration includes a responsibility 
to “express moral perspectives, even when they differ from those of others, and even 
when they might not prevail.”21  The nurse is also called to express her conscientious 
objection to professional activities that are not in line with her personal perspective, 
though she is also called to seek a compromise rooted in integrity whenever possible.  
                                                
19 “Provision 4.3 Responsibility for Nursing Judgment and Action” of the ANA Code of 
Ethics for Nurses. 
 
20 “Provision 5.3 Wholeness of Character” of the ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses. 
 
21 Ibid. 
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Clearly this is a recognition of the tension created when a nurse’s “personal” and 
“professional” identities come into conflict.  In this way, perhaps it is also a recognition 
of a tension similar to that identified by participants in the clergy focus groups, one in 
which a person seeks to live in accordance with her self-understanding in light of a given 
set of circumstances. 
 
The National Society of Genetic Counselors  
Finally, the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) established its own 
Code of Ethics, designed to “clarify and guide the conduct of a professional so that the 
goals and values of the profession might best be served.”22  The NSGC Code is based 
largely on Beauchamp and Childress’ articulation of four principles of biomedical ethics: 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.23  Like the other codes 
described here, the NSGC Code not only covers the values that are to be upheld by 
genetic counselors, but it also offers guidance for their relationships with clients, 
colleagues, and society.  The NSGC Code is not intended to be exhaustive of the genetic 
counselor’s obligations in every circumstance, but is open to “ambiguity…allowing the 
experience of genetic counselors to provide the proper balance in responding to difficult 
situations.24 
                                                
22 National Society of Genetics Counselors.  “’Introduction’ to the Code of Ethics.” 
<http://www.nsgc.org/about/codeEthics.cfm> (accessed August 21, 2009). 
 
23 See Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
24 NSGC, “’Introduction’ to the Code of Ethics.” 
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 The NSGC document is quite brief, divided into six sections consisting of 
explanatory paragraphs and numbered obligations that the genetic counselor should strive 
to fulfill.  In this short space, the NSGC specifically refers to responsibility on five 
different occasions.  In the Code’s preamble, the NSGC notes that the Code is an 
affirmation of the “ethical responsibilities” of its members.  While the specific mention of 
“ethical” here may indicate that there is a distinction between “ethical responsibilities” 
and other kinds of responsibilities, the Code itself then goes on to describe 
responsibilities that arise out of the position of counselor, that is, professional 
responsibilities.  This relation between the invocation of “ethical responsibility” and the 
delineation of professional standards suggests that the NSGC views ethical and 
professional responsibility as inseparable from one another.   
 Three of the four sections devoted to the work of the genetic counselor (Genetic 
Counselors Themselves, Genetic Counselors and Their Colleagues, and Genetic 
Counselors and Society) mention responsibility in some way, though it is curious that the 
“Genetic Counselors and Their Clients” section does not mention responsibility at all.  In 
these three sections, NSGC members are called to “be responsible for their own physical 
and emotional health as it impacts on their professional performance.”  In serving as 
mentors, counselors are also encouraged to “assure that individuals under their 
supervision undertake responsibilities that are commensurate with their knowledge, 
experience and training.”  They also urged to “participate in activities necessary to bring 
about socially responsible change” and to “support policies that assure ethically 
responsible research.”  In these brief statements we once again find that responsibility is 
tied to knowledge and experience, but not in a way that suggests that knowledge and/or 
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experience creates responsibility.  Rather, one’s “knowledge, experience and training” 
can provide the contours of one’s responsibilities, delineating that for which one may “be 
responsible” from that which is off limits.  The two other statements use “responsible” as 
a modifier, describing the social change and research that genetic counselors should 
promote.  However, what such responsible social change and research might look like 
cannot be discerned from the NSGC Code of Ethics alone. 
 
Religious Institutional Responses to the New Genetics: Jewish and Christian 
Denominational Statements 
 In 2002, Rebecca Rae Anderson, a legal scholar and prenatal genetic counselor at 
the University of Nebraska, conducted a survey of 31 Jewish and Christian 
denominational representatives in the United States regarding relevant aspects of their 
faith for how they understand issues of prenatal genetics.25  The survey asks questions 
                                                
25 Anderson contacted all religious denominations in the United States with at least 
200,000 members or at least 50 congregations, including Hindu, Jain, and Muslim 
denominations.  Of the 86 religious organizations she contacted, 31 submitted responses 
to her survey, and of those 31, all were either Jewish or Christian with the exception of 
the Eckankar religious organization.  The following denominations participated in 
Anderson’s survey:  Antiochean Orthodox Christian Archdioceses of North America; 
Christian Reformed Church in North America; Church of Christ, Scientist; Church of 
God (Cleveland, TN); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints; Church of the 
Nazarene; Churches of Christ (Non-Instrumental); Community of Christ [formerly 
Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints]; Cumberland Presbyterian 
Church; Eckankar; Episcopal Church; Evangelical Free Church of America; Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America; General Association of General Baptists; General 
Association of Regular Baptist Churches; General Council of the Assemblies of God; 
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America; Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod; 
Mennonite Church; Orthodox Church in America; Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.); 
Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox Judaism); Roman Catholic Church c/o United 
States Council of Catholic Bishops; Salvation Army; Seventh-day Adventists; Southern 
Baptist Convention; Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform Judaism); 
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about a range of issues in prenatal care (including prenatal diagnosis) and neonatal care, 
including questions about religious ideas of ensoulment, the use of prenatal diagnosis, 
induced abortion for fetal defects, and observances following newborn death.  
Representatives were also invited to elaborate on the issues raised and to provide copies 
of any relevant doctrinal teachings.  As a prenatal genetic counselor, Anderson had 
witnessed firsthand how spiritual ideas or attitudes were frequently operative when 
patients were immersed in difficult circumstances.  She believed that in the counselor’s 
quest to aid patients in understanding complex issues and making tough choices that are 
consistent with their own self-understanding, genetic counselors should be aware of 
prevalent religious teachings and perspectives on those issues in order to facilitate that 
self-understanding.  Hence, she conducted and compiled this survey for the benefit of 
those counselors, though she is quick to note that one should not assume that a person’s 
beliefs are wholly consistent with the teachings of their particular faith tradition. 
As one might expect, responses to the survey questions were as diverse as the 
denominations that participated.  For example, when representatives were asked at what 
point in human development ensoulment takes place or at what point does a unique 
human being becomes present, responses ran the gamut from “conception” (the most 
common response) to “at, or about the time of birth” (Eckankar) to “live birth” to “each 
individual is eternally the image and likeness of God (Gen: 1:26-27).  Therefore, there is 
no single moment when an individual comes into being” (Church of Christ, Scientist).  
On this same question, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) even suggests that its members 
                                                                                                                                            
Unitarian Universalist Association; United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism; Unity 
School of Christianity; and the Wesleyan Church. 
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will hold a range of positions, including at the moment of conception, at the fulfillment of 
criteria developed by Harvard Medical School, quickening, at viability, or even at birth.  
When asked about the acceptability of prenatal diagnostic testing (maternal serum 
screening, ultrasound, amniocentesis, CVS, cordocentesis), parents are often encouraged 
to utilize such testing “at their discretion” while some see such prenatal care as 
“essential” because “our bodies are a trust from God, [therefore] preservation of life and 
health are paramount duties” (Conservative Judaism).  For others, however, prenatal 
diagnosis is considered illicit if “undertaken with the intention of aborting an unborn 
child with a serious defect” (Roman Catholic Church).26 
As interesting as these differences may be, it is also important to note the different 
ways in which these groups speak about responsibility.  Of the 31 participating 
denominations in the survey, 17 specifically draw on the concept of responsibility in their 
answers while two additional participants mention appropriate “responses.”27  The 
frequent use of that concept is all the more notable when we see that Anderson does not 
                                                
26 For a more developed account of the varying responses to the specific issues raised in 
the survey, see Rebecca Rae Anderson, "Religious Traditions and Prenatal Genetic 
Counseling," Am J Med Genet C Semin Med Genet 151C, no. 1 (2009), 52-61.  Roman 
Catholic quote can be found in the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2001), p. 27, paragraph 50. 
 
27 These denominations include: Antiochean Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North 
America; Church of Christ, Scientist; Church of God (Cleveland, TN); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints; Church of the Nazarene; Eckankar; Episcopal Church; 
Evangelical Free Church of America; Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; General 
Association of General Baptists (refer to “respond”); General Association of Regular 
Baptist Churches; General Council of the Assemblies of God; Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod; Mennonite Church and General Mennonite Conference; Orthodox 
Church of America; Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.); Roman Catholic Church c/o United 
States Council of Catholic Bishops; Salvation Army; Seventh-day Adventists; and the 
Wesleyan Church (refer to “respond”). 
 
 72 
use the term “responsibility” at any point in her survey questionnaire.  Other participants 
pick up on related concepts such as “choice” (Church of Christ, Scientist) or “obligation” 
(Reform Judaism) without specific reference to responsibility.  Some denominations 
mention responsibility only once (Antiochean Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North 
America, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Mennonite Church and General 
Mennonite Conference) while others used the term up to 17 times (Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America).  Two of the participating denominations—the Roman Catholic 
Church and Seventh-day Adventists—even supplied supplemental doctrinal statements 
that contained specific emphases on responsibility (“Responsible Parenthood” and 
“Acceptance of Social Responsibilities,” respectively). 
But how do these diverse participants articulate the concept of responsibility in 
their survey responses and doctrinal statements?  One theme that regularly emerged was a 
connection between responsibility and choice: 
“We believe that the human race’s creation in Godlikeness included ability 
to choose between right and wrong, and that thus human beings were 
made morally responsible” (Church of the Nazarene).28 
 
“In their personal lives, members of Eckankar seek divine guidance, 
knowing choices carry responsibility” (Eckankar). 
 
“It may be the morally responsible choice to avoid known risks of serious 
congenital defects by forgoing procreation” (Seventh-Day Adventists). 
 
In the first statement, responsibility seems to be predicated upon one’s abilities to both 
discern and choose between right and wrong, which is in turn rooted in “the human race’s 
creation in Godlikeness.”  Thus, a person can be described as “responsible” not simply 
                                                
28 Church of the Nazarene, “Articles of Faith,” Section 7, paragraph 7, in Anderson’s 
Religious Traditions and Prenatal Genetic Counseling. 
 
 73 
because she has the ability to choose but also because she has a moral understanding of 
her options—she knows right from wrong.  In the Seventh-Day Adventists’ statement, 
“responsible” does not describe the moral agent but rather her choices.  From the ECKist 
perspective, responsibility does not describe the character of an agent or her actions.  
Rather, it is some identifiable quality that accompanies one’s choices. 
Related to this connection to choice, other statements suggest that knowledge is a 
key component of responsibility, particularly as that knowledge relates to making 
choices.  On one hand, knowledge creates responsibilities such that because a person 
knows the difference between right and wrong, she is therefore “responsible” for making 
the appropriate choice.  On the other hand, as our knowledge of the world increases, so 
too does our capacity to interact with the world.  It is in those new interactions that we 
are then faced with new choices—and as some of these statements suggest—new 
responsibilities: 
“We are, to use Philip Hefner’s words, created co-creators with God.  That 
role expands as we know more and can do more….That makes our 
responsibility for human and other life unavoidable, including our 
responsibility in begetting children known to be at risk” (Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America).29 
 
“The moral responsibility to share important genetic knowledge with a 
spouse or potential spouse is not a trivial or passing one; it is a radical 
responsibility which reaches to the core of the relationship (Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America).30 
 
                                                
29 Hans O. Tiefel, “Individualism vs. Faith: Genetic Ethics in Contrasting Perspectives” 
in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America’s Genetic Testing & Screening: Critical 
Engagement at the Intersection of Faith and Science, Roger A. Willer, ed. (Minneapolis: 
Kirk House Publishers, 1998); supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
30 Robert Roger Lebel, “A Geneticist’s Synthesis: Evolution, Faith, and Decision 
Making” in the ELCA’s Genetic Testing & Screening: Critical Engagement at the 
Intersection of Faith and Science; supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
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“The basic Reformed tenet that God alone is the Lord of Conscience 
undergirds long-standing church policy in support of a woman’s ability 
and responsibility, guided by the Holy Spirit, to make good moral choices 
about contraception and abortion within the limits of state and federal law 
(Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.). 
 
“While gene therapy is still in its infancy, it is our moral responsibility as 
thoughtful Christians to become aware of its potential to meet human 
needs, to understand the biological and genetic risks that it entails, and to 
avoid its misuse.  Decisions should be made in accordance with biblical 
principles” (Seventh-Day Adventists). 
 
 Another theme that emerged from the statements was that responsibility is often 
viewed as inseparable from specific roles—roles that are imbued with levels of power or 
authority (legitimated power).  Whether one is a church bishop, a congregant, or a 
parent—each of these positions of authority carry with them specific attendant 
responsibilities.  That is, those who possess the authority to engage in certain activities 
(counseling, protecting unborn children, nurturing one’s family) also have certain 
responsibilities by virtue of their specific role.  Those responsibilities may either direct 
someone to engage in certain sets of activities rather than others (“protecting the rights of 
an unborn child” rather than assisting someone seeking abortion, as in the ELCA example 
below) or they may characterize the ways in which a person participates in his the 
activities of her role.  In other words, certain responsibilities are characteristic of specific 
authority-laden roles: 
“Because of the complexity of the issues, genetic counselors should be 
encouraged to refer members of the LDS Church to their bishop for 
consultation.  He has the responsibility and the right to divine guidance in 
helping them understand spiritual issues” (Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints). 
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“It is the responsibility of members of this Church, especially the clergy, 
to become aware of local agencies and resources which will assist those 
faced with problem pregnancies” (Episcopal Church).31 
 
“We hold that it is the responsibility of parents to protect the rights of an 
unborn child…” (Evangelical Free Church of America).32 
 
“…therefore be it RESOLVED, That the Lutheran Church—Missouri 
Synod in convention urgently call upon Christians…To speak and act as 
responsible citizens on behalf of the living but unborn in the civic and 
political arena to secure for these defenseless persons due protection under 
the law” (Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod).33 
 
“In those increasingly rare cases where a medical choice must be made 
between the life of the mother and that of her unborn child, it is morally 
permissible to favor the mother.  This is not because she is a full ‘person’ 
whereas the fetus is merely ‘potential life,’ for both are equally human.  It 
is rather because of the mother’s place and responsibility within the 
family, where her nurturing and loving presence directly affects the lives 
of her husband and other children” (Orthodox Church in America).34 
  
 Additionally, many of these statements reveal that responsibility is seen as a 
deeply personal matter.  In the statements below we find responsibility associated with 
terms like “unconditional commitment” and “dignity” and “intrinsic value,” words and 
phrases that suggest that there is something so fundamental to responsibility that it may 
be understood as a hallmark of human existence and interaction with the world around us.  
With such “unconditional commitment,” a person devotes herself to a particular cause or 
                                                
31 “Statement on Childbirth and Abortion,” in Resolutions of the General Convention of 
the Episcopal Church, General Convention 1988-C047; supplemental document to the 
Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
32 “Abortion (Declaration for Life and Morality),” Resolution adopted at General 
Conference, 1977; supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
33 “To State Position on Abortion (Overtures 3-02A—3-23),” 1977 Convention 
Proceedings; supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
34 Orthodoxy and Abortion (Syosset, NY: Department of Religious Education, Orthodox 
Church in America); supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
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act, creating a bond in which neither the person nor the cause can be wholly understood 
without reference to one another.  That is, one’s responsibilities come to define who a 
person seeks to be: 
“Responsible opposition to abortion requires our commitment to the 
initiation and support of programs designed to provide care for mothers 
and children” (Church of the Nazarene).35 
 
“Human beings, created in God’s image as male and female (Genesis 
1:27-28), are persons of intrinsic value and dignity.  Human beings live in 
community, with responsibility and accountability to God, self, and 
others” (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America).36 
 
“Amniocentesis can on occasion be put to good use...But we deceive 
ourselves if we suppose that, as a routine feature of medical practice, it 
can simply assist a couple to prepare themselves for their child’s birth.  It 
does exactly the opposite.  It sets our foot on a path that is difficult to 
exit....The technology…prepares us not for the kind of commitment that 
parenthood requires, an unconditional commitment, but for a kind of 
responsibility that finite beings ought to reject” (Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod).37 
 
 Finally, some statements about responsibility stand out in these documents 
because they are so unique.  While the examples above can be readily organized based on 
their shared themes, other statements attract attention precisely because they stand out, 
offering unique insights about how some people construe responsibility: 
“God is not responsible for evil, nor is He its cause.  Neither is he 
blameworthy because He created man’s nature with the possibility of 
                                                
35 “1997-2001 Manual, Church of the Nazarene (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill Press, 
1997), Section 36; supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
36 “A Social Statement on ABORTION,” adopted at the 2nd biennial Churchwide 
Assembly of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America meeting, Orlando, FL, 1991; 
supplemental document to the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
37 Excerpted from Gilbert Meilaender’s Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1996); included in supplemental document to the 
Andreson survey, 2002. 
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alienating itself.  If He had created human nature without free will, by this 
imposed condition He would have rendered the created intelligent being 
purely passive in nature; the creature would simply submit, not having the 
possibility of doing otherwise, since it would not be free.  However, God 
wished that, after a fashion, we too should be His co-workers in His 
creation and be responsible for our own eternal destiny.  God knows in His 
infinite wisdom how to transform the causes of evil into that which is 
profitable for man’s salvation.  Thus, God uses the consequences of evil so 
as to make roses bloom from thorns” (Antiochean Orthodox Christian 
Archdiocese of North America).38 
 
“The Church recognizes that there can be sound reasons for ending a 
pregnancy through induced abortion…We recognize that conscientious 
decisions need to be made in relation to difficult circumstances that vary 
greatly.  What is determined to be a morally responsible decision in one 
situation may not be in another (Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America).39 
 
Each of these statements resonates with commonly held views of responsibility.  
The Antiochean Orthodox statement is particularly rich.  The very first sentence—“God 
is not responsible for evil, nor is He its cause” (emphasis mine)—seems to indicate that 
causality is not a necessary condition of responsibility, as each clause of that sentence 
treats responsibility and causality separately.  However, the rest of the statement suggests 
that freedom is nonetheless a necessary component of responsibility, enabling us to freely 
choose “to do otherwise” as we live and work in the world.  Next, the ELCA statement 
suggests that responsible decision-making requires discernment (determination) and that 
responsibility may be context-dependent.  As the last sentence indicates, what is 
understood as being morally responsible in one context may not be in another.  Thus, 
responsible agents take into consideration the contingent factors of their specific 
                                                
38 “I Believe:…A Short Exposition of Orthodox Doctrine,” 
<http://www.ocf.org:80/OrthodoxPage/reading/believe.html>; supplemental document to 
the Anderson survey, 2002. 
 
39 ELCA, “A Social Statement on ABORTION.” 
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situations.  Even if someone holds certain principles (such as beneficence) as nearly 
absolute, what is considered to be in accordance with that principle in one situation may 
be in another context.  In fact, the very same act may be seen as responsible (or 
beneficent, etc.) or irresponsible, depending upon the mitigating factors surrounding the 
action. 
 From these survey responses, four points are worth emphasizing at this time.  
First, we should note that responsibility is indeed an important concept for how many of 
these religious institutions understand themselves and their work in the world.  Because 
these denominations draw on the concept of responsibility to articulate how they 
understand themselves and their interactions with others, responsibility takes on a keenly 
moral dimension in these statements.  Second, common themes routinely emerged among 
these statements from even the briefest mentions of that concept.  Here, respondents often 
couched responsibility in language of choice, decision-making capacity (which requires 
knowledge), inhabiting roles, and in terms that make responsibility integral to one’s self-
understanding.  None of these themes are incommensurable with one another.  Finally, in 
the two unique statements I highlighted, we see recognition that responsibilities may be 
context-dependent at times.  We also notice in one particular statement that responsibility 
may be associated with causality while nonetheless remaining distinct from that notion.  
Hence, it may be possible to speak of responsibilities that arise independent of whether 
one has “caused” those responsibilities to exist.  Rather, such thinking opens the door to 
speak of responsibilities that arise out of being rather than doing. 
 Finally, the very structure of these institutional statements—for both religious 
denominations and medical professional organizations—is remarkable in its own right, 
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particularly in relation to responsibility.  As statements of official institutional positions, 
these documents serve a specific function, outlining some of the positions that members 
should take and expressing certain expectations that they are expected to fulfill as 
members of a particular denomination or profession.  Beyond providing guidelines and 
describing responsibilities for members of these institutions, however, such statements 
may in themselves create responsibilities for these institutions and their members.  Here, 
J.L. Austin’s distinction between constative and performative utterances is especially 
helpful.40  Constative utterances, according to Austin, describe states of affairs and report 
facts that can be verified or disproven.  Performative utterances, on the other hand, are 
not subject to standards of truth and falsehood, nor do they merely describe events.  
Rather, performative utterances do something (or initiate the doing of something).  For 
example, stating the phrase “I promise X” is not a description of an event but is an event 
unto itself—the very act of promise making.  Similarly, it could be that with these public 
statements that pronouncements like “it is the responsibility of members of this Church” 
may not be merely descriptions of members’ responsibilities but may instead be the 
instantiation of those very responsibilities.  Thus, in declaring that members of these 
various organizations are to be responsible or have certain responsibilities, those 
responsibilities are created through those assertions.  Through taking an oath of 
membership or by continuing to be a member of the organization in question, members 
thereby assent to the responsibilities thrust on them by virtue of belonging to the group.  
                                                
40 See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, William James Lectures (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965); J. L. Austin, J. O. Urmson, and G. J. Warnock, 
Philosophical Papers, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and 
"Performative-Constative" John L. Searle’s The Philosophy of Language, Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 13-22. 
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Further, this way of thinking about institutional statements is commensurate with the 
notion that responsibilities are sometimes borne out of the role that one inhabits.  As a 
member of a church or a medical profession, one takes on responsibilities associated with 
that larger organization, and statements such as the ones mentioned here may be one way 
in which those responsibilities are articulated to organizational members. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I examined data from focus groups conducted by Vanderbilt 
University’s Religion and Genetics study group.  These focus groups, consisting of 
members of the “caring professions” (physicians, nurses, genetic counselors, hospital 
chaplains, evangelical Christian ministers, and mainline Protestant ministers), were asked 
to reflect on their experiences working with patients and congregants dealing with issues 
of genetics and religion in medical care.  Members were also given case studies offering 
specific examples in order to prompt discussion.  For my work, I focused on instances in 
which participants spoke about responsibility in order to develop an understanding of 
how these professionals understand what responsibility entails in the context of their 
professions. 
 In the medical professional focus groups, participants spoke of responsibility in 
relation to control.  Patients who “gave up control” of their health care decisions were 
seen as abdicating responsibility, while the focus group participants articulated a sense of 
lacking responsibility when they were unable to influence their patients’ decisions.  One 
participant drew a distinction between her personal attitudes and her responsibilities “as a 
counselor,” that is, her professional responsibilities that are inherent to her work.  In the 
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clergy focus groups, some of the participants echoed this emphasis on professional 
responsibility.  However, talk frequently turned to the issue of “God’s will.”  In this light, 
some clergy acknowledged that what often appears as an abdication of responsibility is in 
fact a recognition of a tension that permeates human existence: Though we are called to 
be responsible moral agents, we are in fact not in total control of our lives.  Recognizing 
this lack of control may be the first step toward becoming a responsible moral agent, 
particularly when one lives with a worldview in which God’s will is still operative.
 I also examined the statements of medical professional organizations and religious 
denominations to identify ways in which these institutions articulate their visions of 
responsibility.  For the medical professional groups, responsibility is often used 
interchangeably with concepts like “duty” and “obligation.”  Particuarly in the AMA 
Code of Medical Ethics, this understanding of responsibility serves as the foundation of 
the physician-patient relationship.  In working together, patient and physician share 
responsibility for promoting the health of the patient.  Further, AMA Code tied 
responsibility to patient autonomy.  Two other themes that emerged in these Codes of 
Ethics are an emphasis on responsibility for one’s personal well-being (as a member of a 
particular profession) and the unique responsibilities that arise as a result of the 
specialized knowledge that is the hallmark of a given profession. 
 The religious statements I examined are from Rebecca Rae Anderson’s survey of 
31 Christian and Jewish denominations in the United States in which she asked 
representatives to discuss relevant aspects of their faith for issues of prenatal genetics.  
Representatives were also encouraged to include supplemental statements of faith in 
order to provide a more robust account of their particular orientations.  Responses to this 
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survey were as varied as the denominations that agreed to participate.  Some 
denominations connect responsibility to matters of choice, such that one makes 
“responsible choices” or becomes a responsible moral agent by virtue of the choices she 
makes.  Others echoed the familiar sentiments that responsibility is predicated upon the 
possession of knowledge or one’s particular roles (as a parent, sibling, Christian, etc.).  
Many respondents also spoke of responsibility as a deeply personal matter, describing it 
in terms like “unconditional commitment.”  Finally, some responses were very unique 
and were in tension with other statements.  One denominational respondent, for example, 
described responsibility in language that suggests that responsibilities arise independent 
of causality and instead come from one’s being rather than her doing.  This perspective 
may be in line with a status-based view of responsibility or ones like those above in 
which responsibility is inextricably linked to one’s specific roles. 
 The following chapter seeks to contextualize these various reflections on 
responsibility by examining prevalent understandings of this concept that are operative in 
bioethics and ethics discourse.  What might be truly unique about some of these 
statements, and what finds a readily identifiable counterpart in responsibility ethics 
literature?  By turning to ethics and bioethics literature, I intend to highlight ways in 
which typical scholarship on responsibility tends to neglect some of the most interesting 
insights articulated throughout this chapter.  As a result, these statements can serve as the 
basis for an updated account of responsibility that is more reflective of the experiences of 
members of the caring professions.  Thus, a new understanding of responsibility may be 
more suited to address some of the challenges I identified in chapter one that are posed by 
genetics and genetic technologies in the clinic.
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CHAPTER III 
 
UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIBILITY: PREVALENT DISCUSSIONS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN RELIGIOUS, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND BIOETHICS 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
 In the previous chapter I demonstrated ways in which responsibility is an 
important concept for the self-understanding and ethical reflection of the caring 
professions and their individual members.  Survey responses from religious 
denominations and medical codes of ethics attest to the centrality of responsibility as a 
framework for institutional understanding.  Likewise, the focus group transcripts reveal 
that individuals also draw on that concept when discussing the ethical dimensions of their 
work in light of genetics and genetic technologies.  The examples in the previous chapter 
do not provide an adequate data set for making definitive statements about the meaning 
of responsibility for these groups and individuals.  They nonetheless provide testimony to 
the multivalent character of responsibility and its critical importance for moral 
understanding. 
 That multivalent character is on full display in both contemporary moral discourse 
and in everyday conversation (though these categories are by no means exclusive).  
Responsibility is talked about as something a person takes or accepts; a person might be 
held responsible.  It is both thrust upon and striven for by a moral agent.  There are 
frequent references to the responsible citizen, corporate responsibility, and social 
responsibility.  A person may have responsibilities toward herself, toward her family, and 
 85 
toward God.  As a noun, responsibility is often understood as an obligation or duty that a 
person must discharge.  As an adjective, it describes a moral agent who possesses the 
positive or praiseworthy trait of being able to reliably discharge those obligations.  Or, 
being responsible may mean being the one from whom a response is demanded, the one 
who is called upon by the other to give an account of herself.  To a degree, the 
multivalent nature of responsibility is a result of its immense scope of concern.  As social 
scientist Gabriel Moran states, “The relation between the human race and its total 
environment forms the backdrop of all questions of responsibility.”1  With this large 
backdrop and with an ever-increasing expansion of human power and control over our 
surroundings, it should come as little surprise that we often articulate responsibility in 
ambiguous—and sometimes contradictory—terms. 
Theologian Edward Farley has characterized a related concept—obligation—as an 
eroding deep symbol of modern Western societies.2  For Farley, deep symbols are those 
metaphors and concepts that a community uses to engage in self-criticism and develop 
self-understanding.  In our late-modern or post-modern era, these deep symbols have 
become disenchanted and dislodged from the larger interpretive master narratives within 
which they once thrived.  Moran similarly describes this dislodgment as the “lack [of] 
agreement on any rules for our moral language.”3  Alasdair MacIntyre’s entire ethical 
project is based on the premise that the concepts of our moral language have become 
                                                
1 Gabriel Moran, A Grammar of Responsibility (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1996), 
14. 
 
2 Edward Farley, Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern Effacement and Reclamation (Valley 
Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1996). 
 
3 Moran, 23. 
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detached from the rich traditions of inquiry from which they arose.4  As a result of this 
disenchantment and dislodgment, people may still draw on those deep symbols but they 
do so in ways that are varied and often incompatible (or, for MacIntyre, at the services of 
one’s emotions or personal preferences).  In this dissertation I follow Farley’s analysis 
and take responsibility to be a deep symbol—one whose erosion is evident in the 
ambiguity encircling its usage. 
In this chapter I offer an overview of prevalent understandings of responsibility in 
philosophical, theological, and bioethics discourses.  In doing so, I aim to contextualize 
the statements described in the previous chapter to demonstrate how the perspectives 
offered here fail to attend to some of the ways in which members of the caring 
professionals talk about responsibility in light of their work.  This chapter is heavily 
informed by the earlier works of both Albert Jonsen and William Schweiker, two 
theological ethicists (the former is a pioneer in the work of bioethics) who have 
developed classificatory schemes for framing discussions of responsibility.  Jonsen 
organizes his systematic review of responsibility according to two patterns that are akin 
to Weberian ideal types: the attribution of responsibility and the appropriation of 
responsibility.5  Schweiker develops a typology of responsibility based on the locus of 
                                                
4 See MacIntyre’s trilogy: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); and Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition: Being Gifford Lectures Delivered in 
the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990). 
 
5 Albert Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Corpus 
Books, 1968). 
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judgment and action in assigning and discharging responsibility.  He classifies theories of 
responsibility as being agential, social, or dialogical.6 
To provide an overview of the contours of responsibility theories in ethics, I 
unpack what agential, social, and dialogical theories entail by appealing to representative 
examples of each type: Immanuel Kant (agential), Stanley Hauerwas (social), and H. 
Richard Niebuhr (dialogical).  I have selected the quintessential modern philosopher 
(Kant), someone who eschews any attempt to render “the Christian story” into the 
supposedly universal language of modernity (Hauerwas), and someone who described his 
work as an example of “Christian moral philosophy” (Niebuhr).7  While two of these 
theorists do not place responsibility at the center of their work, they nonetheless provide 
representative examples of what agential, social, and dialogical theories of responsibility 
entail for moral agents and communities. 
                                                
6 William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
 
7 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, 1st 
ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), x.  The choice of Kant as the representative for 
agential theories of responsibility may seem a bit odd to those who are familiar with 
responsibility’s history in our moral language.  In fact, Kant never explicitly uses the 
concept in his writings.  However, Kant’s ethical writings lay the groundwork for much 
of modern philosophy, including subsequent writings on responsibility.  Despite Kant not 
using the term “responsibility” in his writings, I have chosen his work as representative 
of an agential theory of responsibility for two important reasons.  First, many of the 
crucial themes of Kant’s works (respect for self, autonomy, and intentionality, to name 
but three) are fundamental to agential theories of responsibility.  Second, Kant provides 
the basis for H.L.A. Hart’s articulation of responsibility.  While I do not discuss Hart’s 
work in detail in this dissertation, I reference him in the following chapter because his 
work serves as a foil for John Silber and his notion of “status responsibility” [see John R. 
Silber, "Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary 
Responsibility," The University of Chicago Law Review 35, no. 1 (1967)].  To a great 
degree, Silber’s status responsibility is the notion that I seek to recover and update in 
light of genetics and genetic biotechnologies.  Additionally, Schweiker includes Kant in 
his discussion of agential theories of responsibility. 
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Most importantly for this dissertation, these typologies provide a manageable way 
to demonstrate not only what these powerful understandings of responsibility emphasize, 
but also what each tends to neglect.  In this review of scholarly literature, I show that 
responsibility is framed almost exclusively in language that emphasizes intentionality, 
voluntariness, and contexts of decision-making.  Recalling some of the statements from 
the previous chapter, however, we find that people often speak of responsibility in ways 
that are independent of such frameworks.  Further, the frameworks of intentionality, 
voluntariness, and decision-making are not necessarily reflective of the ways in which 
moral agents speak about their moral distress when confronted with issues of genetics 
and genetic technologies.   
Additionally, I examine discussions of responsibility in bioethics literature, with a 
special emphasis on talk of responsibility in relation to genetics-based issues.  With the 
exception of scholarship in research ethics, little work on responsibility has emerged in 
recent bioethics literature.8  There are a few exceptions, however.  Anders Nordgren’s 
                                                
8 There is a significant internal debate around what scholars who study these issues 
should call the area in which they work.  However, must of that debate remains 
unpublished.  The Office of Research Integrity (ORI), an office under the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, has published a guidebook for all researchers 
who receive federal funding for their research through the National Institutes of Health.  
The book, authored by Nicholas Steneck, is required reading for those researchers and its 
title suggests the “official” position of the ORI on the matter of naming the field: 
Nicholas H. Steneck, Ori Introduction to the Responsible Conduct of Research, Updated 
ed.([Washington, D.C.]: Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of the Secretary, 
Office of Public Health and Science, Office of Research Integrity, 2007).  The book 
reviews nine “core areas” (research misconduct, protection of human subjects, laboratory 
animal welfare, data management, mentor and trainee responsibilities, conflicts of 
interest and commitment, authorship and publication practices, peer review, and 
collaborative science) for which researchers must receive some training regarding ethics 
and best practices in their work.  While this dissertation will not focus on how 
responsibility is defined here in this work, I should point out that much of the discussions 
on the “responsible conduct of research” follow the agential, individualistic model of 
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Responsible Genetics (2001), for example, directs his attention to the moral responsibility 
of genetic researchers for the outcomes of their work.9  Guido Pennings and colleagues 
have provided the only scholarship on responsibility specifically in relation to 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and like Nordgren, they emphasize the moral 
responsibility of care providers in that context.  
In turning to these bioethics texts, I demonstrate how they also presuppose 
decision-making contexts and rely heavily on notions of voluntariness and 
intentionality—partially a byproduct of Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism and its 
emphasis on respect for autonomy.  As a result, bioethics scholarship on responsibility 
follows the trend of religious and philosophical scholarship that construes responsibility 
as a matter of free, voluntary, autonomous decision-making.  That limited understanding 
of responsibility, I maintain, fails to attend to some of the fundamental challenges posed 
by genetics and genetic biotechnologies.  It also fails to reflect the perspective of those 
individuals who deal with these issues firsthand. 
Though these various discussions of responsibility are fruitful in many ways, I 
point to their short-sightedness in order to lay the groundwork for a more robust 
understanding of responsibility for ethics and bioethics, one marked by the 
acknowledgement of responsibility that arise from a person’s status, regardless of his or 
her voluntary, intentional choices.  These are responsibilities, I maintain, for which one 
                                                                                                                                            
responsibility described by Schweiker combined with an appeal to the “scientific 
community” as both judge and enforcer of these ethical guidelines and their “responsible” 
implementation. 
 
9 Anders Nordgren, Responsible Genetics: The Moral Responsibility of Geneticists for the 
Consequences of Human Genetics Research, Philosophy and Medicine series (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic, 2001). 
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can still be held accountable.  Moral agents are called to give accounts of themselves—
even for aspects of their lives over which they have no control.  For this reason, I argue 
that questions of responsibility are oftentimes questions of integrity, that is, how an agent 
understands herself, her actions, her values, and her commitments in light of a given 
context.  Moral distress results not only from uncertainty about what choices to make, but 
also from the struggle to oneself and to live in accordance with a person’s fundamental 
values in unfamiliar, challenging contexts.  To lay the groundwork for these claims, I 
must first show how responsibility is typically articulated in ethics and bioethics 
literature.  
 
A Brief Word on Responsibility 
 As many other scholars have noted, responsibility is a peculiarly late addition to 
Western moral discourse.10  Its Latin cognate, respondeo, carries connotations of 
promising an answer or providing an account of oneself to someone else.11  Pascal uses 
the term in his Lettres Provinciales (1656), but Jonsen notes that responsibility’s 
“philosophical debut” occurs in David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1740).12  
Here, Hume asserts that to hold a person morally responsible is to judge that person in 
light of his or her actions.  This adjudication of praise or blame, he argues, is an extension 
of the indirect passions of love and hatred, a view in accordance with his belief that the 
passions are the motivating factors behind human action.  Similarly, Jonsen states, “The 
question of responsibility has always been, in moral philosophy, a question about the 
                                                
10 Schweiker, 55; Jonsen, 3; Nordgren, 1. 
 
11 Schweiker, 55. 
 
12 Jonsen, 3. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions which must exist if a man is truly to be called the 
author of his actions and justly to be praised or blamed for them.”13   
In both Hume and Jonsen we see certain elements that ground this understanding 
of responsibility: accountability, judgment, and clarifying the relationship between a 
moral agent and her actions.  In other words, to be responsible agent is to be able to be 
able to take ownership of one’s actions and call them one’s own.  It is, as the Latin root 
suggests, to give an account of oneself to the other.  As a promise, responsibility is also a 
duty that a person bears to be faithful in giving that account of herself.  With this view in 
mind, it should be no surprise that responsibility has found a home in legal and political 
discourses.  The language of accountability and judgment is precisely the language we 
expect to hear in the legal context, the place in which the accuser must state her case, the 
accused must give an account of herself and her actions, and the authoritative judge and 
jury weigh those accounts against each other. 
 
Jonsen’s Basic Patterns of Responsibility 
 
Attribution of Responsibility 
 The resonance with legal matters characterizes the first pattern of responsibility 
that Jonsen identifies—the attribution of responsibility.  He maintains that the attribution 
pattern is rooted in the fundamental question: “How do we know when we may justly 
praise or blame, punish or reward a man for what he has done?”14  He even characterizes 
                                                
13 Ibid., 5. 
 
14 Ibid., 36. 
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this question as “the judge’s problem.”  In this pattern, responsibility is connected to the 
notion of fault.  Here, “to ask whether a man is responsible is to ask whether the act he 
performed was his fault.”15  To say someone is at fault, however, is to rely on two 
unstated assumptions: that some knowable standard of conduct exists and that the person 
who is supposedly “at fault” should have been able to attain that standard.  For Jonsen, 
these moments of fault are “moral events” in which an action “contributes or detracts 
from the human good, however that might be defined, and which comes about through 
the intervention of the human agent.”16  When an agent acts in a way that contributes to 
the human good, she is praised as the one who is responsible for that contribution.  On 
the other hand, when she fails to meet that standard, she detracts from the human good 
and is “held responsible” for being “at fault.”  To describe the basis of this pattern of 
responsibility as “the judge’s problem” seems all too appropriate. 
 In the process of attributing responsibility, the agent presents to the judge and jury 
reasons for which she should not be held responsible—reasons that demonstrate she is 
not at fault.  In that process of reason-giving, the defendant frequently appeals to one of 
the six elements that comprise Jonsen’s pattern of attributing responsibility: intention, 
motivation, deliberation, voluntariness, excuse, and character.  If the agent can 
demonstrate her lack in any one of these six elements, then she may not be held 
responsible for her actions, or she may be held responsible to a lesser degree.  After 
                                                                                                                                            
 
15 Ibid., 39. 
 
16 Ibid., 38. 
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describing each element, I will provide a series of examples to illustrate what Jonsen 
refers to in each case. 
 To articulate the difference between intention and motive, Jonsen draws on John 
Dewey’s distinction between the two oft-conflated concepts.  For Jonsen, an agent acts 
intentionally when she has a particular action in mind and is aware of its potential 
consequences as well as its relation to relevant norms.  In other words, the agent 
understands what she is going to do and the foreseeable impact of her actions.  Motive, 
on the other hand, is the “personal frame of mind” that addresses the question of why the 
agent strives after that goal in particular.17  A person’s motive provides her with reasons 
for her action.  A graduate student who writes a dissertation may be motivated by 
intellectual curiosity and the desire for future employment, for example.  Deliberation is 
linked to both intention and motive, as deliberate acts are those that are “thought about 
through and through.”18  Deliberation enables the moral agent to consider her goals, her 
means for achieving those goals, and her reasons for seeking one goal over another.  It is 
an exercise of the agent’s intellect that allows her to exercise her will.  In describing the 
element of voluntariness, Jonsen draws on Aristotle to assert that voluntary actions are 
those that are performed without constraint or ignorance.  In acting voluntarily, the agent 
has the capacity to deliberate and choose for herself her course of action. 
 Jonsen concludes his discussion the six elements of the pattern of attribution by 
turning to excuses and character.  In making excuses for our actions, a person accepts that 
an act is wrongful but she seek to eschew responsibility for the act by arguing that the act 
                                                
17 Ibid., 45. 
 
18 Ibid., 49. 
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is not subject to the “court of moral verdict.”19  In making excuses, an agent frequently 
refers to other elements of this pattern of responsibility, arguing (for example) that the 
consequences of an act were unforeseeable and thus unintended.  Finally, Jonsen argues 
that character is a key element to the pattern of attributing responsibility, particularly as 
the “judge” weighs the actions and words of the agent who stands accused of some act.  
According to Jonsen, the judge asks: Does this specific act reflect the person’s habitual 
conduct?  Is it consistent with what we know about a person’s intentions, motives, and 
deliberations? That is, what inferences can we make about those elements in light of what 
we already know about a person?  Is the person in need of reform (via punishment), or 
does this one act appear to be an isolated incident? 
 A concrete example will help flesh out these notions.  Consider a person on trial 
for killing her neighbor. In crafting her defense, she may deny any involvement in the 
murder in question.  Or, she may admit to her involvement in the death of her neighbor, 
but will argue that she should not be “held fully responsible” because of her apparent lack 
in any of those six elements.  Below are examples of reasons she may give in her defense 
according to the six elements Jonsen mentions: 
 Intention: “I didn’t mean to kill my neighbor!” 
 Motive: “I have no reason for killing my neighbor!  I wasn’t mad at her!” 
                                                
19 Ibid., 56.  In his discussion of excuses, Jonsen also refers to the practice of 
justification.  When we seek justification for our acts, we “accept responsibility” for 
acting in that fashion but deny the wrongfulness of the particular act due to extenuating 
circumstances.  A person who kills someone who attacks them with a knife, for example, 
justifies her actions by arguing that her actions were in self-defense.  She accepts 
responsibility for her act but denies that she should be punished. Jonsen treats 
“justifications” under the sub-heading of excuses but only offers “excuses” as one of the 
six elements of this pattern.  If justifications are a form of excuse, this is not clear in 
Jonsen’s writing.  
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 Deliberation: “I got caught up in the heat of the moment and stabbed my 
   neighbor!” 
 
 Voluntariness: “I blacked out in a fit of rage and apparently stabbed my 
      neighbor!” or “Her husband forced me to kill her!” 
 
 Excuse: “Yes, I killed my neighbor but it was an accident!” 
 
 Character: “I’ve never acted violently before.  I’m not the kind of person who 
          would kill her neighbor!” 
 
In giving the reasons above, the defendant admits that she was involved in her neighbor’s 
death.  While a judge and jury would likely assign some responsibility to the accused 
because of her admitted involvement, those authority figures may “hold her responsible” 
to a lesser degree by convicting the defendant of a lesser crime that carries a less severe 
sentence (reckless homicide rather than manslaughter or first-degree murder, for 
example)—if any of the reasons above are deemed valid.  
 
Appropriation of Responsibility 
 It is fitting that Jonsen concludes his analysis of the pattern of attribution with a 
discussion of character.  He notes that the process of becoming a moral agent is one of 
gradual growth, a view that I share.  From this perspective, the agent is cast into a world 
over which she has little or no control.  She is raised by parents who teach her particular 
values and behaviors, immersed in a culture with established norms of praiseworthy and 
blameworthy behavior, and “directed toward certain patterns of action (intentions), for 
certain reasons (motivation), and in terms of certain logic (deliberation).”20  At some 
point in this process, the individual transitions from a passive recipient of those lessons 
and values to an active person who can make them her own, someone who can criticize, 
                                                
20 Ibid., 61. 
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alter, accept, or reject what she has received.  Against the backdrop of her socio-cultural 
milieu, she begins to shape her own character and direct her own life.  In other words, she 
becomes a moral agent who “accepts responsibility” for the person she has become and 
strives to be. 
 Whereas the pattern of attributing responsibility examined moral actions almost 
exclusively from the perspective of a judge or authority figure who sought to find the 
grounds for adjudicating praise and blame, the pattern of appropriation is concerned 
largely with the acting moral agent and her ability to take possession of her own actions, 
that is, to call her actions her own.  In other words, “the pattern of ideas associated with 
appropriation of responsibility is that pattern which arises when the philosopher thinks 
about the problem which he and every man has when he faces the challenge to become a 
self-determining being, master of his fate.”21  Questions of unity and character are at the 
forefront of the pattern of appropriation, while those questions remained in the 
background in the pattern of attribution. 
 With its emphasis on character, the pattern of appropriation consists of four 
elements: the self, consideration, conscientiousness, and commitment.  According to 
Jonsen, these elements work simultaneously in the process of appropriation, not as 
sequential events that culminate with the agent’s appropriation of responsibility.  The 
first element, the self, seems to be the foundation upon which the other elements depend 
for their execution.  Here, Jonsen follows the work of F.H. Bradley in noting that 
character helps to explain an agent’s tendencies in action, but it does not explain an 
action itself.  In other words, there must be some volitional agent to put her character into 
                                                
21 Ibid., 63. 
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action.  He claims that it is “the self” who is able to “transcend” what happens to her, 
what has been formed in her (as character or disposition), and even transcends herself 
through critical self-reflection.  The “problem of appropriation,” according to Jonsen, is 
“the problem of the self accepting and taking a position toward what happens to it and 
even toward what it is.”22  In this self-transcendence and self-reflection, the agent must 
make choices.  By making choices that bear witness to the transcendence and critical 
reflection of the self, the agent comes to “appropriate responsibility.”  Such choices, 
Jonsen argues, bear certain hallmarks.  They are made “’with consideration,’ 
‘conscientiously,’ and ‘with commitment.’”23   
 Jonsen’s description of the element of consideration bears a striking resemblance 
to his earlier description of deliberation in the pattern of attribution.  To act with 
consideration is to act with an awareness of alternative possibilities.  The agent chooses 
one course of action over others, making that decision in light of her awareness of the 
potential outcomes of her decision and her alternatives.  Further, consideration entails 
being able to contextualize actions and alternatives, understanding their impact on one’s 
life and relations to others, as well as the ways in which those actions will be understood 
by other members of society.  It involves asking the following question: If I choose to 
perform this action over other possibilities, what does this choice reveal about who I am 
and who I aim to be?  By asking this question, the agent makes advances toward 
becoming her own judge. 
                                                
22 Ibid., 64. 
 
23 Ibid. 
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 Consideration/deliberation is largely an intellectual exercise.  The agent can 
deliberate about nearly any activity in which alternatives exist: “Should I take the 
expressway or surface roads?  Do I want tuna or chicken salad?”  However, Jonsen notes 
that “for situations commonly called moral something more is asked of the agent than 
technical skill in thinking through and interpreting his action.”24  In “moral” situations the 
agent must consider rules of judgment, standards of praiseworthy and blameworthy 
behavior, and she must also hold to those standards and her decisions with consistency.  
The ability to act in this way, according to Jonsen, is the sign of conscientiousness.  The 
conscientious agent demonstrates “seriousness, constancy, and consistency in both his 
considerations and his conduct.”25  In addition to understanding how one’s actions relate 
to standards of behavior judgment, the moral agent should “stick with” her well-
considered actions, even in the face of adversity.  For Jonsen, this attitude or disposition 
toward constancy is the hallmark of conscientiousness. 
 The final element of the pattern of appropriation is commitment.  In the moral 
life, the agent engages in the process of consideration and then determines a course of 
action that is expressive of those considerations.  In other words, the agent makes 
choices.  Commitment, for Jonsen, “suggests the active engagement of the person to a 
course of action, to a cause, or to a way of life.”26  In this way, the agent’s choices do not 
signal an end to the deliberative process, but rather mark the final steps toward becoming 
an agent who can appropriate responsibility for herself.  In commitment, the agent calls 
                                                
24 Ibid., 66. 
 
25 Ibid., 67. 
 
26 Ibid. 
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choices and actions her own.  Though he recognizes that Sartre’s existentialism may 
overstate the case, Jonsen points to Sartre to demonstrate the foundational nature of 
commitment for the possibility of appropriating responsibility as a moral agent: “If it is 
only by choice, by commitment in absolute freedom, that the self and the world come 
into existence, then the self is totally responsible, totally and incontestably the author of 
being.”27 
 
William Schweiker’s Typology of Responsibility 
 Jonsen’s patterns of attribution and appropriation describe two ways in which 
responsibility is thrust upon the moral agent, whether she is “held responsible” by an 
authority figure or she “takes responsibility” for herself and her actions.  However, these 
patterns offer little substantive guidance for agents navigating the moral life.  “To be 
responsible is to be held accountable for your actions” or “Being responsible means being 
able to stand by your actions” reveals little about what responsibility actually entails.  
Instead, those patterns highlight responsibility’s origins.  Theological ethicist William 
Schweiker has also developed a typology for theories of responsibility, classifying those 
theories as agential, social, or dialogical.  Like Jonsen, Schweiker also examines 
responsibility in light of the primary moral actors (judge and agent for Jonsen, and the 
agent, community, and dialogue partners for Schweiker, respectively).  However, 
Schweiker’s typologies provide more substantive accounts of what it means to “be 
responsible” according to each theory.  As he later moves to the constructive element of 
his work (which will be discussed in the following chapter), Schweiker maintains that 
                                                
27 Ibid., 68. 
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each of these three types of responsibility are helpful for thinking about what it means to 
be responsible; no theory is sufficient by itself.  He then argues for an integrated theory 
of responsibility.  For now, it is important to note how he classifies prevalent 
understandings of responsibility. 
 
Agential Theories of Responsibility: Immanuel Kant 
Jonsen’s patterns of appropriation and attribution fit within the framework of 
agential theories of responsibility.  Like the pattern of appropriation, agential theories 
emphasize the work of the individual moral agent.  They place great emphasis on the 
relationship between the agent and her acts; her causal agency determines her moral 
responsibility.  As described in the pattern of attribution, if an agent did not “cause” the 
act in question, or if she did so under extenuating circumstances, then she may not be 
held responsible.  Schweiker identifies two forms of agential theories of responsibility, 
which he calls “strong” and “weak” agential theories.  For strong agential theories, the 
principle for judging acts (as moral/immoral, praiseworthy/blameworthy) rests in the 
“self-legislating capacity” of the moral agent.28  For weak agential theories, the principle 
of judgment is grounded elsewhere, such as in social practices or religious ideals.  
However, whether it is the agent who judges herself to be responsible or whether she is 
judged to be responsible by her society’s judicial institutions, that judgment is based on 
the ontologically real responsibility that is derived from her causal agency.  In other 
words, the starting point for moral assessment within both strong and weak agential 
theories of responsibility is the relationship between the moral agent and her actions. 
                                                
28 Schweiker, 78. 
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Schweiker then turns to representatives of both strong and weak agential theories: 
Immanuel Kant and Paul Tillich, respectively.  His selection of Kant may seem peculiar 
considering that Kant never explicitly develops an account of responsibility in his 
writings.  However, Schweiker views Kant’s work as providing the foundation upon 
which strong agential theories of responsibility rest, as his entire philosophical project 
depends upon his formulation of the rational, self-legislating moral agent.  Schweiker 
describes Kant’s vision of autonomy as a form of “responsibility for self” and thereby 
interprets his work as a contribution to analysis of responsibility. 
In the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant turns his transcendental 
method from matters of epistemology to ethics to inquire into the conditions that make 
morality possible.  For Kant, the basis of morality is our sense of duty or obligation; 
duties are what separate the human from the beast.  One hallmark of duties is their 
conflict with inclinations or desires.  After all, if a person wanted to do something, it 
would not be a duty.  So while the rational capacity tells agents that duties exist, sensory 
experiences compel the agent to act contrary to those duties.  That rationality, universally 
held by all moral agents, also provides the basis for the universal moral law.  Being 
innate (that is, prior to our experience), the moral law is both universal and categorical, 
hence the label “categorical imperative.”  As a categorical (rather than hypothetical) 
imperative, the moral law is applicable at all times, regardless of the context or the ends 
that one desires.  Two formulations of the categorical imperative are worth mentioning 
here: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law,” and “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether 
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in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and 
never simply as a means.”29 
To act in this way, the moral agent must not be wholly subject to her desires or to 
the pressures of the world around her—she must have freedom as a precondition of moral 
agency.  She must have freedom from the influence of her impulses and sensuous desires 
but she must also have freedom to discover the universal moral law and enact it.  This 
freedom is an exercise of autonomy, according to Kant, as the moral agent frees herself 
from the bonds of sensuous desire and can exercise her rationality, legislating her actions 
without the influence of those desires.  The moral agent, now free, recognizes the 
universal moral law described above and, acting with a “good will,” she acts from her 
sense of duty to that law.  As Schweiker states it, “What ought objectively to determine 
the will is law while its subjective determination is pure respect for this practical law.”30  
For Kant, this feeling of pure respect for the moral law is an effect of the law rather than 
its cause, providing moral agents with “a conception of a worth that thwarts self-love.”31  
It is the agent’s good will—that which compels her to act from pure respect for the moral 
law and not merely in accordance with the moral law—that is the only “good without 
qualification” for Kantian ethics.32 
                                                
29 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd ed., trans. James W. 
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), § 421 and § 429, 
respectively. 
 
30 Schweiker, 81. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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Schweiker interprets Kant’s moral project as a contribution to responsibility ethics 
because, like subsequent theorists of responsibility, Kant aims to draw connections 
between causative and evaluative judgments.  Kant works to show how the moral agent 
can be a “free cause” in the world; it is from her freedom that questions of responsibility 
may arise.  Schweiker rightly notes, 
“But the question of responsibility, given Kant’s construal of freedom, is 
whether or not an agent is responsible for the maxim on which she or he 
acts.  An agent is only secondarily responsible for the consequences of an 
action; she or he is properly responsible, morally praised and blamed, with 
respect to the motive for acting.”33 
 
Many of the ideas that comprise in Jonsen’s pattern of attribution find their early 
expression in the work of Kant.  There is a concern with the relationship between causal 
and evaluative judgments, such that a moral law is judged to be valid when it is an 
expression of the moral agent’s free, rational, autonomous capacity.  There is also an 
explicit reference to motive and an implicit understanding that responsible moral agency 
requires deliberation.  Additionally, autonomy and intentionality are necessary 
components of responsible moral agency.  Finally, Schweiker notes that responsibility 
assignment is a secondary activity within the Kantian schema—the assignment of 
responsibility depends on living a life that is an authentic expression of the true nature of 
the autonomous moral agent.  In other words, responsibility is a secondary principle at 
best, subordinate to the autonomous, rational capacity of the moral agent. 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
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Social Theories of Responsibility: Stanley Hauerwas 
 Where agential theories of responsibility (exemplified by Kant) emphasize the 
self-legislating capacity of the moral agent, social theories emphasize the influence of 
social roles and practices for shaping the outlook of the moral agent.  Schweiker quotes 
Peter French in describing this phenomenon, noting, “In short, the content of the self is a 
pattern of relations within a community.”34  From this perspective, the identity of the 
moral agent develops via a social process of becoming acculturated to the social roles and 
practices of the community in which she exists.  This is a claim about both identity and 
moral duty for the moral agent, as that duty also arises from the agent’s social relations 
and the functions of her specific social roles that she inhabits.  In other words, the moral 
agent’s duties arise from who she is insofar as she is identified by her various roles—her 
profession, family roles, memberships in specific communities or organizations, etc.  The 
agent’s own identity is formed through the social practice of describing the agent’s roles 
and its associated responsibilities.  Therefore, Schweiker notes, “If we can specify the 
rules for description, or, more properly, the rules for praising and blaming agents, we can 
fulfill all that can or need be said about conditions for moral agency and responsibility.”35 
Like agential theories of responsibility, social theories also come in strong and 
weak varieties.  Strong social theories of responsibility are concerned primarily with the 
process of assigning responsibility to agents in a community.  On the other hand, weak 
social theories emphasize identity formation rather than responsibility assignment.  In 
other words, weak social theories interpret responsibility as one of the mechanisms 
                                                
34 Peter A. French, Responsibility Matters (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 
61;  quoted in Schweiker, 87. 
 
35 Schweiker, 87. 
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through which both individual and community identity are constituted.  Schweiker 
identifies Stanley Hauerwas as a representative of weak social theories of responsibility 
since Hauerwas’ primary ethical consideration is not “What ought I do?” but instead 
“How can I live in accordance with the Christian story as revealed through the work of 
God in Christ?”  For Hauerwas, Christian identity can only be understood from within the 
narrative that the Church tells about God’s redemptive work in Christ (For Hauerwas, the 
definite article is important.).  Any moral ought that can be discerned arises out of that 
narrative and the Church’s faithful retelling of that story—not from any appeals to human 
“nature” or supposed universal principles.  On this point, Hauerwas notes, “For the 
Christian seeks neither autonomy nor independence, but rather to be faithful to the way 
that manifests the conviction that we belong to another.  Thus Christians learn to describe 
their lives as a gift rather than an achievement.”36  This perspective is definitely a stark 
contrast from the Kantian who views the moral life as an autonomous endeavor. 
One of Hauerwas’ most pressing critiques of modern liberal Protestant ethics is 
that it has assumed the conceptual categories and framework of Enlightenment thought, 
thereby diluting and distorting the message of the story of God’s love in Jesus Christ.  As 
a result, “being Christian simply became a way to indicate what the society generally 
regarded as decent.”37  That story, he argues, cannot be told in the language of modernity.  
Instead, he seems to follow Alasdair MacIntyre’s retrieval of Aristotle and Aquinas, 
                                                
36 Stanley Hauerwas, “Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life” (1980);  
Reprinted in Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive 
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Stanley 
Hauerwas, John Berkman, and Michael G. Cartwright, The Hauerwas Reader (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 224.   
 
37 Ibid, 227. 
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claming that “the language of virtue and character is especially fruitful in providing 
moral expressions appropriate to Christian convictions.”38  As noted above, when we rely 
on the modern language of autonomy, so his argument goes, we fail to appreciate that our 
lives are gifts.  To strive for autonomy is to enslave ourselves rather than to seek the 
freedom that accompanies dependence on the one who has given us that gift of life.  As 
he notes, “The self can be held to have sufficient coherence to deal with the diversity of 
our moral existence only if that self is formed by a narrative that helps us understand that 
morally we are not our own creation, but rather our life is fundamentally a gift.”39 
In an essay describing the inadequacy of Kohlbergian theories of moral 
development for accounting for the Christian moral life, Hauerwas quickly notes that one 
problem Kantian-based theories encounter is in giving an account for how someone can 
be “held responsible” for acting in a way that “requires moral skills that he has not yet 
developed.”40  To think of responsibility as a matter of character and narrative, he argues, 
addresses that challenge.  He claims that within a Kantian framework, holding someone 
responsible becomes a way of encouraging moral growth—we grow as moral agents by 
being held responsible by others.  However, this creates other another problem: This 
“public morality” or “public responsibility” (to borrow Hauerwas’ terminology) seems 
unjust when holding someone responsible for something she could not avoid, but to 
render responsibility relative to the character of each individual moral agent would 
seemingly undermine that public morality or public responsibility.  However, to seek 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Ibid., 233. 
 
40 Ibid., 229. 
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recourse in the view of the “impartial moral agent” is to altogether lose sight of the 
developing moral agent. 
Not surprisingly, Hauerwas’ response to those challenges is to interrogate the 
assumptions on which the idea of public morality is based.  He states, “I assume that no 
moral theory is capable in principle of closing the gap between what I should do (my 
public responsibility) and what I can or have to do (my own responsibility).”41  Instead of 
developing an account of moral development that connects “personal responsibility” with 
“public responsibility,” Hauerwas provides account in which the agent’s appropriation of 
public responsibility contributes to “the story of that people.”42  That story, he claims, is 
more fundamental than the agent’s own standpoint, therefore, “To claim responsibility 
for (or to attribute responsibility to) the agent is to call for an agent to be true to the 
narrative that provides the conditions for the agent to be uniquely that agent.”43  
Responsibility thus provides the means to live in line with “a narrative that charts a way 
for us to live coherently amid the diversity and conflicts that circumscribe and shape our 
moral existence.”44  It compels the agent to call her actions her own, even when she acts 
unknowingly or unreflectively.  In being held responsible by the community that shares 
in the narrative, her character develops. 
In sum, social theories of responsibility—as exemplified by the work of Stanley 
Hauerwas—portray responsibility as a social endeavor, not as an ontologically “real” 
                                                
41 Ibid., 232. 
 
42 Ibid. 
 
43 Ibid. 
 
44 Ibid., 245. 
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moral fact waiting to be discovered.  That is, one cannot learn for herself what it means to 
be responsible: she learns to be responsible only through being held responsible by 
others.  Praise and blame are social activities determined by the norms (or narrative) of 
the particular community of which the agent is a member.  Responsibility becomes a 
matter primarily focused on the developing character of the moral agent and her relation 
to the norms and narrative(s) of her community, with relatively little focus on isolated 
individual decision-points. 
Great difficulty arises for these social theories of responsibility when a person 
seeks to understand why one community’s norms/narrative(s) are more valid than those 
of another community, or why some versions of that narrative are authoritative at the 
exclusion of other versions.  Further, social theories of responsibility, insofar as 
Hauerwas is a representative example, tend to assume that there is one narrative, one set 
of norms, or one community that organizes the world of the moral agent.  However, I 
maintain that moral agents act in multiple roles with different, sometimes competing or 
incommensurable, norms of responsible action.  That is, moral agents find themselves 
living within more than one narrative.  Which “story” or set of norms should organize the 
agent’s world?  This question, I argue, is frequently the source of moral distress for many 
moral agents facing difficult circumstances.  Finally, within pluralistic settings like the 
clinic, moral agents frequently encounter others with different sets of social norms—and 
yet they must worth together to overcome the challenges that brought them together.  
Social theories of responsibility offer little guidance for engaging in that process in a 
manner that fosters mutual respect for the various moral agents involved in such 
endeavors. 
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Dialogical Theories of Responsibility: H. Richard Niebuhr 
 The final classes of responsibility theory that Schweiker describes are dialogical 
theories of responsibility.  These theories typically characterize human life as a matter of 
responsive encounter with the “other” (human, non-human, or intrapersonal).  Schweiker 
describes two basic varieties of these dialogical theories: those that hold responsibility to 
be “the first principle of ethics” (Niebuhr, for example) and those that hold the response 
of the other to be “the answer to the problem of the human good” (Barthian divine 
command theology).45  Schweiker interprets these theories as attempts to bridge the 
challenges posed by agential and social understandings of responsibility.  While agential 
theories of responsibility focus largely on the responsibility of the agent (particularly how 
she can call her actions her own) and social theories emphasize the ways in which moral 
identity is socially formed, dialogical theories of responsibility suggest that the moral 
agent is actually constituted by the encounter with the other—a social act that makes 
moral agency possible, all the while challenging the very notion of the self-acting, self-
legislating moral agent. 
 H. Richard Niebuhr suggests a way of thinking about the moral life that contrasts 
with deontological ethics that portray moral agency as a matter of rule-following and 
teleological ethics that cast the moral agent as one who strives after self-determined 
ends.46  “All life has the character of responsiveness,” he claims.47  That is, the moral 
agent is engaged in dialogical (or trialogical) relations with others who act upon her and 
                                                
45 Schweiker, 94. 
 
46 The labels and depictions of “deontological” and “teleological” ethics are those of 
Niebuhr, not the author’s own. 
 
47 Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, 46. 
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call for a response.48  This encounter becomes the moment in which responsibility is 
enacted: 
“The idea or pattern of responsibility, then, may summarily and abstractly 
be defined as the idea of an agent’s action as response to an action upon 
him in accordance with his interpretation of the latter action and with his 
expectation of response to his response; and all of this is in a continuing 
community of agents.”49 
 
This brief statement highlights the four elements of Niebuhr’s pattern of 
responsibility: response, interpretation, accountability, and social solidarity.  Responsible 
action, Niebuhr states, is a response to the actions of others upon the agent.  Action that 
may be called “moral action” is interpreted action.  Not only do agents interpret the 
action of others upon themselves, they also interpret their own action and anticipate how 
the other will in turn respond to their response.  Hence, responsible moral action is action 
for which the agent is held accountable.  Moral actions anticipate where the 
“conversation” of action may be headed as well as the significance that the larger 
conversation may have.  These actions do not occur in isolation, however.  They require 
the presence of other beings with whom the agent may interact and who may interpret the 
agent’s actions.  That is, moral actions occur within a social context and are understood 
within that social context.  Hence the fourth element of Niebuhr’s theory of responsibility 
                                                
48 For Niebuhr, it may be more appropriate to speak of trialogical relations between the 
agent, the other, and God.  This point goes back to Niebuhr’s relational value theory in 
which God is the One Absolute that relativizes all other values.  As God is the center of 
value, a person’s fundamental relationship is her relation to God such that she exists only 
in God.  Further, because relational value theory asserts that God relates to all things, 
God is a participant in each responsive encounter.  As noted below, God acts in all 
actions upon the moral agent, so the agent is called to respond in all actions as she would 
respond to God, hence the trialogical structure of the responsive encounter. 
 
49 Ibid., 65.  Sex-exclusive language is Niebuhur’s. 
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is social solidarity.  Moral actions must be able to demonstrate continuity with one 
another in order to be understood.  Other beings within a community come to know the 
agent through her actions, and those actions must be connected with one another so that 
others may interpret them as her actions.  
Because God is the One Absolute that relativizes all other values and is related to 
all things, the scope of the moral community extends well beyond any particular locale 
with its distinctive mores; the moral community is universal.  Here, God is always an 
interlocutor.  When the moral agent recognizes this ever-present relation to God, she sees 
that she is held accountable to God in all her actions.  Hence, Niebuhr also asserts, 
“Responsibility affirms: ‘God is acting in all actions upon you.  So respond to all actions 
upon you as to respond to his action.”50  With the social, relational, and theocentric 
dimensions to responsible action in mind, Niebuhr contends that this responsible action is 
fitting action.  As Niebuhr explains in his development of relational value theory, fitting 
action is action that is good-for-being, both reflectively and reflexively.  Additionally, 
Niebuhr describes fittingness much more literally, noting that responsive action is fitting 
when it “fits” into the process of response and interpretation mentioned earlier.  Such 
fittingness is possible through recognition of an agent’s place within the universal 
community as well as through a recognition of the timefulness of her own moral agency.  
The agent then seeks to make her action responsive by “fitting” it into those contexts, 
                                                
50 Ibid., 126. 
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much like a sentence fits into and contributes to a paragraph, which in turn further adds to 
a chapter of a book.51   
 This discussion of fittingness is premised upon a particular claim about God, one 
that is revealed in and through Christ: God is a life-affirming God.  For Niebuhr, that 
which promotes the well-being and meets the needs of a being may be called “good.”  If 
fitting action is both action that is good for a being as well as action that “fits” within the 
context of the universal community with the Universal Other (God) at its center, then one 
may conclude that the universal community of which God is the center is a community 
that intends for a being’s needs to be met.  Once the agent recognizes this characteristic 
of the universal community of which she is a part, she sees that responsible action is 
action that promotes the well-being of others.  Even when she is called upon to conduct 
herself in various roles (wife, mother, employee, church member, etc.) by the different 
communities of which she is a part, responsible action is that which nonetheless responds 
to the One in all the many.  That is, despite being called upon to respond in different 
situations through different actions, her integral selfhood can be achieved only because 
she is responsible to the Absolute One in her actions, a possibility recognized only in 
faith to the One for whom being and value are co-extensive.  For Niebuhr, writing a work 
of Christian moral philosophy,” we have faith that God’s intentions are ultimately life-
affirming and integrity-establishing rather than destructive, but this “faith” is not the 
same as “hoping” that God is life-affirming.  Christians claim to witness this life-
                                                
51 For more on relational value theory, see H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and 
Western Culture, with Supplementary Essays (New York, NY: Harper, 1960).  See also 
“Value-Theory and Theology” in The Nature of Religious Experience: Essays in Honor 
of Douglas Clyde Macintosh, eds. Eugene Garrett Bewkes and Julius Seelye Bixler (New 
York, London: Harper & Brothers, 1937), 93-116. 
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affirming and integrity-establishing character of God in and through Christ.  That is, 
Christ is revelatory of God’s patterns of action in this world.  He is the revelation within 
the Christian’s internal history that illuminates and makes the rest of our lives intelligible 
and promotes self-integrity. 
 
Responsibility in Bioethics Scholarship 
 
The Influence of Priniciplism 
Any discussion of the foundational moral concepts used in bioethics must begin 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics.52  Regardless of one’s 
opinion of the value of a principle-based approach for confronting ethical challenges, 
their classic articulation of bioethics foundational principles—respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice—has become a cornerstone for bioethics 
discourse, one whose influence can be detected in debates on abortion, stem cell research, 
physician-assisted suicide, and a host of other topics.  In this principle-based framework, 
ethical challenges are interpreted as moments in which a person struggles to balance or 
prioritize a set of principles that are to be respected.  Or, those challenges may be seen as 
a struggle in determining which principles are operative in a given set of circumstances.  
A brief example will illustrate this approach.  Consider potential parents who approach 
their clinician about utilizing PGD to select the sex of their next child.  Must the clinician 
respect the autonomous choice of those potential parents, even if the clinician sees no 
                                                
52 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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clear health benefits to using PGD in this way?  Or, should concerns about justice 
override the autonomous choice of the potential parents?  Is conceding to the wishes of a 
patient a beneficent act?  This is a very helpful framework for analyzing ethically 
contentious issues in the clinic, but I should note that it is only one of many approaches to 
bioethics analysis, albeit an especially powerful approach. 
Although Beauchamp and Childress advocate striking a balance among the ethical 
principles at work in a given situation, respect for autonomy is the most frequently cited 
principle by clinicians and ethicists alike.53  As they articulate this principle, respecting 
autonomy entails respecting “the autonomous choices of persons.”54  In other words, their 
vision of autonomy is rooted in a context of decision-making.  They note, “To respect an 
autonomous agent is, at a minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views, to 
make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and beliefs.”55  At this point, 
examinations of autonomy frequently delve into issues of informed consent, capacity, 
competence, and who counts as an autonomous agent.  For my purposes here, however, I 
simply want to call attention to the overarching emphasis on matters of free choice.  This 
emphasis on autonomous, intentional decision-making pervades the dominant principle-
based approach to bioethics analysis, well beyond matters where issues of autonomy are 
at stake. 
 
                                                
53 Performing a keyword search in the PubMed database, for example, I found 27,045 
citations for “autonomy,” 3011 for “nonmaleficence,” 2974 for “beneficence,” and 
16,222 for “justice.” PubMed.gov Database,  U.S. National Library of Medicine, National 
Institutes of Health.  <http://www.ncbi.nlm.gov/sites/entrez> (accessed March 2, 2010). 
 
54 Beauchamp and Childress, 57. Emphasis mine. 
 
55 Ibid., 63. 
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Early Discussions of Responsibility: Garrett Hardin and George Agich 
With that emphasis on autonomous, intentional decision-making, the principle-
based approach to bioethics also informs discussions of responsibility in bioethics 
literature.  In an early attempt to wrestle with the challenges posed by the “new genetics,” 
biologist Garrett Hardin briefly appeals to “genetic responsibility” in his assessment 
those challenges.  He states, “We must admit that if there is one thing a person is not 
responsible for, it is the genes that were passed on to him.  No one has the opportunity to 
pick his parents….  But should we not be responsible as transmitters of errors?”56  He 
then offers an example of a hemophiliac man who reproduces despite passing the 
condition to subsequent generations.  Hardin’s analysis of the example, however, is 
limited to a discussion of conflicts between individual freedom and social costs.  He also 
assumes that the man in the example knows the risks involved with procreating and yet 
chooses to do so in spite of the future social costs of his decision.  In other words, he 
assumes that the man makes an autonomous, informed decision.  Hardin also fails to 
elaborate on what “genetic responsibility entails.  Does responsibility in this light refer to 
a duty to not pass on one’s genes or a duty to accept the full burden that comes along 
with that process?  On these questions, Hardin offers no response. 
In another early essay, George Agich notes the potential benefits that a focus on 
responsibility has for “medical ethics” scholarship on a variety of topics.  It provides 
benefits, he suggests, “by raising to prominence not only the social and organizational 
structure of health care, but also the manifold senses in which individual moral agents 
                                                
56 Garrett Hardin, “The Moral Threat of Personal Medicine” in Mack Lipkin and others, 
Genetic Responsibility: On Choosing Our Children's Genes (New York: Plenum Press, 
1974), 85-91; quote on 88. 
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and groups are accountable for their actions.”57  By focusing on responsibility, medical 
ethics turns its attention away from idealized case studies of physicians and patients 
trying to “solve” a particular problem and toward the ways in which medicine is actually 
practiced—within specific organizational structures marked by a managerial mentality 
and by the input of numerous care providers.  Following the work of Richard Zaner, 
Agich argues that the relationship based on responsibility elucidates one of the very 
cornerstones of the clinical encounter: “Illness or affliction compels response.  The 
response solicited is not abstract or general but particular, and involves the interaction of 
individuals—an interaction which is sustained by a social and institutional context or 
practice.”58  He also articulates the four features of responsibility in this context:  
accountability, liability, rationality, and the absence of negligence.  In describing these 
four features, he draws on the same language that we find in Jonsen’s patterns of 
appropriation and attribution: rational deliberation, knowledge, intention, causal 
connection, and punishment.59  He notes, “Liability involves reference to an agent’s 
knowledge and intention, as well as the causal connection between the action and its 
consequences.”60  Agich also claims, “Implicit in the notions of accountability and 
liability is the assumption that a responsible agent will ‘take his responsibility seriously.’  
This assumption implies two further features: rationality and absence of negligence.  A 
                                                
57 George J. Agich, “The Concept of Responsibility in Medicine” in Responsibility in 
Health Care, ed. George J. Agich (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1982), 53-73; quote on 
55. 
 
58 Ibid., 69. 
 
59 These terms come directly from Agich’s description of responsibility.  See Ibid., 55-56. 
 
60 Ibid., 56. 
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responsible agent is one who exhibits rational deliberation regarding his actions.”61  Thus, 
while he makes the case that responsibility is well suited for probing the ethical 
complexities of the clinic, he does not offer any new insights about what responsibility 
might mean in this context.  Instead, he follows the tradition of treating responsibility as a 
matter of rational deliberation and being held accountable for one’s actions. 
 
Responsibility and Genetics: Anders Nordgren and Guido Pennings 
In his work Responsible Genetics Anders Nordgren offers the first sustained 
treatment of responsibility in relation to innovations in genetics.  That treatment is largely 
grounded in the general trajectory of scholarship on responsibility in philosophy and 
religious studies.  Still, he provides the most substantive analysis of responsibility in 
relation to genetics and genetic technologies, so his work is worth exploring here.  His 
concern rests primarily with the moral responsibility of genetics researchers for the 
consequences of their work.  Like many other theorists of responsibility, Nordgren views 
responsibility as a metaphor in the context of morality, as its use in that context 
corresponds to the two different root meanings of respondeo that I previously 
mentioned.62   
His understanding of responsibility is clearly rooted in Schweiker’s typology, as 
he offers his own “modified social model” that addresses the perceived shortcomings of 
agential and social views of responsibility.  He finds agential models to neglect the social 
dimensions of responsibility (ascription of responsibility as a social act), to conflate 
                                                
61 Ibid.   
 
62 See Jonsen op. cit. and Schweiker op. cit. 
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moral responsibility with causal responsibility, and to “assume that moral responsibility 
is a matter of discovery” rather than ascription.63  He also finds the ontology of agential 
models to be thoroughly lacking, as those models seemingly focus on the isolated moral 
agent who, as Nordgren notes, is never isolated but is always “socially and biologically 
constituted and situated.”64  Social models of responsibility also fail to adequately take 
biological conditions into account (a point on which I agree with Nordgren).  For 
Nordgren, social models also tend to neglect the multiple social influences that shape the 
moral agent, instead typically portraying the social moral agent as merely a member of a 
given society or institution.  For Nordgren, social models also stress the social ascription 
of responsibility while failing to attend to the ways in which individuals assume moral 
responsibility by their own choices. 
After offering the basic outline of his modified social model of responsibility 
(which will be described in the following paragraph), Nordgren turns to the dialogical 
models (which he calls encounter models).  He criticizes the efforts of Lévinas and 
Niebuhr, arguing that they offer no guidelines for differentiating between “mere 
responsibility” and “moral responsibility.”  The distinction Nordgren makes between 
mere responsibility and moral responsibility goes back to the discussion of metaphors in 
moral language.  Responsibility becomes “moral responsibility” when that term is used 
metaphorically.  “Mere” responsibility, on the other hand, is the concrete form 
responsibility in which one is called to give an answer or in which one owes something to 
someone else.  He then asserts that “we have moral responsibility in relation to some 
                                                
63 Nordgren, 5. 
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entities” but then fails to substantiate this remark and neglects to articulate who/what can 
be considered an “entity.”65  Based on his interpretation of these models of responsibility, 
it seems that they leave open the possibility that human beings have a moral 
responsibility to non-human entities or perhaps even to non-entities (principles like love 
or justice?).  Such possibility is unacceptable in Nordgren’s account of responsibility. 
Noting the weaknesses of the agential, social, and dialogical models of 
responsibility, Nordgren offers a “modified social model” of responsibility marked by the 
following characteristics: 
1. “Causal agency is commonly relevant to moral responsibility but does 
not in itself determine it. 
 
2. Moral responsibility is ascribed or assumed by communities, social 
groups, or individuals. 
 
3. Individuals can ascribe or assume a moral responsibility that deviates 
from established social practice.”66 
 
The ability of moral agents to assume responsibility is a great concern for 
Nordgren.  Instances of this “deviation” from the socially ascribed responsibilities borne 
by the agent make it possible for agents to criticize their own communities, as this 
deviation helps the agent forge a unique identity that goes beyond social roles and 
responsibilities.  It also means that “at least to some extent, taking responsibility is a 
matter of individual choice.”67  Yet Nordgren’s modified social model implies that 
responsibility can be either chosen or unchosen, insofar one does not always choose the 
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communities and social groups of which she is a part.  While this unchosen component of 
responsibility goes largely unnoticed by Nordgren, his model leaves room for the 
possibility of responsibilities that arise outside of a decision-making context.68 
 When turning to the domain of scientific research, Nordgren provides one more 
assessment of responsibility worth mentioning here.  He distinguishes between the 
domain, content, and form of responsibility.  For Nordgren, the domain of responsibility 
concerns the linkage between responsibility for something and responsibility to someone 
(or a group) in particular.  Speaking of the endeavors of scientists, he states, “I call the 
linkage of a stage of research (for which scientists are responsible) with a party (to whom 
scientists are responsible) a ‘domain of responsibility.’”69  He argues that the domain of 
responsibility for scientists is vast because they should be responsible for all aspects of 
their research and responsible to all parties affected by that research.70  The content of 
responsibility, on the other hand, provides the normative recommendations or standards 
for a given situation; those contents change according to the specific perspectives or 
approaches with which moral agents confront that situation.  The form of responsibility is 
the means by which the normative content is implemented by those who are responsible 
for the situation (scientists in Nordgren’s example).  Here we at last come to Nordgren’s 
recommendations for scientists working in genetics research.  I’ll quote him at length: 
                                                
68 It should come as no surprise that Nordgren’s model of responsibility is concerned 
primarily with chosen responsibilities and chosen social roles considering that his 
audience consists of scientists working in genetics.  After all, those individuals chose to 
join the scientific community and chose to work in the field of genetics. 
 
69 Ibid., p. 53. 
 
70 Ibid., p. 91. 
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“What should responsible scientists do?  My general proposals to these 
scientists—as individuals and as a community—are as follows: 
 
(1) Use your moral imagination to envision different ethically relevant 
consequences of research, and to figure out different ways of taking 
responsibility for these consequences. 
 
(2) Learn from history, i.e. from earlier, prototypical cases. 
 
(3) Participate in a dialogue with the general public, politicians and 
industrialists. 
 
(4) Integrate ethical reflection with scientific practice by choosing an 
appropriate form of responsibility, i.e. adequate means of 
implementing the content of responsibility at different social levels.”71 
 
Turning specifically to discussions of genetic biotechnologies—in this case 
PGD—I must highlight the work of Pennings et al. that examines the moral responsibility 
of patients and clinicians in the context of utilizing PGD.  Their work is notable because 
it is the only scholarship that examines new genetic tools through the lens of 
responsibility.  One of the tenets of their argument is that clinicians or physician 
collaborators should not be “held responsible” for the outcomes of their work in PGD if 
potential parents “change their mind” and back out of an agreed-upon plan, thereby 
leading to any number of unintended consequences.  Here, they note, “the responsibility 
of the collaborator is determined by his or her causal and intentional contribution.”72  
When potential parents change their mind or intentionally deceive the clinician, “the prior 
contributions of the clinician are ‘cut off’ by the decision of the patients: their 
autonomous decision intervenes between the acts of the physician and the possible 
                                                
71 Ibid., 84. 
 
72 Guido Pennings, Maryse Bonduelle, and Ingeborg Liebaers.  "Decisional Authority and 
Moral Responsibility of Patients and Clinicians in the Context of Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis." Reproductive Biomedicine Online 7, no. 5 (2003): 509-13; quote on 510.  
Emphasis mine. 
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harm.”73  Thus, the physician collaborator may be responsible for the conception and 
pregnancy, but not for the birth of an affected child.  This position is rooted in what 
Pennings calls “the theory of moral responsibility in situations of joint action and causal 
collaboration,” though he does not elaborate on precisely what this theory entails.74 
It is also clear that Pennings and colleagues view responsibility in terms of 
individualism and autonomy.  They note that while physicians and clinicians can decide 
to conscientiously object to collaborating with potential parents who seek to use PGD for 
reasons deemed condemnable, the appeals to conscientious objection are valid only for 
the clinician’s own acts.  Thus, while she can condemn the intentions of potential parents, 
she cannot act in a way that hinders those parents from finding other ways to carry out 
their plans (She cannot destroy the embryos, for example.).  In other words, the physician 
or clinician is only responsible for ensuring that her own actions are morally acceptable, 
but she has no responsibility for working to avoid the potentially negative outcome she 
envisions.  I am not making a moral judgment about thinking of responsibility in this 
way: it is certainly a very pragmatic approach and one that many physicians and 
clinicians would be willing to support.   
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I provided an overview of prevalent understandings of 
responsibility in ethics and bioethics literature.  I noted the multivalent nature of this 
concept and some of the ways it has developed since its philosophical debut in the work 
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of David Hume.  Specifically, I utilized the frameworks of Albert Jonsen and William 
Schweiker to categorize scholarship on responsibility in philosophical and religious 
ethics.  Jonsen’s first pattern of responsibility, the attribution of responsibility, is 
described as the “judge’s problem” and is concerned with the way in which praise and 
blame is accorded to the agent based on her actions.  Noting the six elements of this 
pattern—intention, motive, deliberation, voluntariness, excuse, and character—I showed 
how the pattern of attribution treats responsibility exclusively as a matter of intentional, 
rational, voluntary decision-making.  The pattern of appropriation, on the other hand, 
deals with the ways in which the moral agent accepts responsibility for herself and her 
actions.  For Jonsen, appropriating responsibility is a matter of character.  This pattern 
has four elements—the self, consideration, conscientiousness, and commitment.  By 
describing the ways in which these elements operate within the pattern of appropriation, I 
noted that this pattern also places an emphasis on intentional, voluntary decision-making 
but does so within the context of an agent’s development of character. 
 Next, I turned to William Schweiker’s classification of theories of responsibility 
in philosophical and religious ethics.  His typology consists of three models of 
responsibility theories: agential, social, and dialogical theories.  For each model, I 
selected one representative figure to examine in detail in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of what responsibility entails.  For agential theories, I explored the work of 
Immanuel Kant.  His work serves as a foundation for many subsequent agential 
understandings of responsibility, particularly with the emphasis on rational autonomy.  
Agential theories, Schweiker suggests, are concerned primarily with the relationship 
between an agent and her action.  Social theories of responsibility, on the other hand, are 
 124 
concerned primarily with the influences of social roles and practices for shaping the 
outlook of the moral agent.  Responsibility is a social matter, to be determined and 
assigned by and within a given community.  Stanley Hauerwas presents a weak social 
theory of responsibility and offers a way of thinking about responsibility beyond the 
bounds of autonomous decision-making.  However, his account of responsibility is 
embedded in a view that treats narrative as a monolith; he assumes that agents live within 
“a” narrative rather than within multiple narratives with potentially different norms of 
behavior.  His treatment of responsibility then becomes problematic when one seeks to 
draw on it within a context in which people with different operative narratives must work 
together to resolve a particular issue.  To explore dialogical theories of responsibility, I 
turned to the work of H. Richard Niebuhr.  Dialogical theories, Schweiker notes, are 
rooted in a moral anthropology in which the moral agent is constituted by her relations 
and encounters with others.  For Niebuhr, responsibility is the first principle of ethics 
because all existence has responsiveness as its form.  Responsibility is a matter of 
interpreting and responding to the actions of the other in a “fitting” way.  Dialogical 
theories, like social theories, offer another way of thinking about responsibility outside of 
rigid emphases on intentional, voluntary decision-making, although those elements are 
still present.  
Finally, I turned to scholarship in bioethics and explored ways in which 
responsibility has been articulated in that field, particularly in relation to issues of 
genetics.  Through an examination of the scholarship of Beauchamp and Childress, 
Hardin, Agich, Nordgren, and Pennings, I demonstrated that bioethics has appropriated a 
view of responsibility that is largely a matter of intentional, voluntary, autonomous 
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decision-making.  In this way, bioethics has drawn on Jonsen’s patterns of attribution and 
appropriation as well as what Schweiker calls “agential” theories of responsibility.  Such 
emphases are particularly evident in Pennings’ work on responsibility in light of 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.   
 What is needed in bioethics, particularly in light of the challenges posed by new 
genetic technologies, is a different way of thinking about responsibility.  As I shall argue 
in the following chapter, responsibility is not always a matter of intentional, autonomous, 
voluntary choice.  Following some of the voices expressed in the previous chapter, I 
contend that responsibility is oftentimes a matter of integrity and status.  To confront the 
challenges of genetic technologies like predictive genetic testing and PGD, I claim that 
we need an account of responsibility that emphasizes two salient features that are often 
ignored in bioethics discussions of responsibility.  First, responsibility entails the 
acceptance of obligations borne from one’s status, regardless of one’s acceptance of the 
status itself.  Second, responsibility must promote the movement toward greater integrity 
in one’s life, but that movement paradoxically involves recognizing and incorporating 
uncertainty and loss of control into that life.  While the position I am advocating has 
resonances with many of the ideas described in this chapter, I will demonstrate why a 
new framework for responsibility is better able to attend to the challenges of the new 
genetics. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF RESPONSIBILITY GROUNDED IN 
STATUS AND INTEGRITY 
 
“I am interrupted by my own social origin, and so have to find a way to take 
stock of who I am in a way that makes clear that I am authored by what precedes 
and exceeds me, and that this in no way exonerates me from having to give an 
account of myself.”1 
    -Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 
 
 In the previous chapter I noted the ways in which dominant understandings of 
responsibility in ethics and bioethics largely assume voluntaristic accounts of moral 
agency and contexts of decision-making.  With rare exception, responsibility is taken as a 
matter of freely, voluntarily, rationally making the “right” choices when faced with a 
given ethical quandary.  Even the social and dialogical models of responsibility described 
earlier contain the elements of voluntariness and decision-making, though in understated 
forms.  However, as the transcripts and statements discussed in chapter two indicate, 
moral agents often speak of responsibilities or “being responsible” for matters beyond 
their voluntary choices.  Further, when confronted by challenging circumstances, those 
agents do not always frame their moral experiences with the language of voluntary, 
autonomous decision-making.  For some moral agents, there is relatively little wrestling 
about what choice to make in a given situation; the appropriate (in their view) way 
forward is all too clear.  Rather, as Hauerwas suggested in the previous chapter, their 
moral distress arises from the challenges of living a life that is reflective of their self-
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understanding.  Here, to speak of an agent’s responsibilities is to speak of those 
obligations and commitments that give meaning to her life. 
 This chapter does much of the dissertation’s constructive work by articulating a 
supplementary account of responsibility that is more responsive to the ways in which 
moral agents frame challenges related to genetic technologies; this account is also more 
reflective of some of the ways in which those agents speak of their responsibilities.  My 
overall thesis is as follows: Prevalent theories of responsibility operative in ethics and 
bioethics presuppose a decision-making context, a voluntaristic account of moral agency, 
and lack a sufficiently robust and contextualized account of moral experience.  Such 
views of responsibility must be supplemented by an account that emphasizes two salient 
features that are too often ignored in those dominant theories: 1) Responsibility entails 
the acceptance of obligations borne from one’s status, regardless of one’s acceptance of 
the status itself—whether one is a medical professional, a potential carrier of a genetic 
anomaly, a parent, or a member of a religious community; and 2) While responsibility 
promotes the movement toward greater integrity in one’s life, that movement 
paradoxically involves recognizing and incorporating uncertainty and loss of control into 
that life.  This paradox is especially evident in light of biotechnologies like PGD and 
predictive genetic testing, which purportedly provide a person with greater control and 
certainty about the biological conditions of her life or the future life of her offspring, 
though they often highlight the ways in which agents lack certainty and self-control.   
To develop and support this new vision of responsibility, I first return to the 
voices of two individuals who have dealt with genetics-based challenges in their work—
two participants in the focus groups described in chapter two.  Earlier, I highlighted the 
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various ways in which those individuals and organizations described responsibility in 
relation to their work.  Here, I briefly turn to how two of the focus group participants 
frame their moral experiences.  In doing so, I highlight how the theories of responsibility 
described in chapter three—with their emphases on voluntary, autonomous choices—fail 
to attend to the rich nature of those experiences.  For this reason, a supplemental account 
of responsibility must address those experiences if it is to remain a viable concept for 
moral discourse.   
I then turn to the works of Judith Butler, John Silber, and William Schweiker to 
develop an account of responsibility rooted in notions of status and integrity, an account 
that is more responsive to the ways in which many moral agents actually interpret the 
challenges they face.  Butler provides a sharp critique of modernity’s image of the 
autonomous self all the while maintaining that responsibility still obtains even when the 
moral agent cannot fully account for her existence as a moral self.  Silber advances a 
notion he calls “status responsibility,” which he describes as “a view which permits of 
finding men morally wrong and blameworthy for their diseased condition or state of 
being in the absence of any morally blameworthy conduct that might have been 
avoided.”2  This view, I assert, is beneficial for considering the ethical challenges related 
to genetic technologies like PGD and predictive genetic testing. After all, with so many 
components of one’s very existence supposedly “in the genes” of that person and thus 
non-selected, non-voluntary, and out of one’s control, one will discover that one 
nonetheless carries specific responsibilities as a result of those very elements.  Finally, 
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the “imperative of responsibility” developed by William Schweiker provides a starting 
point for considering responsibility as a matter of integrity.  This imperative states: “In all 
actions and relations we are to respect and enhance the integrity of life before God.”3  
While I find Schweiker’s work to be too reliant on a decision-making framework, his 
emphasis on integrity shifts our attention away from isolated decisions and toward the 
agent whose values are enacted in and through her confrontations with ethical challenges. 
Two points must be noted at the outset of my constructive endeavor.  First, I am 
not arguing that a vision of responsibility rooted in status and integrity is exhaustive of 
what responsibility entails.  Many times, responsibility is a matter of freely making 
decisions and dealing with a particular ethical quandary.  What I suggest, however, is that 
this typical account must be supplemented by a recognition that responsibility is 
sometimes concerned with more than just making the right choices or about having 
control over oneself and one’s actions.  Second, although the Hauerwasian framework of 
social responsibility broadly resonates with the theoretical shift I advocate here, his 
contributions to responsibility theories are unhelpful for sorting through ethical 
uncertainties in a pluralistic context.  While he recognizes that the ethical life is a 
constant striving for greater integrity, that is, for living in a way that is reflective of the 
values that one holds dear, his treatment of narrative as a monolithic entity fails to 
appreciate the manifold nature of moral agency and moral experience, particularly those 
experiences of agents in the clinical context.  In other words, the vision of integrity that 
flows from his project is constrained by the limits of the narrative (note the definite 
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article).  For Hauerwas, the moral agent lives in one narrative—one for which there is a 
“right” telling of that story.   As the quotes from the focus group participants in the next 
section illustrate, agents find themselves living out multiple narratives and values.  
Genuine ethical anxiety arises from discerning which values take precedent in a given 
situation.  A Hauerwasian view of narrative, responsibility, and integrity fails to 
appreciate such anxiety.  I advocate thinking about integrity as a matter of striking the 
right balance among an agent’s multiple values and commitments so that she can live in a 
way that enables her to recognize her actions as reflective of who she understands herself 
to be. 
 
Moral Agents Speak: Challenges in the Clinic 
 An earlier chapter offered numerous examples of medical professional 
organizations, religious denominations, ministers, and medical professionals speaking of 
responsibility in terms that challenge the widely-held view of responsibility as a matter of 
voluntaristic, autonomous decision-making.  While their varied expressions of that 
concept are noteworthy in their own regard, it is also revealing to listen to how some of 
these moral agents frame their moral experiences in general, even if they do not speak of 
responsibility.  Consider the words of a genetic counselor struggling with offering 
information about abortion services to a patient: 
Genetic Counselor 2: “Right, but what I’m thinking of is what is their 
legal right to do and my responsibility as a counselor, and where I do or do 
not draw the line as my responsibility as a counselor as long as what their 
choice is is legal and my religious beliefs, I’ve had to sort through, 
through the years, because I still do have a problem with that is a 
life…that is a life that is being taken and I take that very, very 
seriously…very seriously…and I still struggle with that issue but I also 
would fight for their right to make that decision because and part of that 
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doesn’t come just from my religious beliefs and that’s concern about that 
child.  Part of that comes from my familial background that I have a sister 
with Down Syndrome who was born 40 years ago when there was nothing 
to do for those children.” 
 
Admittedly, the transcription of her remarks is a bit difficult to follow.  The counselor 
describes her struggle reconciling her “responsibility as a counselor” to offer information 
about terminating a pregnancy to her patient with her personal and religious belief that 
“that is a life that is being taken.”  As she indicates, her struggle is not with deciding 
which responsibilities take precedent—she clearly states that she would “fight for their 
right to make that decision [to terminate the pregnancy]”—but with being in a position 
where she is pulled in seemingly different directions.  In other words, her challenges do 
not arise from making a particularly difficult decision, but in the discovery of inevitable 
tragedy no matter how she responds to her patient.  If she offers abortion services to the 
patient, she fails to uphold her religious convictions; if she refuses to offer those services, 
she sees herself as failing to fulfill her professional duties.  In either case, her integrity 
becomes, perhaps, tragically challenged. 
 In another focus group, an evangelical Christian minister recalls his experiences 
counseling a couple in his congregation.  The wife was pregnant and amniocentesis 
revealed that their future child had Trisomy-18, a condition for which only 5% of 
children survive beyond their first year of life.  Not surprisingly, the minister focuses his 
discussion on the religious convictions of the couple: 
Minister: “And yet, in the case of this family, they both had a strong faith.  
They came from different backgrounds.  She was Catholic in background, 
so it had a very strong bias for life, as you can imagine.  She was a very 
devout Catholic, who came to be a part of our congregation, and we were 
very thankful for that.  Her husband grew up in a very traditional religious 
background in the Churches of Christ, and when I say traditional, 
traditional for the Churches of Christ, at least, in that both of them really 
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never considered—they never considered abortion as an option, ever, in 
this entire process, but the real questions for them were, you know, ‘Why 
did this happen?’ and from a medical perspective, the wife supplied a lot 
of those answers.  You know, she had her training in pediatrics.  She was 
very much aware of what was going on, and the risks that were involved 
in that, but I think for them, it was really interesting that—the question 
that really mattered to them is ‘What do we do next?  What do we do to 
make this meaningful?’  Not so much—I mean, the whys were there, but 
they weren’t there so deeply as ‘What do we do to make this 
meaningful?’” 
 
A moment later, another minister in the focus group asked him why the parents 
considered undergoing amniocentesis if they were unwilling to consider terminating the 
pregnancy.  His response is especially revealing: 
Minister: “The reason they went, and because that was one of the 
questions, actually, I had on that, was that they said if—you know, there’s 
always the possibility ultrasound may not be fully accurate; the 
amniocentesis will tell them precisely what the chromosomal situation is 
with this child.  They wanted to know, because they wanted to be 
preparing themselves, their children, and their friends for what was going 
to happen in the future.  They did not want to know to make an option on 
whether or not to abort that child, but how to prepare people, and to begin 
right then preparing.” 
 
 The minister’s recollections depict a family whose moral challenges did not arise 
from a particular decision-point or from their causal contribution to the difficult 
circumstances they face.  As the minister clearly states, there was no choice for this 
family to make.  Their religious convictions informed their understanding of their 
situation and assured them that pregnancy termination was not an option.  Instead, the 
couple’s challenges arose from their attempts to find meaning in a tragic situation and 
from trying to create a future in which they would be supported for living out those 
convictions.  Again, this was not a struggle about an especially tough decision—it was a 
struggle over how to best live in accordance with the ideals they hold as fundamental to 
their self-understanding.  In other words, it was the struggle of living a life of integrity. 
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 The statements of the genetic counselor and the minister point to limitations of 
construing moral challenges solely in the language of autonomous decision-making.  In 
the case of the genetic counselor, her perceived challenge could easily be framed as a 
matter of choice: Should she offer to her patient information about pregnancy termination 
or should she withhold that information?  But the difficulty she experiences in that 
moment cannot be fully understood in the language of decision-making.  Rather, the 
genetic counselor describes her moral distress as a tragic conflict between two 
commitments she holds dear.  No matter if she decides to offer or withhold information to 
her patient, the counselor feels that she falls short of being true to her values (as a 
counselor or as someone who opposes abortion).  While she may have a decision to 
make, her moral distress is a result of conflicting values.  In the evangelical minister’s 
discussion, the moral distress he describes is the product of being involved in a tragic 
situation, not in any agony over a “problem” that is to be solved by making the 
appropriate choice. 
 These sentiments echo the concerns of Edmund Pincoffs, who argued that 
twentieth century ethics had assumed that its object of analysis is a “problem” or 
quandary.  However, looking back at the history of ethics, thinkers like Aristotle, Kant, 
and Hegel were not primarily concerned with developing defensible problem-solving 
methodologies.  Any prescriptive guidance (such as the Aristotelian mean or Kant’s 
categorical imperative) those thinkers offered were situated within larger, more robust 
analysis of the moral life, human agency, and the human condition.  However, this more 
recent understanding of the task of ethics, which he calls “quandary ethics,” assumes that 
ethics deals with “situations in which it is difficult to know what one should do; that the 
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ultimate beneficiary of ethical analysis is the person who, in one of these situations, seeks 
rational ground for the decision he must make….”4  It attempts to derive universal, 
abstract principles for decision-making.  However, Pincoffs notes that responding to the 
question “What ought I do?” requires an understanding of who “I” am and what details of 
that situation are relevant to “my” predicament.  Pincoffs claims that “what would be 
right for anyone in the same circumstances…is not necessarily right for me.  Because 
what I have to take into account as well as the situation is the question of what is worthy 
of me.”5  From this perspective, ethics is about more than problem-solving and decision-
making.  It is concerned with matters of character, self-understanding, and integrity.  
However, by focusing on “problems” and “decisions” ethical analysis ignores those more 
basic issues that moral agents—like the genetic counselor and the family in the minister’s 
story—struggle with at a given moment. 
 
Judith Butler: Giving an Account of Oneself 
 
The Modern Subject 
 The dominant modes of responsibility described in the previous chapter share an 
important assumption, though in varying degrees: Talk of responsibility nearly always 
assumes the existence of a recognizable, knowable “I” or “subject” that can assume 
responsibility, be held responsible, and accept or reject responsibilities.  For Kant, this 
“I” is the rational autonomous agent whose increasing self-awareness is grounded in the 
                                                
4 Edmund Pincoffs, "Quandary Ethics," Mind 80, no. 320 (1971), 552-517; quote on 552. 
 
5 Ibid., 561. 
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self’s rational capacity.  In Hauerwas’ work, the self is a social creature, finding meaning 
and value in her life through participation in a particular social world that is guided by its 
own value-giving narrative.  A person comes to see herself as an agent or a subject by 
accepting, rejecting, or altering the values of the community in which she lives.  Yet, 
prior to those acts there is still some entity that accepts, rejects, participates, or eschews.  
That prior entity is not a self-created being but is seen as a gift from God, according to 
Hauerwas.  In that sense, though the agent is not the efficient cause (in an Aristotelian 
sense) of her life, she can nonetheless account for her existence by pointing to God.  
Niebuhr seemingly presents an alternative view with his claim that all human life has the 
characteristic of responsiveness; the subject develops in relation to others.  Yet, he does 
not provide an account of how the “self” acquires the capacity to initially respond and 
freely interpret.  In other words, interpretation is a constitutive element of the self’s 
responsiveness, yet there must be some prior “self” or “subject” that is able to raise the 
questions of interpretation: What is going on?  What is happening to me?  
 Though Niebuhr’s explication of the self is a definite challenge to the modern 
view of the subject, certain traces of that modern visage remain: freedom and self-
knowledge are its hallmarks.  For the other modes of responsibility—especially those that 
are far more common in bioethics discourse—the assumed subject is indeed a decidedly 
modern subject.  This modern subject arose in part as a response to David Hume’s 
challenge that the self was “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions.”6  
Through his empiricist methodology, Hume was unable to identify an observable entity 
                                                
6 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 
Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Book I, Part IV, 
section vi. 
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that unified those different perceptions and thus he rejected the notion of a substantive 
subject.7  Following the Humean critique, one of Kant’s most significant tasks became 
locating the grounds for the possibility of the subject, which as noted in the previous 
chapter, he locates in our rational capacity.   
A thumbnail sketch of the modern subject may be helpful at this point.  He 
(because the modern subject is nearly always a “he”) is rational, free, exerting control, 
and constantly growing in self-awareness.  The progress of “civilized” or “cultured” (in 
other words, Western and European) societies was understood as reflective of the modern 
subject’s reason.  As the subject grew in reason and self-knowledge, so too did society 
progress.  Here, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a powerful representative of this 
view, as history is understood as the site in which the Spirit grows in greater self-
knowledge and the subject is an instance of that movement.8  Further, views of this 
modern subject are typically articulated in light of certain dualisms: mind/body, 
male/female, freedom/oppression, control/chaos, reason/madness, cultured/savage, 
science/superstition, universal/contingent, one/many, and so forth.  Those divisions were 
seen as ontologically real, independent of agential input.  To be a subject was to have a 
                                                
7 In the mid-20th century, A.J. Ayer took up Hume’s empiricist cause in Language, Truth, 
and Logic (1946), but modified the Humean position on selfhood by arguing that bodily 
identity provides the basis for an observable entity that can be called a “self.”  He defends 
this modification by arguing that that while we can speak of someone losing their 
memory or changing their character, it would be self-contradictory to speak of someone 
losing their body.  See pp. 120 ff. in A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London: V. 
Gollancz Ltd., 1946).  I do not endorse Ayer’s position as I think it is possible to speak 
meaningfully about a person losing control of her body or becoming alienated from her 
body in some ways.  I simply want to note that Hume’s cause (at least this cause) has 
been taken up in more modern times. 
 
8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit trans., Arnold V. Miller and 
J. N. Findlay (Oxford Clarendon Press 1977). 
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mind, to be rational, autonomous, controlling, cultured, an individual, scientific, and a 
fervent supporter of scientific investigation as the means to discovering truths about the 
world.  
 
Butler on Subjectivity and Responsibility 
 This view of the subject continues to hold sway in contemporary popular 
discourse, although continental philosophy’s recent history is scattered with attacks on 
the modern image of the autonomous, free, self-grounding subject.  Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Rorty, Foucault, and numerous others have ushered us into the 
world of posts: post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-foundationalism, post-
humanism, post-Christianity, etc.  Judith Butler is a contemporary contributor to that 
interrogative work, especially in her book Gender Trouble in which she challenges the 
perceived coherence and static nature of sex, gender, and sexuality in modern 
discourses.9  Though Kant recognized that self-grounding knowledge never complete (but 
always expanding), many attacks on the modern subject have emphasized this unknown 
(and perhaps unknowable) dimension to selfhood as evidence of the “death of the 
subject.”  Heidegger, for example, challenged the modern view of the subject by arguing 
that autonomy and the capacity for knowledge (including self-knowledge) do not exist 
independently of that subject’s interactions with the world around it.  Thus, Dasein 
(“being-there”) can only be understood within the complex social web of history and 
                                                
9 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
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value into which Being has been thrown.10  For this reason, the subject cannot be fully 
autonomous, nor can she ever expect to achieve exhaustive self-knowledge.  Similarly, 
Foucault’s projects (particularly his archaeological works) critique the idea of the modern 
subject by emphasizing the historically and socially contingent conditions that limit and 
shape the possibilities for what constitutes subjectivity.11  In other words, the self is never 
fully free to make autonomous decisions about who she can be—many aspects of her 
subjectivity are beyond her control. 
In her more recent Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler’s work follows the 
insights of Heidegger and Foucault and takes a decidedly meta-ethical turn.  Here, her 
driving concern is with the possibility of responsibility in light of the opacity of the 
human subject.  In other words, how can moral agents be held responsible—or how can 
they be responsible for themselves—if the very notion of a free, autonomous, rational 
moral agent is no longer self-evident?  Butler poses the question: “Does the postulation of 
a subject who is not self-grounding, that is, whose conditions of emergence can never 
fully be accounted for, undermine the possibility of responsibility and, in particular, of 
giving an account of oneself?”12  As the previous chapter showed, responsibility’s 
primary concern is with the relationship between the moral agent (the self or subject) and 
her actions.  How can she call her actions her own, particularly when she can never fully 
give an account of her selfhood?  If she is not free and autonomous, in what sense can she 
call actions her own? 
                                                
10 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper, 1962). 
 
11 See especially Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1972). 
 
12 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 19. 
 
 139 
To respond to such enquiries, Butler combines rhetorical analysis with insights 
from Adorno, Levinas, Foucault, Laplanche, and Adrian Cavarero in order to affirm the 
possibility of responsibility, even despite the subject’s inability to give an exhaustive 
account of herself.  She argues that while the subject can never give such an account, this 
does not necessarily spell the death of the subject altogether.  In fact, Butler follows 
Adorno in asserting that morality requires the existence of a moral subject: there can be 
no morality without an “I.”13  It is thus necessary to explore what constitutes the “I.”  To 
support this claim, Butler turns to the structure of address to postulate the possibility of 
the subject: “…the fact that we cannot exist without addressing the other and without 
being addressed by the other, and that there is no wishing away our fundamental 
sociality.”14  Thus, the address becomes the starting point for subjectivity. 
Implicit here is an idea of relationality: Being addressed by the other is a form of 
relationship with the other.  Though “I” am addressed by the other (the “you”)—you call 
me to give an account of myself—I can do so only through linguistic tools and structures 
that “are not of [my own] making.”15  To borrow Hauerwas’ terms, I am called upon by 
another to give a narrative of myself, but because I must use tools that I did not create to 
articulate an account of a “self” that I did not bring into being, there are sure to be parts 
of my “self” and my “story” that remain hidden from me.  In addressing my narrative to 
you, that story “assumes a rhetorical dimension that is not reducible to narrative 
function….Something is being done with language when the account I give begins: it is 
                                                
13 Ibid., 7. 
 
14 Ibid., 33. 
 
15 Ibid., 21. 
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invariably interlocutory, ghosted, laden, persuasive, and tactical.”16  Thus, the “I” of the 
subject comes into being by addressing her story to the other, but because that story is 
told as an address (and thus “interlocutory, ghosted, laden, persuasive, and tactical”), the 
telling of that story is dependent upon the presence of the other and is always incomplete.  
Butler states, “The ‘I’ cannot give a final or adequate account of itself because it cannot 
return to the scene of address by which it is inaugurated and it cannot narrate all of the 
rhetorical dimensions of the structure of address in which the account itself takes 
place.”17 
So where does this postulation of the subject leave us in relation to responsibility?  
If the subject can never fully account for herself, how can she be responsible?  On these 
questions, Butler returns to the works of Levinas, Adorno, and Foucault to assert that 
responsibility arises not out of autonomous control but out of the very vulnerability that 
constitutes one’s subjectivity.  Following Levinas, she notes that “we are vulnerable to 
the address of others in ways that we cannot control….Responsibility emerges as a 
consequence of being subject to the unwilled address of the other.”18  Here, it is worth 
quoting Butler at length: 
“I want to suggest that the very meaning of responsibility must be 
rethought on the basis of this limitation [the self’s limited ability to 
provide an account of itself]; it cannot be tied to the conceit of a self fully 
transparent to itself.  Indeed, to take responsibility for oneself is to avow 
the limits of any self-understanding, and to establish these limits not only 
as a condition for the subject but as a predicament of the human 
community….I speak as an ‘I,’ but do not make the mistake that I know 
precisely all that I am doing when I speak in that way.  I find that my very 
                                                
16 Ibid., 63. 
 
17 Ibid., 67. 
 
18 Ibid., 85. 
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formation implicates the other in me, that my own foreignness to myself 
is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others….I 
cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in isolation form the 
other.  If I do, I have taken myself out of the mode of address (being 
addressed as well as addressing the other) in which the problem of 
responsibility first emerges.”19 
 
Butler also suggests that because we only come into being through the call of the 
other, we “affirm the unfreedom at the heart of our relations” by taking responsibility for 
that which we do not choose or control.20  Being responsible in this way is a recognition 
that “none of us is fully bounded, utterly separate, but, rather, we are in our skins, given 
over, in each other’s hands, at each other’s mercy.”21  It also means that, following 
Adorno and Foucault, acting “ethically” means that “we must avow error as constitutive 
of who we are.”22  From this perspective, attitudes of humility, mutual dependence, and 
care for others become the hallmarks of responsibility.  Ethical judgment should be 
withheld when that judgment hinders recognition of the other and suppresses the life of 
oneself and the other.  This humility in our ethical judgment arises out of deference to the 
limits of both self-understanding and the social conditions that normalize certain modes 
of being to the exclusion of others.  While we make strides toward recognition of the self 
and the other, we should do so with an awareness of our own limits.  Further, we are 
called to care for the other precisely because of our mutual dependence on one another: 
Without “you” there can be no “I” and vice versa. 
                                                
19 Ibid., 83-84. 
 
20 Ibid., 91. 
 
21 Ibid., 101. 
 
22 Ibid., 111. 
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As I will show in the following chapter, these insights directly impinge on how 
we might think of responsibility in light of genetics and genetic technologies.  Butler 
offers a view of the subject that appreciates the bounded, inexhaustible nature of 
subjectivity.  Her subject never fully knows herself, nor does she achieve certainty and 
total control over her existence.  Yet, Butler argues, responsibility remains in spite of that 
lack of certainty and self-control.  In fact, the “error” that is “constitutive of who we are” 
and the “unfreedom at the heart of our relations” becomes the very locus of 
responsibility.  In other words, autonomy, freedom, and rational decision-making are not 
necessary preconditions of responsibility.  Responsibility actually requires humility in 
light of our limited capacities for self-understanding, self-control, and the mutual 
dependence that render possible any human subjectivity. 
 
John Silber’s Status Responsibility 
 Implicit in Butler’s account of subjectivity and responsibility is the notion that 
responsibility obtains to a moral agent not only for what she does (or fails to do) but also 
because of who she is: a subject called into being by others, incapable of ever giving a 
full account of her existence or fully understanding who she is.  In other words, 
responsibility arises out of both action and being.  This view is obviously contrary to 
many of the dominant accounts of responsibility in ethics and bioethics discourse.  
Further, it is contrary to the ideal driving the American legal system in which justice is 
meted on the basis of one’s actions—which one can presumably control—rather than on 
the basis of status-based traits like sex, religion, skin color, or sexual orientation.  Recall 
Jonsen’s pattern of the attribution of responsibility, which relied exclusively on this 
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legalistic framework.  Voluntariness and intentionality are crucial elements in the pattern 
of attribution and they continue to shape legal discussions of responsibility (with its 
concern for mens rea), as exemplified in the work of H.L.A. Hart.  Consider the 
following statement from Hart: 
 “If a person whose action, judged ab extra, has offended against moral 
rules or principles, succeeds in establishing that he did this unintentionally 
and in spite of every precaution that it was possible for him to take, he is 
excused from moral responsibility, and to blame him in these 
circumstances would itself be considered morally objectionable.  Moral 
blame is therefore excluded because he has done all that he could do….In 
morals ‘I could not help it’ is always an excuse and moral obligation 
would be altogether different from what it is if the moral ‘ought’ did not in 
this sense imply ‘can.’”23 
 
Even in this brief passage, we are presented with the attribution pattern’s elements of 
voluntariness, intentionality, and excuse.  We also see that Hart “restricts himself to a 
pejorative context, to a context of moral failure.24  From this perspective, morality is 
essentially a rule-oriented activity and that failing to follow those rules leads to negative 
judgment. 
 John Silber is a prominent legal scholar who recognized the importance of 
voluntary action-oriented visions of responsibility for the legal context.  However, he also 
suggests that in some cases it may be logical to think of responsibility in relation to a 
person’s status, hence the term “status responsibility.”  Silber did not claim that status 
responsibility to be an original idea, as he considered it to be rooted in Western 
Christianity’s mythology of “original sin.”25  Like both Kant and Butler, Silber grounds 
                                                
23 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961), quoted in Silber, 49. 
 
24 Silber, 57. 
 
25 Ibid., 47. 
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the possibility for responsibility in the very nature of the human subject.  His concern, 
however, is with expanding the scope for which responsibility is a relevant concept for 
making moral judgments; he is not interested in articulating a vision of what constitutes 
responsible agents and actions. 
 For Silber, responsibility is situated on a broad continuum in which actions are 
assessed according to the degree of the agent’s voluntariness present in those actions.  On 
one end of the continuum are actions over which moral agents have no control (“I 
couldn’t help it!”) while on the other end one finds autonomous, freely chosen actions.  
To illustrate his argument, Silber offers a series of events, ranging from a man walking 
aimlessly in his garden to that same man offering poisoned eggs to his brother.  “At what 
point,” Silber asks, “shall we speak of action rather than mere event?  At what point does 
the personality of X express itself in what happens or what is done?”26  In this series of 
events/actions that Silber provides, one sees a gradual increase of personal involvement 
and a resulting increase in personal responsibility for those events/actions and their 
outcomes.  But, as Silber is quick to note, it is often difficult if not downright impossible 
to distinguish between what constitutes a mere event and an action, between an action 
and its consequences, between voluntary and involuntary action, or even between a 
person and a thing.27  At what point are we to distinguish between actions for which a 
person can be held responsible and events for which responsibility is not an issue?   
                                                                                                                                            
 
26 Ibid., 69. 
 
27 Ibid., 68. 
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Silber suggests that even at the furthest end of that continuum of events and 
actions—the place at which moral agents have no control over the event in question—a 
limited degree of responsibility remains.  He calls this status responsibility.  This type of 
responsibility remains, he suggests, because “human choice is not something isolated 
from the choosing person.”28  Choice is a process of self-creation and self-discovery, but 
in those very processes the moral agent may soon discover the limits of thinking about 
responsibility solely in terms of one’s voluntary, intentional choices.  As Silber notes, 
“moral obligation may obtain whether or not it is chosen.  Moral obligation obtains 
according to the nature and the situations of persons.”29 
 An example may be helpful for illustrating precisely what Silber means by status 
responsibility.  I was diagnosed with type-1 diabetes when I was 15 months old.  I did not 
choose this condition, nor did any of my actions as a toddler cause me to become 
diabetic.  I just happened to be born with a genetic predisposition that, when coupled with 
certain environmental factors, made me more likely to develop that condition. Though I 
did not choose to be diabetic nor did I intentionally cause my diabetes, I am nonetheless 
responsible for attending to my unchosen status.  It places certain obligations on me—to 
check my blood sugar levels, to be thoughtful about what I eat, to exercise, to take daily 
insulin injections—if I am to continue to live.  Such responsibilities are what Silber 
seems to have in mind when he speaks of status responsibility—those responsibilities that 
arise out of the unique circumstances that shape a person’s very existence. 
                                                
28 Ibid., 90. 
 
29 Ibid., 88. 
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 The appeal to status responsibility reaffirms Butler’s interrogation of the 
autonomous self and her subsequent views of responsibility.  As Butler and others 
suggest, there is always some dimension of what I call my “self” for which I can never 
give a full account.  I cannot always point to specific choices that gave rise to particular 
dimensions of my being, nor can I ever give an exhaustive account of how “I” came to be 
as my very origins lay outside the realm of my control and decision-making capacity.  
Yet, the address of the other compels me to give an always-inadequate account of myself, 
that is, to respond and be responsible.  Though argued in decidedly more legalistic 
language, Silber’s advocacy of status responsibility echoes Butler’s sentiment that 
responsibilities are not always chosen.  Both scholars agree that responsibility oftentimes 
obtains by virtue of the unique conditions of the agent’s existence, whether one speaks it 
in terms of status or the unwilled address of the other.  In either case, moral agents are 
responsible by virtue of their unique states of being, regardless of any elements of 
intention or control on the part of those agents. 
 The idea of status responsibility may be criticized for seemingly justifying certain 
entrenched racist, sexist, heterosexist, abelist, and other discriminatory attitudes.  By 
claiming that certain responsibilities obtain by virtue of who someone is, are we not 
leaving the door open for a range of exclusivist perspectives and practices?  Consider the 
numerous appeals to “objective” science that have been deployed to justify attitudes of 
racial, sexual, and heterosexual superiority.  Phrenology, for example, was thought prove 
the intellectual superiority of Europeans in comparison to Africans throughout the 
nineteenth century.  In early 2005, former President of Harvard University, Lawrence 
Summers, came under serious scrutiny for stating in a speech that more men than women 
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might occupy high-level positions in science and engineering professions because men 
naturally had a potential for greater aptitude than women in those fields of study.30  Such 
judgments are made based on a person’s status—as a European or African, as male or 
female—but we likely bristle at these examples because they seem so negatively 
prejudiced.  Do such examples mean that status responsibility may be little more than a 
euphemism for discrimination? 
 While there is a clear danger to potentially using the idea of status responsibility 
to justify discriminatory attitudes and practices, I do not find status responsibility to be 
inherently discriminatory or oppressive.  Butler, following Foucault, is quick to point out 
the ways in which linguistic and social structures create oft-unrecognized boundaries that 
limit possibilities for how a subject can live her life.  Based on her understanding of 
responsibility in light of those boundaries and the self’s opacity, she advocates an attitude 
of humility and withholding ethical judgment when such judgment fails to promote life.  
Consider someone who, for any number of reasons, must use a wheelchair.  On one hand, 
that person is indeed saddled with responsibilities that able-bodied individuals do not 
have.  The built environment makes moving in a wheelchair difficult at times.  It may 
seem that such burdens make that particular mode of being-in-the-world less desirable 
than that of a person who can walk.   
                                                
30 Specifically, Summers claimed that “in the special case of science and engineering, 
there are issues of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability of aptitude, and 
that those considerations are reinforced by what are in fact lesser factors involving 
socialization and continuing discrimination.”  See his “Remarks at the NBER Conference 
on Diversifying the Science & Engineering Workforce,” 14 January 2005.  Available 
online: 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeche
s/2005/nber.html>. 
 
 148 
However, it is important to ask:  What responsibilities obtain to being 
(temporarily) able-bodied that the wheelchair-bound individual does not possess? 31  
What implicit structures shape our society in a way that privileges able-bodiedness often 
to the exclusion of disabled bodies?  In other words, the evaluative claim that being 
disabled in some way is worse or less desirable than being temporarily able-bodied is not 
necessarily and wholly rooted in these different biological states, but rather in the ways in 
which those states of being are accommodated—or neglected—by society at large.  
While I do not intend to underestimate the challenges that accompany disabled bodies, I 
contend that by withholding ethical judgment and being responsible for shaping society 
to be more conducive to the wide spectrum of states of being, we can make great strides 
toward eliminating discriminatory attitudes and practices aimed at disabled members of 
our society.  In doing so, we then see that different states of being are just that—
different—and not necessarily better or worse than others.  In fact, from this perspective 
it becomes the responsibility of those who are temporarily able-bodied to render the 
social world more open to disabled persons.  
Additionally, status responsibility resonates with much of the work in feminist 
ethics and Christian theology during the past half century.  In her groundbreaking work 
                                                
31 I follow Nancy Eiesland and many others in the disabled community in using the term 
“temporarily able-bodied” to designate so-called “normal” modes of being.  Eiesland 
notes that the overwhelming majority of us will inevitably become physically disabled at 
some point in our lives, either temporarily or permanently.  Thus, it is appropriate to 
think of able-bodiedness as a temporary status for most individuals.  For more, see Nancy 
L. Eiesland, The Disabled God : Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1994).  See also Eiesland’s “Things Not Seen: Women with Physical 
Disabilities” in Liberating Faith Practices: Feminist Practical Theologies in Context, 
eds. Denise Ackermann and Riet Bons-Storm (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1998), 103-
127. 
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In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan challenges the paradigm of moral development 
articulated by Freud, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg.32  She demonstrates ways in which 
their work considers maleness to be normative, excluding women’s moral development 
from their purview.  By listening to the voices of women talking about their moral 
experiences, Gilligan discovers that women tend to frame moral issues differently than 
men.  She notes that where men typically think about morality in terms of rights, rational 
discernment, rules, and justice (distributing rewards and punishment), women typically 
construe moral issues in the language of responsibility for others, relationships, and 
caring.  In other words, men and women often have different moral voices—not better or 
worse, just different.  The difference that Gilligan highlights has given rise to an “ethics 
of care” that feminist scholars have drawn upon for decades in order to articulate how an 
agent’s female status shapes how she views a moral issue and gives rise to certain 
responsibilities in a given situation because of that status. 
In theological circles, various “identity theologies” have risen to prominence in 
response to abstract theologizing of post-Enlightenment Western Christianity, with its 
racist, sexist, heterosexist, and ableist language that contributes to the oppression of non-
white, non-male, non-heterosexual, or disabled people and communities.  To paraphrase 
the work of theologian James Cone, the theology of Karl Barth had little to say to 
African-Americans of the mid-20th century who spent their lives tenant farming in the 
rural south.33  In another example, Marcella Althaus-Reid recalled a group of Argentine 
Catholic women discussing the veneration of the Virgin Mary.  When asked if they 
                                                
32 Carol  Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
 
33 James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). 
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identified with the Virgin in their suffering, they responded, “’No, because she has 
expensive clothes and jewels, she is white and she does not walk.’”34  What such 
statements reveal is the acknowledgement by astute theologians that theology—if it is to 
address the specific challenges that individuals and communities face—must consider the 
unique lived experiences of those people if it is to have any resonance with their lives.  In 
other words, one’s status informs the ways in which one thinks and lives in the world; 
thus it is not far fetched to think that certain responsibilities may obtain from one’s 
unique status, as well. 
As the next chapter will demonstrate, status responsibility can be a helpful 
concept for thinking about moral challenges associated with genetics and genetic 
technologies.  It provides a way to identify specific responsibilities that arise as a result of 
one’s genetic constitution.  Status responsibility also provides a means for articulating the 
responsibilities that may arise by virtue of one’s status as a potential parent, a 
patient/client, a member of a religious community, or a medical professional.  Certainly 
many of these states or roles are freely chosen, but it is rarely the known dimensions of 
one’s status that an agent finds so morally troubling.  Further, while agents oftentimes 
freely choose many of their roles, we cannot typically choose which responsibilities 
associated with that role are relevant to our specific instantiations of those roles.  Further, 
agents are challenged by the unknown, by the unexpected question a patient poses or by 
the diagnosis that is far from definitive.  What does it mean to be responsible in these 
                                                
 
34 Quoted in Marcella Althaus-Reid, From Feminist Theology to Indecent Theology: 
Readings on Poverty, Sexual Identity and God (London: SCM Press, 2004), 30. 
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situations where our own status places us in these difficult circumstances with little 
guidance?  How do we exhibit responsibility for a self that cannot be fully known?  
 
William Schweiker: Responsibility as a Matter of Integrity 
 William Schweiker’s constructive turn in Responsibility and Christian Ethics 
provides guidance for addressing those very questions.  His integrated theory of 
responsibility is deeply indebted to the work of the theorists described in chapter three, 
but none more so than to H. Richard Niebuhr.  Schweiker, much like Niebuhr, contends 
that the basic problem of the moral life is that of faith, that is, in discerning what 
“identity-conferring commitments” should guide our lives by expressing what is to be 
valued.35  By turning to responsibility, Schweiker addresses the contemporary outlook 
that typically obfuscates value in relation to power.  He seeks to counter the notion that 
what is “valuable” is that which is powerful, or that which allows humans to merely 
fulfill their own interests.  His emphasis on the relations between responsibility, faith, and 
value theory also show Schweiker’s indebtedness to Niebuhr.  Also following Niebuhr, 
Schweiker begins his analysis of the moral life with lived human experience rather than 
with reified first principles by which life or actions are to be judged.  Though decidedly 
informed by Christian ideals, Schweiker’s insistence that responsibility is a matter for all 
moral agents puts him in line with Niebuhr, who saw his own work as an example of 
Christian moral philosophy.  To further support the task of Christian moral philosophy, 
Schweiker commits himself to a perspective of “hermeneutical realism” in which, to 
                                                
35 Schweiker, 2. 
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paraphrase Paul Ricoeur, “we invent in order to discover the truth of our moral 
condition.”36 
 Schweiker’s overall project is a defense of what he calls the imperative of 
responsibility: “In all actions and relations we are to respect and enhance the integrity of 
life before God.”37  Responsibility is defined in terms of the integrity of life.  It may be 
appropriate to think of the integrity of life as Schweiker’s primary concern rather than to 
see his work as a reformulation of the concept of responsibility; responsibility is the 
means to the end of integrity.  He states, “Moral integrity is the substantive moral good 
and hence the focus in theological ethics; the idea of responsibility provides the means 
for thinking about the meaning of that good for how we ought to live.”38  This substantive 
moral good of integrity “designates the integration of the goods of life with respect to 
attitudes and commitments to a moral project which defines what an agent’s life is 
about…[Moral integrity] concerns consideration of the well-being of others as well as 
self.”39  That is, a life of integrity is one in which the goods of that life are ordered in 
accordance with the values and commitments that a person holds dear.  Following the 
trajectories of relational thinkers like Niebuhr and Butler, Schweiker’s vision of integrity 
                                                
36 Ibid., 114.  Hermeneutical realism holds that moral values exist prior to the traditions 
and cultural artifacts that moral agents deploy in order to articulate those values.  
However, it also admits that our understanding of those values requires some conceptual 
scheme and linguistic structures.  Hence, we “invent” moral frameworks with notions like 
“truth” or “beauty” or “good” or “God” in order to “discover” those moral goods to 
which those names are applied.  The task of ethics becomes validating the claims of a 
community and its conceptual scheme “by articulating the basic character of moral 
experience” (110). 
 
37 Ibid., 2. 
 
38 Ibid., 44. 
 
39 Ibid., 130. 
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also takes the well-being of the other into account; perhaps this his recognition that there 
can be no “I” without a “you.” 
 With this understanding of integrity, it is important to consider what the “goods of 
life” signify.  Schweiker notes, “The moral domain of life is constituted by interlocking 
goods endemic to human existence and the choices we make about them.  Taken together 
these diverse goods constitute the values which the responsible person or community is 
committed to respect and enhance.”40  He identifies four levels of such goods: pre-moral, 
social, reflective, and the ethical good of integrity.  Pre-moral goods include those goods 
necessary for material well-being (food, shelter, bodily integrity), but also goods that 
“situate us in the world as feeling, aspiring, social, acting agents” (sexual fulfillment, 
music, etc.); these goods are pre-moral because it is sometimes necessary to diminish or 
sacrifice these goods in order to uphold other goods (Schweiker uses an example of 
sacrificing a limb in order to save a life.).41  Social goods promote communal and 
environmental well-being and include goods like family, friendship, political 
participation, and interaction with the environment.  These goods are “those forms of 
human excellence and well-being associated with fidelity to the consideration of others in 
a way of life and in specific choices.”42  Reflective goods promote personal well-being by 
supporting the quest for a life of truth, self-interpretation, and self-understanding.  Such 
goods include “the goods of culture or civilization, that is, the whole domain of symbolic, 
                                                
40 Ibid., 117. 
 
41 Ibid., 117-118. 
 
42 Ibid., 118. 
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linguistic, and practical meaning-systems.”43  The final good that Schweiker discusses, 
the ethical good, is described as moral integrity.  This ethical good “designates a 
commitment through which an agent helps create her or his life with respect to goods at 
the root of personal and social existence” and as noted above, it “specifies the wholeness 
of life.”44 
 The moral life, however, is an ambiguous endeavor.  At times these various goods 
conflict; natural law advocates speak of such instances in terms of the principle of double 
effect.  Another difficulty of the moral life is that the goods and values to which one 
agent is committed will come into conflict with another moral agent’s striving for her 
own goods.  In other words, one person’s constant striving for integrity will inevitably 
bump up against the struggles of another person.  Yet, the imperative of responsibility 
calls on moral agents to respect and enhance the integrity of life in themselves and others.  
Resolution of this conflict requires the act of radical interpretation, the “reflective, 
critical inquiry aimed at the question of what has constituted our lives in terms of what 
we care about and what ought to guide our lives under the demand of respect for 
others.”45  Through radical interpretation moral agents do not “merely evaluate the moral 
worth of others in terms of our interests or inchoate feelings; we also understand the 
moral life and what we care about in terms of the experience of the recognition of 
others.”46  It provides “moral depth and inwardness of life” through “critical assessment 
                                                
43 Ibid., 119. 
 
44 Ibid. 
 
45 Ibid., 176. 
 
46 Ibid., 176-177. 
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of the ground project(s) to which the meaning and value of life is bound.”47  It is the 
practice that transforms the moral agent’s commitments out of respect for the moral 
agency of others.   As an example of radical interpretation, Schweiker points to the 
Hebrew people’s repentance and remembrance of their covenant with God—those acts of 
repentance and remembrance were the basis of their very identity.48 
 “We all live,” Schweiker states, “by faith.  The hard question to answer is the 
faith by which we ought to live.”49  One must remember that his project is a work of 
Christian ethics.  For Schweiker, it is the conceptual framework of Christianity through 
which he interprets the moral life, value, power, responsibility, and integrity.  He claims 
that “For Christian faith ‘God’ is the name for the radical interpretation of ultimate reality 
in which power is transformed in recognition of and care for finite existence.  ‘Who’ God 
is…is interpreted with respect to specific values and norms: God is creator, sustainer, and 
redeemer.”50  From this perspective, power is no longer self-interested power: it is the 
ability to promote life and care for that for which God is creator, sustainer, and redeemer.  
God is the root of all value, and for Christians this God is a God that promotes life and 
places great value on being.  Responsibility affirms that being is valuable and moral 
integrity comes about when one lives a life of reverence for being and not merely one of 
self-interest.  Schweiker concludes: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
47 Ibid., 176. 
 
48 Ibid., 177. 
 
49 Ibid., 120. 
 
50 Ibid. 179. 
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“The paradox of morality from a Christian point of view is, again, that we 
cannot directly aim at the final good of human life for ourselves.  Genuine 
moral integrity is an indirect consequence of first seeking to respect and 
enhance the integrity of all life before God.  It is in this sense that persons 
must lose themselves in order to find themselves.  The true integrity of 
existence is only received when a person’s or community’s life has a 
purpose other than its own quest for authentic fulfillment.”51 
 
 At first glance this understanding of integrity may seem to run counter to my 
assertion that integrity is a matter of self-understanding.  However, what Schweiker notes 
here—and what Butler previously asserted—is that the “self” or the “subject” that strives 
for self-understanding is never fully one’s own.  Schweiker uses the language of losing 
oneself in order to find oneself.  Butler speaks of the inherent relationality that undergirds 
moral existence—the address of the other that calls me into being.  Both Schweiker and 
Bulter recognize that self-understanding is crucial to the moral life, but it is not the telos 
of that endeavor.  In fact, both suggest that the more someone comes to understand about 
herself, the more she realizes that she is not fully her own being; she does not have full 
control over her life.  And yet for Schweiker, like Butler, this point does not negate the 
call of responsibility—it amplifies responsibility.  In some sense, integrity may be a 
heuristic device for the moral life.  Moral agents constantly strive to achieve a life of 
integrity, but as someone reaches closer to that goal, she comes to see the boundedness 
and giftedness of her own existence.  A fully integrated existence may be unattainable, 
but through the process of striving for integrity the moral agent begins to acknowledge 
the significant un-accountability and unknowability that rests at the heart of her very 
being. 
 
                                                
51 Ibid., p. 225. 
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Summary: Responsibility as a Matter of Status and Integrity 
 By analyzing the works of Judith Butler, John Silber, and William Schweiker 
relating to matters of responsibility, I have laid outlined a vision of responsibility that 
provides a necessary alternative to the dominant understanding rooted in notions of 
autonomy, voluntariness, and decision-making contexts.  While that dominant view is 
helpful for thinking about certain moral challenges—particularly when those challenges 
take the form of a quandary—the voices of the moral agents described earlier in this 
chapter and in chapter two suggest that moral challenges do not always take the form of 
agony over making hard choices.  Rather, sometimes the moral agent’s struggles are 
interpreted as a matter of integrity or self-understanding: Who am I and how can I live 
out my values in these otherwise bleak circumstances.  Or, to paraphrase the minister 
quoted earlier, “How do I prepare myself?”  Sometimes, the moral agent’s distress is not 
related to decision-making—perhaps the choice is all too clear or there are no choices to 
make—but with wrestling with issues of identity in the midst of tragedy. 
 If responsibility is to remain a viable concept for moral discourse in these 
instances—and its frequent use by professional organizations and focus group 
participants attests to its importance—then it must be able to address these matters of 
self-understanding and integrity.  Hence, I advocate a vision of responsibility that 
emphasizes two salient features that are too often ignored by dominant understandings of 
that concept: 1) Responsibility entails the acceptance of obligations borne from one’s 
status, regardless of one’s acceptance of the status itself—whether one is a medical 
professional, a potential carrier of a genetic anomaly, a parent, or a member of a religious 
community; and 2) While responsibility promotes the movement toward greater integrity 
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in one’s life, that movement paradoxically involves recognizing and incorporating 
uncertainty and loss of control into that life. 
 In the vein of Foucault, Derrida, and Levinas, Judith Butler’s critique of the 
modern subject emphasizes the mutual dependency at the heart of subjectivity.  She 
asserts that the subject is first called into being by the address of the other.  The subject 
must first be subject of the other’s call.  She cannot control that address, nor can she give 
a full account of its origin.  She does not enter into subjectivity voluntarily.  Further, 
because the subject must rely on linguistic and social artifacts that she did not create in 
order to give an account of herself to the other, her account can never be exhaustive.  
Thus, the subject is always, to various degrees, opaque and perhaps ultimately 
unknowable to herself.  Exhaustive self-knowledge and complete self-control are 
unattainable.  Though the free, voluntary, autonomous subject is an illusion, Butler 
nonetheless maintains that responsibility is both possible and necessary for the moral life, 
not only in spite of the subject’s limitations but because of the subject’s boundedness. 
 Along similar lines, John Silber’s argument on behalf of status responsibility 
supports the claim that an agent may be responsible for matters she does not necessarily 
choose.  In this case, he notes that certain obligations may be borne from one’s status.  
Responsibility, Silber argues, rests along a continuum in which actions are judged 
according to the degree of agential voluntariness present in those actions.  Even those 
actions that are not chosen carry some limited degree of responsibility because it is 
impossible to fully separate the moral agent and her actions.  Some range of 
responsibilities often exist independent of the agent’s voluntary, autonomous choice; 
these responsibilities can develop as a result of who a person is rather than from what she 
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does.  For example, while someone may choose to be a parent, she does not choose her 
uniquely different children, nor does she choose the different responsibilities that arise 
out of being a parent to those specific children with their own unique traits.  Or, while 
someone may choose to be a physician, she does not choose the challenges that she and 
her patients will face.  By virtue of being a parent or physician, however, the agent 
acquires certain responsibilities that she does not necessarily choose.  Silber’s status 
responsibility provides a theoretical foundation for making this claim. 
 Finally, William Schweiker’s imperative of responsibility provides an articulation 
of the importance of integrity for thinking about responsibility and moral agency.  He 
convincingly argues that thinking about responsibility in terms of integrity is especially 
important in our contemporary context in which value and power are often conflated.  He 
asserts that the concern of the moral life is faith, that is, which identity-conferring 
commitments should guide our lives.  Integrity becomes crucial because of the tragic and 
inevitable conflict of goods that accompany human existence.  Without integrity to help 
us acknowledge and order those goods, power and value are conflated and human beings 
become nothing more than self-interested creatures.  The imperative of responsibility, 
grounded in the notion that God is the source of value and responsibility, then calls us to 
respect and enhance the integrity of life in ourselves and in others.  The nuances of 
Schweiker’s argument are of little consequence to my own, though his insistence on the 
centrality of integrity for responsibility provides a way for thinking about responsibility 
in terms beyond those of isolated choice.  Responsibility is more than making a “right” or 
“responsible” decision; it is the product of constant striving for self-understanding and 
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living in accordance with one’s values and commitments, especially when one recognizes 
the limits of one’s own self-understanding and self-control. 
 The following chapter further explicates the vision of responsibility that I 
advocate.  I do so by returning to the challenges of genetics and genetic biotechnologies 
of predictive genetic testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  I do not offer 
normative guidelines about how someone ought or ought not deploy these technologies; I 
make no claims about what the responsible use of these tools might be.  Rather, I intend 
to show how this new understanding of responsibility can be beneficial for 
patients/clients and clinicians as they reconsider the challenges they confront in dealing 
with these tools in the clinic.  Thinking about responsibility as a matter of status and 
integrity enables us to think of those challenges in a different light.  It calls attention to 
helpful ways of thinking about what responsibility entails in difficult circumstances.  
Further, I show how the genetics science supports the assertion that responsibilities 
sometimes arise out of one’s status and show why responsibility requires accepting 
limitations to self-knowledge and self-control.  I conclude the dissertation by outlining 
the implications of this work for the practice of medicine in general, particularly with 
reference to the popular notion of “evidence-based medicine.”
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CHAPTER V 
 
PREDICTIVE GENETIC TESTING AND PGD IN LIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 This project began with an analysis of the role of genetic information in the 
contemporary clinic, with particular emphasis on new biotechnologies like predictive 
genetic testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  To contextualize 
discussions on those issues, I examined three themes that permeate public discourse on 
genetics: genetics as novel, genetic exceptionalism, and genetic determinism.  Given 
what researchers have discovered about the relationship between genes, behavior, and 
environmental factors, I argued that those notions are often misguided.  This 
misunderstanding about what genetic knowledge can provide leads to equally misleading 
promises about genetic technologies enabling people to “take charge” of their health.  I 
also examined predictive genetic testing and PGD in detail, identifying prominent ethical 
challenges that these new technologies pose to patients/clients, clinicians, and counselors.  
In this final chapter, I conclude by returning to those challenges equipped with a vision of 
responsibility rooted in notions of status and integrity.  I aim to show how this 
understanding of responsibility offers helpful ways to consider genetics-related issues in 
a manner that addresses the underlying moral anxieties these issues evoke.  Those 
anxieties, I maintain, go well beyond matters of autonomous, voluntary decision-making. 
 I do not intend to establish strict normative guidelines for what constitutes 
“responsible use” of predictive genetic testing and PGD, nor do I seek to draw a 
normative line between acceptable and unacceptable uses of these technologies.  Instead, 
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I want to demonstrate how thinking about responsibility in this way changes the terms of 
the debate, so to speak.  Considering responsibility as a matter of status and integrity 
clarifies many of the ethical challenges that arise from genetic technologies and their 
increasing presence in the clinic.  It equips us with tools to understand those challenges as 
matters of discerning who we are as moral agents and who we strive to be.  Through this 
understanding of responsibility, I also demonstrate the importance of attitudes of humility 
and openness to unique states of being, noting how these attitudes are reflective of 
responsible moral agency in this context.  Additionally, considering responsibility as a 
matter of status and integrity enables agents to reflect on responsibilities that they do not 
necessarily choose but for which they will nonetheless be held accountability.  These 
responsibilities arise out of an agent’s embodied, socially located, and role-informed 
status. 
 Further, I argue that technologies like predictive genetic testing and PGD 
reinforce many of the insights I have put forth about responsibility in the face of 
uncertainty and un-control in difficult circumstances.  The information these technologies 
provide—and the inherent limitations of what they can offer—attest to the inexhaustible 
character of selfhood.  In other words, the limited information and limited ability to 
control a progeny’s future offered by these technologies is indicative of our inability to 
attain full self-knowledge and full self-control.  Yet, predictive genetic testing and PGD 
may be still be helpful for individuals who want more information about their possible 
future health outcomes or the future health status of their offspring, provided those 
individuals are aware of the inherent limitations of these technologies.  
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Because many of these ideas are broad departures from how ethics is typically 
construed (particularly in bioethics discourse), I conclude this dissertation by briefly 
turning to bioethics and medical practice, drawing out possible implications for these 
fields that this vision of responsibility brings to light.  Thinking about responsibility as a 
matter of status and integrity provides a beneficial way to consider the tasks of bioethics 
and the ways in which medicine is currently practiced, particularly with the emphasis on 
evidence-based medicine. 
 
Responsibility and Genetics: Predictive Genetic Testing 
 The challenges of predictive genetic testing that I outlined in chapter one may be 
broadly classified under three headings: challenges of uncertainty, challenges of 
information, and challenges of interpretation.  I see these three sets of challenges as 
related and I contend that the vision of responsibility that I advocate provides a beneficial 
lens through which those challenges may be examined.  The first set of challenges—
challenges of uncertainty—stem from the nature of the information that predictive 
genetic testing provides.  These tests, as I noted earlier, are different than most other 
medical tests, such as any number of blood assays or a CAT scan of a patient’s head; 
most medical testing that a clinician provides reveals something about the patient’s 
present condition (the presence of absence of a specific pathogen, for example).  While 
predictive genetic testing draws on a person’s current genetic constitution, they use that 
information to provide forecasts about a person’s future well-being.  Further, the vast 
majority of conditions for which predictive genetic testing is commercially available, are 
subject to a variety of contingent factors: environmental, behavioral, dietary, and more.  
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Certainly there are conditions like Huntington disease, in which the presence of certain 
genetic markers guarantees that an individual will eventually develop that condition; 
these conditions tend to be the exception rather the rule.  Thus, predictive genetic testing 
typically treads in probability rather than certainty.  These tests offer a person risk 
percentages, along with the caveat that genetic constitution is only one factor (albeit an 
important factor) in shaping a person’s future health.  Additionally, predictive genetic 
tests do not indicate with any degree of certainty when a person might develop the 
condition for which she has been tested.  Because of these limitations, I call the 
challenges that they pose to patients/clients and clinicians “challenges of uncertainty.” 
The second set of ethical challenges I identified may be classified as challenges of 
information.  Specifically, these challenges arise when discerning how the information 
derived from predictive genetic tests will be shared.  As noted earlier, 2008’s Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) is a direct political response to concerns that 
employers and insurance companies might gain access to the results of a person’s genetic 
testing results.  Concerns have also been raised because the results of one person’s 
genetic testing may indicate something about the health status of members of his or her 
family.1  While I argued that genetic information is not often exceptional in this regard—
blood tests may also reveal information relevant to a family member’s health—I also 
noted that there are instances in which the information revealed by predictive genetic 
testing is directly relevant to the health of a person’s family members, as the case of 
Katherine Moser highlighted in chapter one.  Should the results of predictive genetic 
                                                
1 James P. Evans, Cécile Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke, "The Complexities of Predictive 
Genetic Testing," BMJ 322, no. 7293 (2001), 1052-1056. 
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testing be shared?  With whom?  In what instances?  How should someone deal with 
information that may be relevant to one’s family members? 
The final set of ethical challenges that I noted earlier may be understood as 
challenges of interpretation.  These challenges are closely related to the challenges of 
uncertainty and information because how someone deals with those challenges will be 
heavily influenced by how she understands predictive genetic testing and its results.  The 
crux of the challenges of interpretation may be understood as this: How do individuals 
understand the information provided by predictive genetic testing?  Given the pervasive 
public perception that what is “written in the genes” is determinative of one’s well-being, 
how does someone interpret a test that typically provides that person with probabilities 
and risk percentages?  This concern is especially important given the increased 
availability of direct-to-consumer predictive genetic tests, which give the patient/client 
the opportunity to bypass the genetic counselor altogether. 
These challenges of interpretation, I suspect, are rooted in the very way in which 
the supporting data for these tests are created.  Predictive genetic tests, while purportedly 
offering patients/clients the information necessary to “take charge of your health” and to 
“make the promise of personalized medicine a reality,” actually provide very little 
“personal” information for the patient/client who uses them.2  Instead, they offer statistics 
about populations who possess the genetic marker in question.  For example, a study of 
120 Ashkenazi Jewish women who possessed the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutation 
                                                
2 These statements can be found on the websites of two commercial genetic testing 
companies, 23andMe and Navigenics, respectively.  See 23andMe, "Genetic Testing for 
Health, Disease & Ancestry; DNA Test - 23andme" <https://www.23andme.com/> 
(accessed February 5, 2010); Navigenics, "Navigenics - About Us" 
<http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/> (accessed February 5, 2010). 
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indicated that those women carry a 56% chance of developing breast cancer and a 16% 
chance of developing ovarian cancer by the age of 70.3  What such studies indicate is that 
genetics is an epidemiological, population-based science; as long as one is dealing in the 
realm of probability rather than certainty, no predictive genetic testing can tell a person if 
she will be part of the 78.5% who develop the condition in question or part of the 21.5% 
who have the mutation in question but for whom the condition never manifests.  Nor can 
these tests indicate how a person faced with such results understands her own situation.  
Does she see herself as part of the 56% or the 44%?  Surely moral distress can result from 
less-than-definitive testing results like these. 
As noted below, it is not clear that providing patients with information in the form 
of statistics, percentages, and probabilities is the best way to provide them with health 
information.  One study indicates that depicting risk in the language of “gambling odds” 
(1 chance in X) leads to more accurate understanding of risk for women at high risk of 
developing breast cancer.4  Others have argued that using absolute numbers, numbers for 
positive and negative outcomes, common denominators, and visual aids help patients 
better understand risks.5  Another study suggests that genetic counseling contributes to 
                                                
3 Jeffery P. Struewing, Patricia Hartge, Sholom Wacholder, Sonya M. Baker, Martha 
Berlin, Mary McAdams, Michelle M. Timmerman, Lawrence C. Brody, and Margaret A. 
Tucker. "The Risk of Cancer Associated with Specific Mutations of Brca1 and Brca2 
among Ashkenazi Jews." New England Journal of Medicine 336, no. 20 (1997), 1401-
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4 Penelope Hopwood and others, "Do Women Understand the Odds? Risk Perceptions 
and Recall of Risk Information in Women with a Family History of Breast Cancer," 
Community Genetics 6, no. 4 (2003), 214-223. 
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patients’ risk perception accuracy,6 though I would argue that being able to recall specific 
statistics indicates little about the patient’s actual understanding of what those numbers 
mean for her own health.  In other words, it is not clear that the language of probability 
and statistics is best for communicating risk information to patients, nor is it evident that 
a patient’s ability to recall such statistics is indicative of her understanding of what those 
numbers mean for her personal health.  Yet, these statistics are the most sound data 
clinicians have at their disposal, so clarifying patient understanding about those statistics 
becomes all the more crucial. 
So how can thinking about responsibility help those who are faced with these 
challenges?  First and foremost, the vision of responsibility that I developed earlier 
promotes an attitude of humility.  Through the lens of responsibility, we see that 
predictive genetic testing is an attempt to gain greater knowledge, certainty, and control 
over one’s life.  If I can know what will happen to me, so this line of thinking goes, I can 
prepare myself for the specific future that awaits me.  As the challenges of uncertainty 
and interpretation indicate, however, the claims that predictive genetic testing will enable 
someone to “take charge” of their health are often overstated.  The degree of certainty 
offered by these tests is much less significant than patients/clients may be led to believe, 
particularly if they listen to the claims about genetics that permeate popular discourse.  
 Thus, one significant step toward using predictive genetic tests in a responsible 
fashion would be to do so with recognition of the limits of those tests.  The information 
they provide, while oftentimes very valuable, is rarely determinative of one’s future well-
                                                
6 Chris Smerecnik and others, "A Systematic Review of the Impact of Genetic 
Counseling on Risk Perception Accuracy," Journal of Genetic Counseling 18, no. 3 
(2009), 217-228. 
 
 168 
being, health-related or otherwise.  If individuals are to use predictive genetic testing, 
they should do so with a humble acknowledgement of the limits of such attempts to better 
understand their health status.  To take matters a step further, an agent might be well 
served to follow Foucault and Butler in recognizing the impossibility of complete self-
knowledge and self-control.  After all, one’s life is never fully one’s own, nor are humans 
wholly self-creating beings.  Again, this is not to say that predictive genetic testing is a 
futile activity; some people may very well find those tests to provide valuable 
information.  However, it is imperative that we do not mistake test results for fate.   
We should also remember that there is inherent variability in the information 
provided by predictive genetic tests; similar test results can lead to different outcomes for 
different people.  That variability should be kept in mind when someone is faced with 
information that can potentially be relevant to someone else’s health.  Given that 
variability, it may not be prudent to share such information with others in one’s family 
unless it can be demonstrated that one person’s test is directly indicative of another 
person’s future health outcomes.  Even in those cases, we should respect the (always 
limited) self-determining capacity of others by speaking with those individuals prior to 
testing to determine if they want to know any relevant results.  Here, the importance of 
genetic counselors cannot be overstated.  If a person is open to having such conversations 
with her family prior to testing, a genetics counselor can be of assistance.  If she wants to 
keep her testing a private matter, a counselor can provide strategies for handling that 
information in a private fashion.  Unfortunately, direct-to-consumer predictive genetic 
testing does not come with readily available genetics counseling services.  Individuals 
must seek out those services.  However, out of respect for the selfhood of oneself and 
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others, responsibility calls one to seek the help of qualified professionals in cases where 
information may be relevant to one’s family.  Though our self-legislating and self-
determining capacities are limited, they are nonetheless to be respected. 
Finally, an understanding of responsibility that acknowledges the centrality of 
integrity demands that a person considering predictive genetic testing ask herself certain 
questions prior to testing:  What do hope to learn about myself through this activity?  
How do I foresee these test results shaping my understanding about who I am?  Is the 
pursuit of this knowledge about myself commensurate with the commitments I hold as 
fundamental to that self-understanding?  Can I draw on those commitments for support if 
I am faced with moral distress because of these tests?  How can I draw on those 
commitments?  How might these test results challenge the commitments that I have 
made?  If a person is committed to the position that God is able to intervene in the affairs 
of the world, for example, how might difficult test results impact her view of God?  
These questions of integrity are deeply important, and based on the vision of 
responsibility that I have endorsed, any responsible use of predictive genetic testing must 
address these questions, or at least acknowledge their relevance in the context of using 
predictive testing.  
 
Responsibility and Genetics: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
 As noted in the first chapter, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is 
frequently portrayed as a quintessential example of biotechnology run amok.  PGD brings 
to light serious and fundamental questions about the nature of humanity and our 
relationship to technology.  It is the latest in a line of biotechnologies that elicits charges 
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of “playing God” and overextending human intentionality into a realm where it should 
not be.  In this line of thought, genetic technologies’ casual encroachment have led to 
children being valued as the products of a market-driven, capitalist endeavor in which 
potential parents become consumers and physicians/clinicians offer their services to the 
consumer in exchange for appropriate compensation.  For example, in his discussions of 
“genetic engineering” and the specter of human cloning, Leon Kass appeals to the 
“wisdom of repugnance” as that “emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s 
power to fully articulate” the dis-ease that accompanies these technologies and the new 
capacities that they provide.7  Despite the increased level of intentionality at work in 
PGD, Kass argues that such technologies are ultimately dehumanizing because they 
remove sex, love, and intimacy from procreation.8   
 PGD also has profound implications for our understanding of what constitutes 
“desirable” or “undesirable” states of existence.  We must keep in mind that genetics are 
only one factor—albeit an important factor—that contributes to the development of many 
so-called disabilities.9  Some disabled persons view interventions like PGD as worthy 
endeavors that will reduce the incidence of passing on particular disabled states to 
subsequent generations; others are much more ambivalent or downright opposed to using 
PGD to “eliminate” certain modes of being that may be classified as disabilities.10  There 
                                                
7 Leon R. Kass, "The Wisdom of Repugnance. (Cover Story)," New Republic 216, no. 22 
(1997), 17-26; quote on 20. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 See chapter 4, footnote 31 for my statement on the usage of the label of “disability.” 
 
10 Jackie Leach Scully, "Disability and Genetics in the Era of Genomic Medicine," 
Nature Reviews Genetics 9, no. 10 (2008), 797-802; Jackie Leach Scully, Christine 
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are even documented instances of people seeking out PGD in order to select for disabled 
states.11  While most people who can hear would prefer hearing to deafness, we can also 
understand how a deaf couple would perceive that “a deaf baby would be a special 
blessing,” even if we may disagree with their reasons for doing so.12  Parents want to be 
able to communicate with their children and hope that those children “fit” in a 
community of people with shared experiences and aspirations.  We can sympathize with 
the parents who want their children to be deaf like them, and those of us who can hear 
and speak frequently take those communicative traits for granted.  Family members 
typically bond through spoken language, as evidenced by American households in which 
English is not the primary language; communication creates community.  American Sign 
Language (ASL) is another example of language’s power to shape community and give 
people a sense of belonging.  Is it any wonder that parents would use an available 
medical technology to make that community formation possible within their own homes?  
This is especially true when traits like deafness are understood as being fundamental to a 
person’s identity. 
 The move to select for a “disability” can also be seen as an attempt to de-
stigmatize a condition like deafness, hopefully rendering deafness a more socially 
                                                                                                                                            
Rippberger, and Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, "Non-Professionals' Evaluations of Gene 
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acceptable mode of being.  On the other hand, there may also be considerable pressure to 
use PGD in order to eliminate such disabilities or to deploy PGD to promote other more 
“desirable” traits like height or intelligence.  Further, it must be remembered that, at 
present, PGD is an expensive technology that is not covered under health insurance plans.  
It is thus open only to those who can afford its hefty price tag.  To consider the social 
implications of PGD in light of responsibility, we must reflect on the values and 
commitments that a given society professes; it is only in light of those values that we can 
begin to think about social integrity.  We should ask: Is offering unregulated PGD to 
those who can afford it reflective of what we as a society envision ourselves to be?  On a 
national level, if our identity as Americans is defined by unregulated choice to consume 
what we choose, then perhaps leaving PGD to be regulated by the “free market” is 
appropriate.  If, however, we are committed to notions of equality of opportunity, the 
inherent worth of unique individuals, and the participation of those individuals in 
democratic structures, then perhaps stronger regulatory frameworks are in order so that 
certain so-called “disabled” modes of being are not further stigmatized as a result of 
PGD’s availability. 
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, I do not aim to provide strict normative 
guidelines for what ought to be considered “responsible” uses of PGD, though such 
guidance is valuable in the realm of public policy.  Because I advocate a view of 
responsibility grounded in notions of status and integrity, I am committed to the position 
that what is “responsible” cannot be predetermined—specific, unique contexts and 
individuals shape what responsibility entails in a given circumstance.  If we are to insist 
on the language of line-drawing for public policy discourse on this topic, I maintain that 
 173 
we must first and foremost listen to the voices of those people who are most directly 
affected by PGD’s use: clinicians, potential parents considering PGD, and individuals 
and communities whose identities are partially constituted by the conditions for which 
PGD might be used.  These are the people whose states of being will inform what 
responsibility or responsible uses of this technology will entail; they are the ones whose 
movements toward integrity are shaped by those conditions.  Thus, their voices should 
guide—or at the very least inform—any responsible public policy discussions. 
 Finally, it is important to consider what the use of PGD reveals about who we are 
and who we see ourselves as being.  Michael Sandel forcefully argues that enhancement 
technologies like PGD and “genetic engineering” are an affront to the giftedness of our 
lives.  “To acknowledge the giftedness of life,” he asserts, “is to recognize that our talents 
and powers are not wholly our own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts we 
expend to develop and to exercise them.  It is also to recognize that not everything in the 
world is open to any use we may desire or devise.”13  Sandel notes that the giftedness of 
human life is highlighted in the realm of parenthood: “To appreciate children as gifts is to 
accept them as they come, not as objects of our design, or products of our will, or 
instruments of our ambition.”14  Parents celebrate the unique talents that their children 
cultivate.  They are continually surprised by the gifts those children have—gifts that a 
parent could never anticipate. People may oftentimes choose to be parents, but they 
cannot choose the unique gifts and talents of their children (even with the use of PGD). 
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 Using the language of giftedness in relation to PGD is not without its critics.  John 
Robertson forcefully argues that PGD (and other reproductive technologies) can be valid 
means for exercising a person’s procreative liberty.15  Broadly, procreative liberty is “a 
liberty or claim-right to decide whether or not to reproduce” comprised of the positive 
right to reproduce and the negative right to avoid reproduction if one chooses.16  Thus for 
Robertson, PGD and other reproductive technologies are to be legally protected (and 
largely unregulated) provided that they “aid in the task of successful reproduction.”17  
Further, utilizing PGD to ensure “healthy offspring to nurture and rear” is “usually 
ethically acceptable” and should be legally protected because its “use fits neatly into 
traditional understandings of why reproduction is valued.”18  In this line of thought, PGD 
should be widely available when it serves as a necessary tool for the exercise of a 
person’s procreative liberty. 
Robertson finds the value of reproduction to be in the creation healthy offspring 
for those people who find reproduction to be a deeply meaningful, identity-shaping 
experience that contributes to their sense of human flourishing.19  PGD contributes to the 
realization of that value when it provides the necessary means for a person to procreate.  
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In many cases, PGD is used when there are strong medical indications of its necessity 
(i.e., when the life of the mother or fetus is likely at risk in a potential pregnancy).  These 
uses of PGD are generally acceptable, but Robertson’s notion of “necessary” goes well 
beyond medical necessity.  Citing examples of potential parents who might use PGD to 
screen for “perfect pitch” or against homosexual offspring, Robertson argues that such 
uses of PGD are permissible if those  potential parents would otherwise not reproduce.  
He notes that are legal system already allows for such “private prejudices” and that 
parents are free to train their children in music and to teach them that homosexuality 
should be avoided.  To refuse PGD for those individuals who would use it for reasons 
that we might see as an affront to the giftedness of life would be to infringe upon their 
procreative liberties. 
Admittedly, from a public policy perspective, Robertson’s vision of procreative 
liberty has its appeal, though he fails to adequately address some of its more serious 
social defects and the ethical implications of largely unregulated use of PGD.  On the 
positive side, by allowing PGD to remain largely unregulated, assessments of the moral 
nature of this technology are left in the hands of individual moral agents.  It would allow, 
for example, a deaf family to pursue PGD in order to have deaf offspring with whom they 
could communicate.  Robertson also acknowledges some of the larger social implications 
of PGD’s widespread use, though remedies for these defects are lacking in his analysis.  
In one of Robertson’s example cases, he casts aside questions about the amplification of 
social stigma associated with homosexuality, instead noting that “permitting parents to 
use genetic technology to avoid having a child with a homosexual orientation is distinct 
from the separate question of whether homosexual individuals or couples have the right 
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to reproduce.”20  Here, he altogether neglects the large-scale social implications and the 
ethical dimensions of such selection, focusing exclusively on PGD’s legality. 
Further, by framing discussions of PGD in the language of rights, an additional 
challenge arises for Robertson.  If PGD is indeed a necessary tool for the exercise of a 
person’s procreative liberty, then it must be available to those individuals who require it 
in order to exercise those rights.  At present, PGD is a boutique technology, available 
only to those who can afford it.  As a result, only those who are already advantaged 
enough to pay out-of-pocket are currently able to enjoy the additional advantages that 
PGD supposedly provides.  Robertson recognizes this practical problem but fails to show 
how it can be rectified. 
Related to the issue of conceptual frameworks, Robertson’s vision of procreative 
liberty construes procreation almost exclusively in the language of freedom, control, and 
choice.  Further, it is the freedom and choice of parents that are to be considered.  
Freedom and choice are undoubtedly values to be upheld in the realm of public policy, 
but when it comes specific individuals and families who consider using PGD, their 
understandings of procreation will certainly be laden with other ethical values: love, 
mutuality, responsibility, respect for life, and hope (to name a few).  In neglecting the 
presence and importance of those other values, Robertson’s vision of procreation further 
commodifies that process and renders future children as products of their parents’ 
consumerist choices.  In his attempt to address this concern, Robertson simply suggests 
that there is no good reason for thinking that such commodification is a likely outcome of 
PGD’s widespread use.  Again, while his minimalist approach may be beneficial for 
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constructing public policy, it offers little guidance for persons struggling with whether or 
not to use PGD in their own circumstances.  As a result, Robertson’s work has little to 
say to those parents who are worried about how their future children will respond to 
being the product of PGD, nor to how those individuals may be welcomed or shunned by 
society at large. 
  Finally, Robertson directly critiques the language of giftedness because he 
understands such appeals to have “roots in a religiously based or metaphysical view of 
how reproduction should occur and a breadth that would apparently condemn nearly all 
forms of technological assistance in reproduction.”21  Yet, his appeal to “traditional 
understandings” of reproduction as the basis for PGD’s nearly limitless usage seemingly 
renders the permissibility of PGD to the court of public opinion.  Further, the 
“traditional” view that reproduction can be meaningful and identity-conferring can be 
articulated theologically, just as ideas about the giftedness of life can be stated without 
explicit theological references.  In his critique, he also fails to appreciate that thinking of 
children, or life itself, as a form of gift is indeed a widely held view and also rooted in 
“traditional understandings” of procreation and parenthood. 
 To a significant degree, Sandel’s analysis resonates with my own because the use 
of PGD and other enhancement technologies—particularly in the largely unregulated 
manner endorsed by Robertson—is expressive of an attitude reminiscent of modern 
views of the autonomous, masterful moral agent.  It “expresses and entrenches a certain 
stance toward the world—the stance of mastery and dominion that fails to appreciate the 
gifted character of human powers and achievements, and misses the part of freedom that 
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consists in a persisting negotiation with the given.”22  For Sandel, losing that sense of 
giftedness by exerting dominion through enhancement technologies would also erode our 
ideas of humility, responsibility, and solidarity.  We would lose the humility that 
accompanies the recognition that we are not fully our own creations.  Responsibility, in 
Sandel’s view, would “explode” as choice replaces chance at nearly every turn.  
Solidarity erodes as we lose our sense of shared fatedness and as those who can afford 
PGD become increasingly separated from those who cannot.  As noted above, Robertson 
offers little guidance for addressing these issues through the lens of procreative liberty. 
 Sandel’s view of responsibility is largely in line with the dominant view that 
holds choice as a necessary component of that concept.  I agree with his point that 
substituting choice for chance will expand the type of responsibility of which we 
typically speak, but I would argue that PGD’s prevalence would also expand the type of 
responsibility that I have presented in this dissertation.  Consider the children who are 
created through the use of PGD.  Those children may be burdened by additional 
responsibility precisely because their parents sought control over some aspect of their 
future states of being.  Also, consider a child born to serve as a “savior sibling” for her ill 
brother or sister.  Or, consider a child whose parents used PGD to seemingly ensure a 
physically gifted son or daughter.  Though not subject to the “blind fate” that ushered 
many of us into existence, those children are like us inasmuch as they also did not choose 
the specific elements of their own states of being.  What responsibilities hold for those 
children as a result of their “chosen” status?  Have they been burdened with additional 
responsibilities as a result of the choices of their parents?  These are pertinent questions 
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that we must ask.  Sandel’s understanding of giftedness provides a way for considering 
those questions, but Robertson’s vision of procreative liberty is of little help for working 
through these issues. 
 It is important to remember that even if potential parents find a clinician willing to 
use PGD to intentionally select for traits like height, perfect pitch, or physical 
performance, that intentional selection does not necessarily guarantee tall, musically 
inclinced, physically gifted offspring.  Despite any attempts to inject control and 
intentionality into the procreative process, an irreducible level of uncertainty and 
uncontrol always remain.  Quite simply, we cannot control our futures—or the futures of 
our children—despite our best attempts.  If clinicians and potential parents continue to 
use PGD, and I believe there are instances in which PGD may be warranted, they should 
do so with a recognition that those efforts to be fully self-creating, masterful agents will 
inevitably be thwarted.  Likewise, a person can use PGD to protect future offspring from 
truly devastating conditions (β-thalassemia, for example), but no one can totally protect 
her children from danger and tragedy altogether.  A parent may be able to ensure that a 
child is born with the trait of “perfect pitch” but this by no means ensures that her child 
will take an interest in music.  There is inherent risk and uncertainty, not just in 
parenthood, but in the very heart of human existence.  This inherent risk and uncertainty 
must be acknowledged before we delude ourselves into thinking we are willful masters of 
human being.  To act with blindness toward that uncertainty would be irresponsible. 
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Implications of Status and Integrity-Informed Responsibility for Medical Practice 
 “A new paradigm for medical practice is emerging,” the Evidence-Based 
Medicine Working Group announced in a 1992 issue of the Journal of the American 
Medical Association.23  Indeed, “evidence-based medicine” (EBM) has become quite a 
buzzword and has shaped medical education and practice in the past two decades.  EBM 
represents an epistemological shift for medical practice, a movement from the “former 
paradigm” that relied on “unsystematic observations and clinical experience…the study 
and understanding of basic mechanisms of disease and pathophysiological principles…a 
combination of thorough medical training and common sense…[and] content expertise 
and clinical experience.”24  The “new paradigm” of EBM makes medical claims based on 
“systematic attempts to record observations in a reproducible and unbiased fashion” and 
“certain rules of evidence” that are necessary “to correctly interpret literature on 
causation, prognosis, diagnostic tests, and treatment strategy.”25  EBM values data 
derived from clinical epidemiology, research, and trials.  Under this regime, the clinical 
experience and judgment of the expert physician still carry authority, that authority is 
subordinate to clear and relevant research data.  I called EBM an epistemological shift for 
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medical practice because, as Tonelli notes, EBM is concerned with the “defining optimal 
ways to develop knowledge and describing hierarchies of medical evidence.”26 
Tonelli also highlights the practical dimension of EBM in which this new 
hierarchy of knowledge is integrated into the clinical setting.27  According to the EBM 
Working Group, EBM involves a specific set of skills, including “precisely defining a 
patient problem, and what information is required to resolve the problem; conducting an 
efficient search of the literature; selecting the best of the relevant studies and applying 
rules of evidence to determine their validity…and extracting the clinical message and 
applying it to the patient problem.”28  One task of EBM advocates is to precisely 
determine how to integrate the medical knowledge endorsed by EBM in the clinical 
context.  As Tonelli indicates, however, there always remains a significant gap between 
research and clinical practice.29  The research upon which EBM relies is, by its very 
nature, population-based.  Clinical practice, on the other hand, is concerned 
overwhelmingly with individual patients (or sometimes, families).  While EBM can 
quantifiably account for many differences among individuals, those that cannot be 
quantified are minimized through the process of “randomization.”30  Yet, when it comes 
to providing care to individual patients, the possibility remains that those randomized 
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differences can influence how an individual could best be treated.  In such cases, the 
importance of clinical judgment on the part of the clinician cannot be overstated. 
There is a related issue here that is strikingly similar to a point that I raised 
regarding the information provided by predictive genetic testing.  Because the evidence 
overwhelmingly favored within EBM is population-based, the information that a clinician 
provides to her patients is typically conveyed in terms of probabilities and percentages.  
The Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group provides a case study that highlights this 
very point, illustrating the differences between EBM’s “way of the future” and the “way 
of the past.”  In this scenario, a 43-year-old man arrives at a teaching hospital after 
experiencing a grand mal seizure.  A junior medical resident gives the man a physical 
exam and orders a computed tomographic head scan and electroencephalogram (EEG).  
The exam and head scan are normal and the EEG shows “nonspecific findings.”  The 
patient is concerned about experiencing another seizure, but the medical resident is 
unsure about how to respond to his concerns.  Following the “way of the past,” the 
resident consulted a senior resident (whose views were supported by the attending 
physician) who stated that the risk of recurring seizures was high.  The resident urges the 
patient not to drive, to continue his medications, and to regularly visit his family 
physician.  We are told that the patient leaves “in a state of vague trepidation about his 
risk of subsequent seizure.”31 
 Following EBM’s “way of the future,” however, the resident first visits the library 
in order to conduct a literature search using the key terms epilepsy, prognosis, and 
recurrence.  The search yields 25 relevant articles, with one article being particularly 
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relevant to her case at hand.  From her trip to the library, the resident learns that “the 
patient risk of recurrence at 1 year is between 43% and 51%, and that at 3 years the risk is 
between 51% and 60%.  After a seizure-free period of 18 months his risk of recurrence 
would likely be less than 20%.”32  The resident returns to the patient, encourages him to 
continue his medications and to regularly visit his family physician.  She also relays her 
findings from the literature search.  The Working Group then concludes, “The patient 
leaves with a clear idea of his likely prognosis.”33 
 In their illustration, the Working Group assumes that providing the patient with 
risk percentages gives him a “clear idea” of his prognosis.  Yet, it is not evident that 
using probabilities and statistics to inform a patient of his or her prognosis is meaningful 
in any way.  The difficulties herein are twofold.  First, as Epstein et al note, “Quantitative 
estimates of probability of given outcomes can be difficult to establish prospectively.”34  
Beyond the difficulty of establishing the best quantitative risk assessments in a given 
situation, there is a further difficulty that can only be addressed by the patient herself.  In 
their example, the Working Group assumes that providing the patient with risk 
percentages provides him with a “clear idea” of his prognosis.  However, we must ask: 
Does the patient view himself as part of the 43-51% who will have another seizure within 
one year, or does he see himself as part of the 49-57% who will remain seizure-free in the 
next year?  To a degree, this is a question of how patients understand probabilities and 
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percentages and what is the most appropriate way to communicate risks to those patients.  
Much work has been conducted on that issue, but with little consensus.35  However, it is 
also a question of the patient’s own attitudes.  He may very well understand what a 43-
51% risk generally means, but when it comes what those numbers mean for him, that is a 
question that can only be addressed on an individual basis. 
 It is almost always the case that when one deals with statistics, percentages, and 
probabilities, there is an inherent degree of uncertainty that lingers at every turn.  Even if 
a physician tells her patient that he is 99.9% likely to develop a specific outcome, that 
0.1% still remains, and depending on the values and attitude of the patient, that 0.1% 
could be seen as a reason for despair or hope.  Clinicians routinely face instances in 
which patients must grapple with making sense of their health, their well-being, and their 
sense of self in light of circumstances that inherently contain relevant degrees of 
uncertainty.  While I laud EBM’s insistence that clinical work be guided by sound 
epidemiological data, I also want to make sure we pay attention to the limitations of the 
data on which it relies.   
It is at the limits of that knowledge where the vision of responsibility I have 
proposed can be most helpful.  This view of responsibility acknowledges that specific 
responsibilities may obtain by virtue of one’s status—including one’s status as a carrier 
                                                
35 Andrew J. Lloyd and others, "Patients' Ability to Recall Risk Associated with 
Treatment Options," The Lancet 353, no. 9153 (1999), 645; Ashish Mahajan, "Do 
Patients Understand Risk?," The Lancet 369, no. 9569 (2007), 1243; Marilyn M. 
Schapira, Ann B. Nattinger, and Colleen A. McHorney, "Frequency or Probability? A 
Qualitative Study of Risk Communication Formats Used in Health Care," Medical 
Decision Making 21, no. 6 (2001), 459-467; Steven Woloshin, Lisa M. Schwartz, and H. 
Gilbert Welsh, "The Effectiveness of a Primer to Help People Understand Risk," Annals 
of Internal Medicine 146, no. 4 (2007), 10. 
 
 185 
of a certain gene, as a clinician, as a family member, or as a patient whose physician 
presents her with uncertain prognoses.  It also recognizes the inherent unknowability and 
un-control that rests in the heart of selfhood while affirming that moral agents are 
nonetheless responsible in the face of such uncertainty.  This account of responsibility 
does not prescribe “the responsible thing to do” to a moral agent who is called upon to act 
in a difficult context; her specific responsibilities are always shaped by the context in 
which she acts.  Rather, it affirms that responsibility is not necessarily displaced when an 
agent lacks control over certain circumstances, nor does responsibility dissolve in the 
face of uncertainty.  On these points, the vision of responsibility I endorse can help 
clinicians and patients reflect on how they are called to be responsible even when the 
future remains uncertain, and even when they can do little to change the future course of 
events.  If nothing else, thinking about responsibility in this way can help clinicians and 
patients become more accepting of the inherent uncertainty that is always present in the 
clinic, particularly when many of its norms are rooted in EBM. 
 
Implications of Status and Integrity-Informed Responsibility for Bioethics 
 To conclude this project, I want to highlight how the understanding of 
responsibility that I have endorsed provides a way to reconsider some fundamental 
assumptions of bioethics.  Doing so, I maintain, provides necessary tools for engaging in 
bioethical analysis in a way that is meaningful to persons whose lives are actually 
touched by these very issues.  Reflecting on the centrality of uncertainty, status, and 
integrity for responsibility draws our analysis to the concrete reality of those individuals 
who struggle to uphold responsibility in difficult circumstances.  Unfortunately, this 
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“bottom-up” approach to bioethics analysis has not been fully appreciated in the field, 
which is understandable given the origins of “bioethics.”36  Historically, the focus of 
bioethics scholars has long been on provocative life-or-death scenarios, issues like organ 
transplantation, abortion, the allocation of scarce medical resources, and experimentation 
with human subjects.  This should come as little surprise given bioethics’ origins in 
response to events of the early-to-mid-20th century, such as the Nazi war crimes trials at 
Nuremburg and the development of life-prolonging technologies that make organ 
transplants possible.37  As interest in bioethics has grown in the past decades, scholars 
from a variety of disciplines have entered these discussions, bringing with them the 
methods of their “home” disciplines.38  Yet, despite the multitude of method and 
                                                
36 I use the term “bioethics” knowing that its meaning and the appropriateness of its use is 
not a settled matter.  I prefer “bioethics” rather than “medical ethics” because the former 
demonstrates a recognition that many of the topics that are addressed in this field are not 
solely medical in nature.  Discussions about the ethical implications of genetic 
engineering, for example, may raise questions about plant and animal biology that have 
little or no relation to questions about medical issues.  Further, while graduate programs 
in bioethics are in their infant stages at this time, the defining features of a field called 
“bioethics” have not yet been fully articulated.  It may be more appropriate to consider 
bioethics as an evolving set of ethical issues that scholars from a variety of other 
disciplines examine.  For example, it may be more truthful to speak of a philosopher, a 
pediatrician, a sociologist, a nurse, or a religious studies scholar who deals with bioethics 
issues rather than to call someone a “bioethicist.”  Still, I use the term “bioethics” to 
follow its common usage in scholarship and as a short-hand reference to the ethical 
challenges posed by scientific and medical research advances, as well as the challenges 
that arise when using scientific and medical technologies. 
 
37 For more on the history of the development of “bioethics” as a field, see Nancy Ann 
Silbergeld Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen, and Robert A. Pearlman, Bioethics: An Introduction 
to the History, Methods, and Practice, 2nd ed. (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 2007). 
 
38 Sugarman and Sulmasy’s Methods in Medical Ethics contains chapters written by 
leaders in their respective fields, detailing the relevance for their particular methodologies 
for work in medical ethics.  The collection contains chapters on the following fields: 
philosophy, religion and theology, law, casuistry, history, economics, ethnography, as 
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perspective that coheres in this not-well-defined field of bioethics, bioethics is all too 
often portrayed as an endeavor of applied ethics: “Is abortion permissible? How should 
donated organs be distributed?”39  When a new medical technology arises, such as 
predictive genetic testing or PGD, bioethics then becomes a process of articulating and 
applying the right principles to the matter, thereby supplying an answer for any questions 
that might arise.  In other words, bioethics is typically case-oriented and overwhelmingly 
concerned with discrete moments of decision. 
Admittedly, this dissertation follows this approach to a degree in its examination 
of predictive genetic testing and PGD and its advocacy of a particular understanding of 
responsibility.  I agree that scholars of bioethics must be able to critically assess morally 
distressing situations that arise in relation to science, medicine, and health; these scholars 
must be able to make judgments and express those judgments when necessary.  However, 
by endorsing a vision of responsibility that transcends issues of isolated decision-making 
related to “tough cases,” I intend to highlight a much more fundamental dimension of the 
many tasks of bioethics.  Bioethics, I maintain, must not be solely in the business of 
providing tidy answers to difficult challenges.  It must also critically probe those 
challenges in order to facilitate greater clarification on precisely what makes certain 
                                                                                                                                            
well as qualitative and quantitative sociological methods.  See Jeremy Sugarman and 
Daniel P. Sulmasy, Methods in Medical Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2001). 
 
39 In a recently published introductory bioethics textbook, Lewis Vaughn describes 
bioethics as “applied ethics focused on health care, medical science, and medical 
technology.”  His definition is one of many examples of thinking about bioethics as a 
form of applied ethics, but I use Vaughn as an example because his work is so recent.  
See Lewis Vaughn, Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), quote on 4. 
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issues so distressing.  Bioethicists must recognize that moral distress does not always 
arise out of decision-making difficulty, but rather from the ways in which medicine and 
medical technologies interrogate our moral concepts and self-understanding.  To do this 
work, however, requires a different orientation than the stereotypical principlist approach 
to bioethics, one that does not seek to apply already-given principles to a given situation.  
It also requires openness to the possibility that our very assumptions—including the 
assumption that ethical problems are always problems of choice—are not always correct 
in a given set of circumstances.   
 If responsibility is to remain a valuable concept for bioethics discussions, we must 
reconsider responsibility in light of those tasks I just mentioned.  As noted in the previous 
chapter, the vision of responsibility that I have advocated is one that recognizes the 
ethical import of status, integrity, uncertainty, and the challenges confronting moral 
agents that do not always fit squarely within decision-making frameworks.  It calls us 
away from abstract generalizations about what the generic moral agent should or should 
not do when confronted with a given set of challenges.  To consider the place of status 
and integrity is to acknowledge that ethical analysis must begin with the lived 
experiences of real moral agents, living in specific historical and cultural contexts.  As 
the previous chapter hinted, feminist scholars have been voicing these very concerns for 
decades; bioethics scholars, on the other hand, have seemingly been slow to heed their 
calls.40  Similarly, phenomenological voices in bioethics are rare in contemporary 
                                                
40 For a substantive overview of the contributions of feminist scholarship to bioethics 
discourses, see Hilde Lindemann Nelson, "Feminist Bioethics: Where We've Been, 
Where We're Going," Metaphilosophy 31, no. 5 (2000), 492-508.  Key texts that deal 
directly with feminist contributions to bioethics include: Anne Donchin, Laura Martha 
Purdy, and International Association of Bioethics, Embodying Bioethics: Recent Feminist 
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bioethics, though their contributions to the field have been significant.41  Following the 
work of feminist and phenomenological scholars, a vision of responsibility rooted in 
status and integrity demands that ethics work its way from the ground up rather than 
starting at the top with abstract principles and applying them to concrete situations.  It 
recognizes that the challenges of bioethics are sometimes challenges associated with 
striving toward greater self-understanding or integrity in the face of insurmountable 
uncertainty.  It also recognizes the anxiety that accompanies the approach to the limits of 
one’s self-knowledge.  It can be downright frightening to see that one is not in full 
control of herself.  It can be a real struggle—or a blessing—to deal with responsibilities 
that one does not choose for oneself.  If scholars of bioethics are to use the language of 
responsibility to critically probe such challenges, they must do so in a way that is 
meaningful to the moral experiences of those for whom their work is directed. 
                                                                                                                                            
Advances New Feminist Perspectives Series (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1999); Laura Martha Purdy, Reproducing Persons: Issues in Feminist Bioethics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Susan Sherwin, "Whither Bioethics? How 
Feminism Can Help Reorient Bioethics," International Journal of Feminist Approaches 
to Bioethics 1, no. 1 (2008), 7-27; Susan  Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics 
and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Rosemarie Tong, 
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Applications 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997); Susan M. Wolf, Feminism & Bioethics: Beyond 
Reproduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
41 See, for example Howard Brody, Stories of Sickness, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of 
Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); S. Kay Toombs, The Meaning of 
Illness: A Phenomenological Account of the Different Perspectives of Physician and 
Patient Philosophy and Medicine series (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992); 
Richard M. Zaner, Ethics and the Clinical Encounter (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1988); Richard M. Zaner, Troubled Voices: Stories of Ethics and Illness (Cleveland, 
OH: Pilgrim Press, 1993). 
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 Another implication of this understanding of responsibility for bioethics 
scholarship is its interrogation of the principle of respect for autonomy.  Respect for 
autonomy is one of the cornerstones of the principled approach to bioethics, as 
exemplified in the classic Principles of Biomedical Ethics.42  For example, a search for 
“autonomy” in the PubMed database produces over 27,000 results.43  Despite its 
prevalence, what “respect for autonomy” entails is not a settled affair even among its 
advocates, though as its Greek roots indicate, autonomy is broadly a matter of a moral 
agent’s self-legislating capacity, that is, the ability of the agent to make decisions for 
herself.  As Beauchamp and Childress state, “To respect an autonomous agent is, at a 
minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views, to make choices, and to take 
actions based upon personal values and beliefs.”44  Advocates of autonomy’s central 
place in bioethics rightly argue that critics wrongly attack an “oversimplified, 
overextended, overweighted principle of respect for autonomy” rather than acknowledge 
that autonomy is both limited and limiting.45   
Childress and company are no doubt correct in their assessment that autonomy is 
a cornerstone of bioethics analysis; many ethical challenges are a matter decision 
                                                
42 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
43 PubMed.gov database, U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of 
Health. 2 March 2010.  Keyword: Autonomy.  Available online: 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez>. 
 
44 Beauchamp and Childress, 63. 
 
45 James F. Childress, "The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics," The Hastings Center 
Report 20, no. 1 (1990), 12-17; quote on 12.  For another defense of the principle of 
respect for autonomy, see James F. Childress and John C. Fletcher, "Respect for 
Autonomy," Hastings Center Report 24, no. 3 (1994), 34-35. 
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making.  Moral agents must make choices and typically seek to make those choices in 
light of their own values and commitments.  Being able to have some form of control 
over the circumstances of one’s life is a profoundly important endeavor, and by no means 
should critiques of autonomy ignore the value of being able to exert this self-control.  
However, as I have indicated throughout this dissertation, autonomy and self-control 
have their limitations.  No one individual is the sole author of her life—her story is 
indelibly intertwined with and shaped by the stories of others.  Because we are never the 
sole authors of our lives, we are not always in control of some of the twists and turns that 
occur.  No one willingly and autonomously chooses to have Huntington’s disease—such 
events are beyond our control.  In treating autonomy as the end-all, be-all principle of 
bioethics analysis, one runs the risk of reducing that analysis to the discovery of 
empirically verifiable facts that contribute to the moral agent’s decision-making in a 
given context.  But the moral life, particularly when dealing with issues of medicine and 
health, is more than decision-making and fact gathering.  Again, this does not mean that 
respect for autonomy should be discarded, but rather that the individual moral agent who 
makes decisions should not always set the standard for bioethics analysis.46 
 Margaret Farley echoes similar statements in her book, Compassionate Respect.  
She states, “It begins to be clear that the requirements for right and true caring are 
                                                
46 In an edited collection of essays, MacKenzie and Stoljar develop the notion of 
“relational autonomy” in order to reassess autonomy in light of some of these very 
concerns.  From this perspective, to think of autonomy as a relational matter is to 
consider the numerous and dynamic influences that condition the possibilities of 
someone’s ability to make choices.  In other words, relational autonomy directs one to 
analyze the contextual factors that render some choices possible while limiting other 
possibilities.  See Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
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determined by the concrete reality of those for whom we care” as well as the relationship 
between the care-giver and the other.47  Farley’s work gives voice to a theme of this 
dissertation, namely, that the language of autonomy is insufficient by itself for addressing 
many of the challenges of bioethics.  She views bioethics as torn between two polarizing 
values and approaches: an ethic of care (following the work of Carol Gilligan) and a 
strident emphasis on patient autonomy.  She argues that a strict focus on autonomy leads 
to what Pincoffs described as “quandary ethics”; structural issues fall by the wayside with 
this approach.  This focus on autonomy, particularly as I have described it throughout this 
dissertation, also has negative consequences on an individual level.  Farley asserts, 
“When autonomy is narrowly construed in terms of total self-reliance, personal 
preference and self-assertion, it can compound the burdens of frailty and sickness that are 
experienced in varying and often increasing degrees.”48  At the same time, an ethic of 
care (as exemplified in the work of Carol Gilligan), if unchecked, runs the risk of 
developing into strong paternalism within the context of the clinic.49  Her position of 
“compassionate respect” seeks to integrate an ethic of care, with its emphasis on 
relationality as fundamental to being, with respect for autonomy, which must also be 
upheld so that people can exercise their capacities for self-creation.  Neither relationship-
oriented care nor individual autonomy is sufficient grounds for grappling with challenges 
in bioethics.  Both are necessary and must be integrated: “We are who we are not only 
                                                
47 Margaret A. Farley, Compassionate Respect: A Feminist Approach to Medical Ethics 
and Other Questions, Madeleva Lecture in Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2002), 
34. 
 
48 Ibid., 29. 
 
49 Ibid., 29-32. 
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because we can to some degree make ourselves to be so by our freedom but because we 
are transcendent of ourselves through our capacities to know and to love.”50 
 The vision of responsibility I advocate has strong implications for bioethics 
analysis.  By construing responsibility as a matter of status and integrity, we are called to 
recognize that the moral life is a constant but never-fully-achieved movement toward 
greater self-understanding.  We also acknowledge a significant degree of uncertainty and 
un-control at the heart of our very being and must appreciate the struggles that attend to 
seeking to live a life consistent with that always-limited self-understanding.  With this 
basic framework in mind, the challenges of bioethics may sometimes be construed in 
language other than the language of free, autonomous decision-making.  Medical abilities 
and technologies—organ transplantation, extended life support, abortion, predictive 
genetic testing, and PGD to name a few—present moral agents with the reality of 
uncertainty and un-control in one’s very being.  They challenge us to reflect on who we 
are and who we hope to be, not merely on what decisions are best.  And yet amid those 
challenges, the uncertainty, and un-control that are present, we see that responsibility 
remains.  Moral agents must live their lives in the midst of circumstances and events that 
they did not choose and over which they have no control.  Despite that lack of choice and 
control, they still strive to live a life of self-discovery and meaning; identifying and 
claiming responsibilities is a significant part of that on-going process. 
 If my assessment is correct, if the struggles of the moral life are frequently 
understood as struggles of dealing with unchosen responsibilities and the always-
unfulfilled movement toward greater integrity and self-understanding, then bioethics 
                                                
50 Ibid., 37. 
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analysis will require a basic reorientation if it is to address those challenges.  Bioethicists 
should certainly continue to collect empirically verifiable data related to matters like 
predictive genetic testing and PGD, but they must also recognize that there are limits to 
how that data relates to individual cases.  Bioethicists can analyze a given set of issues 
with all the data they can muster, but if bioethics analysis is to benefit the people who 
actually face the challenges of predictive genetic testing and PGD (or any other bioethics 
issue), they must approach those moments with an attitude of humility.  Bioethics should 
recognize the limits of fact gathering and acknowledge the influence of unique values, 
commitments, and attitudes of each moral agent involved.  Thus, it must humbly listen to 
their stories, how they describe their struggles, how they speak about their 
responsibilities, and how they find meaning amid moral distress.  Bioethicists cannot 
assume that our ready-made principles like autonomy are applicable in a specific context, 
nor can we assume that they understand what autonomy or responsibility means for a 
unique individual.  Above all, bioethicists should acknowledge that the moral life is more 
than just a movement from one decision-point to the next—it is also a constant movement 
toward greater self-understanding and integrity.  Bioethics has done a remarkable job in 
helping people make decisions, but it should recognize that decision-making and 
rendering judgments are only part of bioethics’ tasks. 
 On this point, I would point to the importance of scholars of religion for the 
emerging field of bioethics.  In a significant way, this would be a return to the roots of 
bioethics, as many of its pioneers were scholars of religion—Paul Ramsey, John C. and 
Joseph Fletcher, and Albert Jonsen, to name a few.  It is the theological ethicist William 
Schweiker’s work on responsibility that most forcefully brings forth matters of integrity, 
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and Margaret Farley has likewise provided a significant contribution to the work of 
bioethics in her work on compassionate respect.  Though bioethics fervently needs 
physicians, nurses, counselors, legal scholars, sociologists, philosophers, and members of 
other disciplines in its field, those of us who study in religion have great resources at our 
disposal to analyze those instances of moral distress that arise in the clinic.  In the study 
of religion, we regularly deal with questions of uncertainty, identity, integrity, 
commitment, and that which cannot be named or exhausted.  As I have tried to 
demonstrate in this project, those questions are not left at the door when a person enters 
the clinic.  In fact, they often bubble up in this very context.  It is imperative that we 
acknowledge their presence and continue to draw on those resources available in the 
study of religion so that we can assist those individuals who struggle with those questions 
of integrity and identity in the context of the clinic. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I spelled out some implications of the vision of responsibility that I 
endorsed in the previous chapter, particularly in reference to predictive genetic testing 
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  I also demonstrated how an understanding 
of responsibility grounded in notions of status and integrity provides constructive 
critiques to medical practice and to the burgeoning field of bioethics.  A key theme 
running throughout this analysis is the necessity of acknowledging the limits of human 
self-control, self-knowledge, and the very limits of selfhood.  I argued that predictive 
genetic testing and PGD represent attempts to exert dominion in areas previously 
resigned to the language of “fate.”  I also argued that while fact-gathering is paramount 
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for both medical practice and bioethics, the collection of data cannot always provide a 
full picture of what causes moral distress for agents who find themselves wrestling with 
medical or health-related issues. 
 I broadly classified the ethical challenges posed by predictive genetic testing as 
challenges of uncertainty, interpretation, and information.  I argued that predictive 
genetic testing rarely affords the degree of certainty that it is portrayed as providing in 
much of popular discourse.  Because predictive genetic testing is based on population-
based data, it typically provides patients/clients with percentages, probabilities, or other 
statistics that tell the patient/client about the population of people who share the genetic 
markers in question.  If, for example, a test indicates that a specific patient has a 65% 
chance of developing a certain form of breast cancer, the test cannot reveal if the patient 
is part of the 65% of people who develop the cancer or part of the 35% who do not.  
Given the degree of inherent uncertainty involved in predictive genetic testing, I advocate 
an attitude of humility on the part of those who would use those tests, recognizing the 
limits of the information they can actually provide. 
 With respect to PGD, I again pointed out that genetics are only one factor among 
many that shape an individual’s future status.  Drawing on Michael Sandel’s notion of 
giftedness, I argued that PGD represents an attempt by the modern, autonomous moral 
agent to exert her dominion over yet another realm of human existence.  In doing so, we 
devalue the giftedness of our very being, as well as the gifts that our children provide.   
Reiterating a point made in the discussion of predictive genetic testing, I also noted that 
PGD cannot provide the level of certainty and control that people who use it may seek; 
there is an inherent variability and unpredictability to human existence that cannot be 
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quashed by technological innovation.  Moving to public policy discussions, I then noted 
that PGD’s use has large and serious implications for what we considered to be 
“disabled” states of being.  Using PGD to select against certain disabled states (like 
deafness) further stigmatizes an already ostracized community.  Admittedly, the vision of 
responsibility I endorse provides little guidance for public policy discussions on what 
constitutes “responsible” or acceptable uses of PGD.  With that understanding of 
responsibility in mind, however, I maintain that any large-scale discussions must include 
the voices of those whose lives are most directly impacted by PGD’s use.  
 By emphasizing that level of uncertainty and unknowability that remains at the 
heart of human existence, I suggested that my understanding of responsibility has 
implications for the way medicine is practiced, specifically in relation to the “new 
paradigm” of evidence-based medicine (EBM).  I argued that because EBM’s data is 
based on sound epidemiological research, it too has its limits for what it can reveal about 
specific patients.  Echoing the problems of predictive genetic testing, I showed that 
although EBM can provide wonderful information for patients, there again remains an 
underappreciated degree of uncertainty that must be acknowledged on the clinician-
patient level.  Yet despite that uncertainty, I maintain, responsibility remains for clinician 
and patient alike.  Clinicians have a responsibility to inform their patients about those 
limits and to help patients better understand the often-complicated statistics with which 
they are presented.  Likewise, patients ought not give up on their futures when presented 
with uncertain outcomes.  We must continue to live our lives in the face of uncertainty. 
 Finally, I drew out some large-scale implications of my work for the field of 
bioethics.  By focusing on status and integrity as crucial components of responsibility, I 
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claim that bioethics should incorporate a “bottom-up” approach to its work rather than 
relying on the “top-down” principlism that dominates much of bioethics discourse.  To 
understand how one’s status and one’s drive to live a life of integrity inform their moral 
life, we must speak to those moral agents.  We cannot assume that moral distress is the 
result of conflicting principles or struggles with decision-making.  Bioethicists must 
listen to moral agents describing their hopes and fears if our work is to have any real 
impact on their lives.  Along these lines, I claim that autonomy should continue to be a 
foundational principle of bioethics analysis, but we should be cognizant of the limits of 
that self-legislating capacity.  Here, my work resonates with phenomenological and 
feminist scholars in bioethics, scholars whose contributions are underappreciated in this 
relatively new field.  When we as bioethicists open ourselves to these voices and to the 
voices of the people who struggle with the challenges posed by technologies like 
predictive genetic testing and PGD, we will begin to make great strides toward 
responsible scholarship that can have a real impact on the lives of moral agents struggling 
to find their way in the midst of uncertainty.
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY SAMPLES1 
 
 
 
Prenatal Diagnosis 
 
 A 40-year old woman, Debbie, mother of two teenagers, is 16-weeks pregnant, her 
first time without the use of fertility treatments and a surprise.  She has been referred for 
a high resolution ultrasound and a test for abnormalities in the fetus.  Before undergoing 
ultrasound or other tests, she receives genetic counseling.  The genetic counselor finds no 
factors that would increase existing risk assessments.  She tells  Debbie that every 
pregnancy has a 3-4%  risk for birth defects, that Debbie has an age-related risk of 1/106 
for giving birth to a child with Down Syndrome and 1/66 risk for giving birth to child with 
medical problems caused by abnormal chromosomes.  The genetic counselor tells the 
patient that Down syndrome and a number of other conditions can be detected within a 
couple of weeks using a technique called amniocentesis.  The genetic counselor explains 
the process of amniocentesis including that it carries a 1/200 risk for miscarriage.  
  The patient expresses concern over putting the baby at risk and her willingness to 
consider abortion if the baby has Down syndrome.  She does not want to leave her other 
children the responsibility of care giving when she dies.  The genetic counselor helps 
Debbie identify her options and possible outcomes. The patient asks what is the chance 
of getting pregnant at 40 and then says this baby is a miraculous gift.  She indicates that 
God’s will would be involved in any outcome adding that it would be God’s will if she 
gave birth to child with Down syndrome and it would be God’s will if she underwent 
amniocentesis and a miscarriage resulted.  She decides not to make a decision about the 
amniocentesis until she has the ultrasound results.  
 
Predictive Testing 
 
 Jeff, a 35-year-old father of two young children, watched his mother go through 
Huntington disease, a disorder that usually starts in middle age and progressively gets 
worse affecting moods, judgment, memory and movement.  He saw his mother decline 
through the years as her disease progressed from occasional falls to incidents where his 
mother, a once even-tempered woman, cursed at the grocery clerk.  He grew up being 
frightened and embarrassed and living with the frustration of not being able to help his 
mother whose eyes seemed trapped in a body not her own as her movements and 
                                                
1 Originally developed by multiple members of the Religion and Genetics study group, 
Vanderbilt University.  Used for focus group discussions, Spring 2007. 
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personality grew foreign.  Jeff recently buried his mother who spent years in a nursing 
home that he eventually stopped visiting.   
As the child of a parent affected by Huntington disease, Jeff has a 50% chance of 
being affected with the same condition.  He has only recently understood this risk and has 
begun thinking about undergoing genetic testing.  He knows that symptoms could begin in 
the next several years, a time that he imagines being able to enjoy sports and the outdoors 
with his wife and two kids. Genetic testing, a process which includes psychological as 
well as genetic counseling, would allow him to answer a question he has repeatedly asked 
and avoided, “Will this happen to me?”   
 Jeff has always been a planner and has promised himself that he would not take 
loved ones down the same path as he went with his mother. As he imagines being 
diagnosed with the disease, he confronts suicide as a viable option and yet the thought of 
forgoing the remaining years with his family is unbearable.  Although he had attended 
church regularly, his attendance has dropped as he struggles to worship a God who would 
allow this cycle of suffering to continue.  
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